












Honor Thy Father and Mother: 























Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree  
of Doctor of Philosophy  















































© 2013  
Tamara Mann 




Honor Thy Father and Mother: 
Defining and Solving the Problem of Old Age in the United States, 1945-1961 
 Tamara Mann  
 
 In the twentieth century, Americans got old. The average lifespan grew from 
forty-eight to seventy-eight years of age and new policy questions and ethical challenges 
accompanied this demographic transition. How should old age be defined? Who would 
care for the nation’s elders? What should older Americans give back to their communities 
and what should they expect from their government?  Where would the infirm elderly 
live? Where would they die? This project returns to the middle of the twentieth century 
when experts within universities, foundations, social welfare organizations, and the 
federal government took on these questions and sought lasting solutions to the mounting 
problem of old age. More specifically, Honor Thy Father and Mother investigates how 
“old age” came to be defined as a social problem worthy of federal attention in the 1950s 
and how that federal attention shaped a national discussion on the nature and needs of the 
elderly.  
 From the 1930s to the 1950s, the definition and problems of old age were in flux. 
Scientists, social workers, policy makers, doctors, and religious leaders challenged the 
viability of chronology as a medical and political marker of old age and questioned the 
wisdom of seeking longevity over a purposeful and dignified end. Their perspectives, 
while present in scientific, medical, and political discourse, did not translate into broad, 
well-funded federal programs. In their stead, the government threw its financial and 
administrative weight behind what I call the Medical Security Solution: initiatives such as 
bio-medical research and Medicare, which sought to cure the diseases of old age and 
relieve financial insecurity by covering the health care costs of social security recipients.  
 Honor Thy Father and Mother explores how the Medical Security Solution 
captured the attention of policy makers, activists for the aged, and senior citizens in the 
middle of the twentieth century and what ideas were lost in this process. This project 
offers a needed history of the assumptions that continue to frame, and limit, public 
discussions on care for the elderly. 
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This dissertation is dedicated to my parents,  
Sharyn and Stephen Mann  
 
 In my grandparents’ living room, in the months between and after their deaths, I 
began to articulate this dissertation. I did so with the help of my parents Sharyn and 
Stephen Mann, my uncle, Ira Wolff, my cousin, Erica Wolff, my brother, Joseph Mann, 
and my husband, Benjamin Tweel. While I had no idea where a project on aging in 
America would take me, I always knew where it began—in a house filled with relatives 
trying to care for their elders.  
 From the moment I embarked on this project, I have had the unfailing support of 
my advisors. Since I first arrived at Columbia, Casey Blake has been so much more than 
just an intellectual mentor. It is due to his example and help that I became a teacher in my 
own right, learned how to advise students, and articulated a way to be a scholar engaged 
with and beholden to the community around me. Working with him on the Freedom and 
Citizenship program has been one of the great privileges of my graduate education. I feel 
profoundly lucky to have a mentor who always takes an equal interest in my intellectual, 
moral, and familial growth. This dissertation, and my professional aspirations are due, in 
no small part, to his friendship.  
 I was not supposed to enroll in Ira Katznelson’s yearlong course on 20th century 
American politics; I was supposed to be studying for my orals. Thankfully, neither he nor 
I were deterred by my pending exams. Professor Katznelson and his remarkable course 
! "#!
changed my academic interests and my career—I felt not only intellectually at home, but 
profoundly challenged. The questions, or might I say “puzzles,” posed in that room 
remain the preoccupations I still gladly carry with me. It has been a gift to conceptualize 
and write this dissertation under his able influence.   
 I appeared at Professor Stanley Katz’s office in Princeton eager to talk about 
philanthropic history. He had no reason to let me in, but, of course, he did. And because 
no good deed goes unpunished, he had to follow that visit up with numerous trips to New 
York to sit on my orals exams and dissertation defense. I have always been so very 
touched by the energy he has put into my education and professional growth. Professor 
Katz has the uncanny ability to fully understand the ethical and personal stakes of my 
research. His comments put me back on the right course and remind me that my work can 
and should resonate with those currently crafting policy. I am grateful for the depth of his 
kindness and generosity.  
 At every stage of my intellectual career at Columbia, Professor Betsy Blackmar 
has guided me. From our first year historiography class, where I wanted to write about 
culture, to the following year, where I decided I was really going to write about legal 
history, to the year after that where it would be about philanthropy, to the day I walked 
into her office with a dissertation proposal about aging – she has not only given me 
support but has given me the patience and precision of her magnificent mind. I have 
never encountered a thinker like her. She sees the large and the small, the context and the 
exception. She knows how to frame an argument, and how to lead you through the 
stickier points of intellectual conception. I am so very grateful for the time she took with 
me and have learned so much about how to read, to write, and to think from her example. 
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I only hope to be as devoted a reader and mentor to my own students as she has been to 
me.  
 In the closing months of this multi-year project, three scholars came to my aid. 
Keith Wailoo, who had just taken on a new position as vice dean of the Woodrow Wilson 
School of Public and International Affairs, not only took time to read my dissertation and 
sit on my defense, but he also sent me detailed typed advice on how to improve the work. 
I am awed by the care he put into my project and his intellectual generosity. Alice 
Kessler-Harris met with me on multiple occasions, took the time to read my dissertation, 
and has given me crucial guidance on how to conceptualize the project. Susan Hartman 
also read the entirety of the dissertation and offered me much needed council and 
mentorship.  
 Columbia not only gave me extraordinary mentors, but inspiring peers. In my first 
year of graduate school, I had the intimidating distinction of having Thai Jones, the only 
graduate student who had already published a book, assigned to read my written work. If 
I can write at all, it is because of Thai. He not only spent endless hours walking me 
through the ways in which I could improve my prose but inspired me to enjoy crafting a 
narrative. He introduced me to other writers, set me up with a journalism course, and 
helped me get my work published. I am so very grateful for his friendship and guidance. 
Victoria Phillips, Melissa Borja, and Jessica Adler’s friendships sustained me throughout 
graduate school. They are extraordinary scholars, caring mothers, and are brimming with 
just the right amount of irony to get me through any situation. It has been one of the great 
gifts of this project that Jessica and I are now engaged in some of the same fundamental 
questions about healthcare and policy. She has spent endless hours helping me work 
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through this dissertation and I so look forward to our shared endeavors. Joanna Dee Das, 
whom I met later in graduate school, has also read and given feedback on almost every 
chapter of this dissertation. She is a gifted thinker and I know how much this project has 
benefited from her advice.  
 This dissertation received generous funding from the Doris G. Quinn Foundation, 
the Institute of Political History, the Dirksen Congressional Center, the Howard and 
Natalie Shawn family, the American Historical Association, the Rockefeller Archive 
Center, Columbia University, and the Center for Historical Research at The Ohio State 
University. I am grateful to the historians at Ohio State, John Brooke, Nicholas 
Breyfogle, Christopher Otter, and John Burnham, who not only helped fund the final 
years of dissertation writing, but contributed to this project by giving me office space, 
constant feedback on my chapters, and a welcoming intellectual community. This project 
also benefitted from the kindness of librarians at the National Archives in College Park, 
the Bentley Historical Library at the University of Michigan, the Bernard Becker Medical 
Library at the University of Washington, the!Reuther Library at Wayne State University, 
the Elmer L. Andersen Library at the University of Minnesota, the Phillips Memorial 
Library at Providence College, the Rockefeller Archive Center, the Wisconsin Historical 
Society, the Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, the Yale University Library, and the 
Columbia University Libraries.  
 For the past fourteen years, my husband has read every word I have written. No 
matter how exhausted he is, how many hours he has worked, or how much he just wants 
to retreat and play music, he sits down with a pen to edit my pages. I am consistently 
touched by how much he values and respects what I do. He gives quietly, constantly, and 
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without restraint. This dissertation is due as much to his good husbanding as his 
exceptional parenting skills. I feel blessed for his company, his love, and his partnership. 
Since the day I started writing a dissertation about old age, many of my hours have been 
magically spent nurturing new life. I started the dissertation the month my daughter, Mia 
Aviva, was born and completed it in the days leading up to my son Louis Jacob’s birth. In 
my daughter’s words, “I just love you so.” 
 This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Stephen and Sharyn Mann. My 
father, through a bludgeoning technique he likes to call conversation, taught me how to 
think. More than a teacher, he has always been my intellectual sparring partner. He takes 
on every subject I have ever been interested in, from Jewish philosophy to avant-garde 
performance art to cultural property law, and makes sure that I capably approach a topic 
from every perspective. His mind, so quick, agile, and capacious, is matched by 
compassion and tenderness. I am endlessly grateful to him and know that any intellectual 
success I have is due to his vigilance and support. 
 I would never have written this dissertation without the intimidating example of 
my mother. She built her own life to honor and enrich the lives of her parents. Although 
she never made it seem like a sacrifice, I am in awe of her devotion. In a culture that 
often glorifies independence, she is a woman who embraces obligations. By so honoring 
my grandparents, she gave my entire extended family a center of gravity.  
 As I wrote the chapters of this dissertation, I thought often of my mother. I 
imagined her hovering around the white kitchen table at 41 Old Field Lane, making sure 
my grandfather got the crunchy end of the bread, that my Nana received a piping hot cup 
of instant decaf coffee, that their medicines were properly laid out, and that there was 
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enough food in their fridge so that they could have the pride of feeding the family. Thank 
you for showing me how complicated, how important, how challenging, how enriching, 












A Significant Old Age 
“I know what it is I am now experiencing.  
I know what the frailty is, I know what the fear is.  
The fear is not for what is lost. 
What is lost is already behind the locked doors. 
The fear is for what is still to be lost.” 
    —Joan Didion1 
 
 “Aging,” my grandmother liked to remark, “is not for sissies.”2 Well into her 
eighties, this regal woman had weathered the loss of friends, parents, siblings, aspects of 
her mobility, eyesight, and hearing. She spent decades fighting for her husband’s life only 
to fight again for the right to usher him towards a peaceful death. She suffered from 
numerous chronic diseases, the most debilitating of which was emphysema, and fretted 
constantly about how she and her family would continue to provide for her basic needs. 
My grandmother compensated for these challenges with structured garments, elegant 
scarves, family obligations, and an unparalleled wit. More than anyone, she seemed 
perplexed by her own longevity, aware of its extraordinary blessings and very real 
burdens. My grandmother was hardly alone. Throughout the twentieth century, the 
average American lifespan increased from forty-eight to seventy-eight years of age. By 
2030, experts predict that 20% of the U.S. population will be over sixty-five.3 And once 
citizens reach the ripe age of sixty-five, they can expect to live into or past their eighties.4 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Joan Didion, Blue Nights (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011), 188. 
2 It has recently come to my attention that the great Bette Davis had a similar saying, “Old age is no place 
for sissies.” Bette Davis, the official site, http://www.bettedavis.com/about/quotes.html. 
3 Harry R. Moody and Jennifer R. Sasser, Aging: Concepts and Controversies, 7th ed. (Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications, 2012), xxiii. 
4 See The Official Site of the U.S. Social Security Administration, 
http://www.ssa.gov/planners/lifeexpectancy.htm. 
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Americans are living longer, dwelling in a stage of life marked as much by the addition 
of years as by the fear, anxiety, and uncertainty of loss.  
 Honor Thy Father and Mother explores the ethical debates and policy solutions 
triggered by this demographic transition. Accompanying the rise of old age in the 
twentieth century, in itself a remarkable achievement of public health innovations, were 
new challenges and questions. How should old age be defined? Who would care for the 
nation’s elders? What should older Americans give back to their communities and what 
should they expect from their government? Where will the infirm elderly live? Where 
will they die? This project returns to the middle of the twentieth century when scientists, 
social workers, academics, foundations, and the federal government took on these 
questions and sought lasting solutions to the mounting problem of old age.  
 More specifically, this dissertation investigates how “old age” came to be defined 
as a social problem worthy of federal attention in the 1950s and how that federal attention 
shaped a national discussion on the nature and needs of the elderly. From the middle of 
the 1930s to the middle of the 1950s, the definition and problems of old age were in flux. 
Scientists questioned whether old age was reversible, while urban and rural Americans 
pondered whether it was something to strive for or to avoid. The hardships that plagued 
this ever-elongating stage of life forced Americans to think about the elderly as a distinct 
social group and aging as a social problem. While policy makers and social scientists 
sought to define the problem of old age in the concrete terms of poverty and disease, 
social workers, intellectuals, and religious leaders believed the elderly required more than 
mere financial or physical security. These thinkers argued that the social and spiritual 
health of the aged mattered and that such well-being was fully contingent on maintaining 
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a respected position within the larger society. “Old age,” wrote Rabbi Abraham Joshua 
Heschel, “is an age of anguish. The only answer to the age of anguish is a sense of 
significant being.”5  
 By 1961, the definition, the problem, and the solution to old age at the federal 
level had crystallized. Gone were the multifaceted definitions of aging and its attendant 
problems. In their stead, congressmen and policymakers came to agree that old age could 
be defined chronologically at the age of sixty-five and that the essential, and treatable, 
problem for citizens over sixty-five was poverty due to health failure. This intellectual 
consolidation had the added effect of reducing the elderly into a monolithic bloc, 
undifferentiated by race, class, gender, or region.  
 A conversation formerly centered on the ethics of care became one centered on 
the feasibility of a solution. To solve the problem of old age, Congress funded scientists 
to research chronic disease through the National Institutes of Health and, with ample 
public pressure, offered numerous bills to give social security recipients hospital 
insurance. Such forms of federal policy making, which I refer to as the Medical Security 
Solution, influenced and constrained the way in which the problems of old age came be 
articulated in senior centers, universities, and professional training programs. How, and 
why, in the 1950s the debate over the multiple problems of old age narrowed at the level 
of national policy making to the Medical Security Solution is the historical puzzle this 
dissertation sets out to solve.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel, “The Older Person and the Family in the Perspective of Jewish 
Tradition, ” in Aging with a Future: A Selection of Papers Defining Goals and Responsibilities for the 
Current Decade; Reports and Guidelines from the White House Conference on Aging (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Special Staff on Aging, 1961), 42.   
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 By focusing on the ascendency of a policy agenda, the dissertation follows in the 
tradition of scholars like Jacob Hacker and Margaret Weir, who have drawn on the 
extensive literature on agenda setting to craft historical narratives that plot the rise of 
policy ideas.6 But more than asking how the Medical Security Solution came to dominate 
policy conversation, this dissertation asks the equally critical question of what was lost in 
the process. What ideas circulated in Washington, D.C., in the 1940s and 1950s but never 
received the same kind of attention? Why did these ideas fail to gain ground and what are 
the repercussions of this loss?  
 By many measures, the Medical Security Solution was successful. Medicare and 
repeated amendments to the Social Security Act lifted numerous elderly out of real or 
imminent poverty and funding for medical research and hospitals offered Americans the 
chance to live better with formerly crippling chronic diseases. There were and continue to 
be predictable and unpredictable consequences of these policy accomplishments.  
 The singular drive to cure or to solve old age overlooked the very nature of aging 
itself—that it remains irreversible. Despite every scientific advance, human beings age 
and die. By establishing age-based policies that have added years to the American 
lifespan, subsidized institutional care, bolstered hospital care, and arguably fostered the 
growth of the senior citizens lobby, the Medical Security Solution exacerbated many of 
the hardships first described in the middle of the twentieth century. The material 
challenges of long-term housing, disability, disease, and unemployment persist. As do the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Margaret Weir, Politics and Jobs: The Boundaries of Employment Policy in the United States (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), xiii; Jacob S. Hacker, The Road to Nowhere: The Genesis of President 
Clinton's Plan for Health Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
 For more literature on agenda setting see John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public 
Policies (New York: Longman, 2003); Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability 
in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); and William H. Riker, Agenda 
Formation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993). 
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existential agonies of uselessness, isolation, and an undignified death. Financial 
incentives to institutionalize the elderly remain entrenched in federal policies, and the 
creation of age-based entitlements and subsequent age-based interest groups, continue to 
exacerbate intergenerational tensions.  
 “One father,” uttered Heschel to a rapt audience in 1961, “finds it possible to 
sustain a dozen children, yet a dozen children find it impossible to sustain one father.”7 
Caring for the aged, Heschel knew, would always be a personal and communal challenge. 
In the middle of the twentieth century the United States government took up that 
challenge. And now, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, it is crucial to think 
through the contours of this relationship. What assumptions have guided major federal 
policies on the elderly? What assumptions that are no longer consonant with current ideas 
on aging continue to inform policymaking? Are there other policy paths that would better 
serve current and future needs?  
 By returning to the ethical debates, value-driven conversations, and openness to 
the reality of aging and death that dominated policy conversations in the 1950s, Honor 
Thy Father and Mother aims to recast and animate a political discourse that is too often 







7 Abraham Joshua Heschel, “To Grow in Wisdom,” in Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Insecurity of 
Freedom: Essays on Human Existence (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1966), 70. 
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Background and Methodology 
 In the 1920s, charity workers, political activists, labor organizers, doctors, and 
writers awoke to the mental and physical needs of the aged poor.8 The corresponding 
developments of industrialization and urbanization left many aged without job prospects 
or nearby extended families at the time of the Great Depression.9 The informal network 
of state- and religious-run charities and poorhouses failed in the face of the mass-
unemployment and destitution that disproportionately afflicted a growing number of 
individuals over forty. For the first time, the plight of dependent elders warranted 
national attention. 
 Within the decade, spokesmen across the United States pressed the government to 
enact pension programs. By the time President Roosevelt came into office, some thirty 
states had enacted pension programs, albeit unevenly; only 3% of those deemed aged 
were receiving state funds in 1935. The fight for pensions continued through the 1930s in 
the popular Townsend Old Age Revolving Pension Plan, Upton Sinclair’s End Poverty in 
California (EPIC) plan, and Robert Noble’s spurious Ham & Eggs movement. All of 
these groups argued that the government should give a stipend to those deemed too old to 
work, whether forty, fifty, or sixty-five.10 Both encouraging and mollifying these popular 
social movements was the growing interest in the European intellectual tradition of social 
insurance.11  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 W. Andrew Achenbaum, Shades of Gray: Old Age, American Values, and Federal Policies since 1920, 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1983); Henry J. Pratt, The Gray Lobby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1976). 
9 Carole Gratton and Brian Haber, Old Age and the Search for Security: An American Social History, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993).   
10 Pratt, The Gray Lobby. 
11 “Historical Background and Development of Social Security,” The Official Site of the U.S. Social 
Security Administration, http://www.ssa.gov/history/. 
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 At its base, the philosophy of social insurance, or the social welfare tradition, 
maintained that governments should provide some measure of economic security. First 
enacted in 1889 by Otto von Bismarck in Germany, social insurance programs spread 
quickly across Europe. American yearnings for such programs began with Theodore 
Roosevelt in 1912 and reached an apex during the Great Depression. In 1927, Abraham 
Epstein, a weathered state pension advocate announced, “It’s time for a group that will do 
nothing but work to create old-age pensions.”12 Mindful of the sullied public reputation 
of the word pension, Epstein titled his organization The American Association for Old 
Age Security, later to be renamed the American Association for Social Security. 
Epstein’s rebranding held.  
 In 1934, President Roosevelt issued an executive order to create the Committee 
on Economic Security with the goal of studying and solving the problem of economic 
insecurity in America. On August 14, 1935, the President signed into law the 
monumental Social Security Act. Through this act, writes historian Michael Katz, “old-
age security broke loose from its earlier association with poor-relief; forged ahead of 
every other kind of social insurance; and earned its privileged place as the only 
irreversible and untouchable welfare program in American history.”13 Explicitly designed 
as a financed earned right and not a charitable handout, the Social Security Act offered 
eligible elders “economic security with dignity.”14 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Pierre Epstein, Abraham Epstein: The Forgotten Father of Social Security (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 2006), 78. 
13 Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America (New York: 
Basic Books, 1986), 211.   
14 James Schulz and Robert Binstock, Aging Nation: The Economics and Politics of Growing Older in 
America (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2006), 55. 
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 In 1935, the aged—or “oldsters,” as they were then often called—were not 
exclusively defined chronologically. In fact, numerous doctors and scientists working in 
the 1930s pushed for a biological, rather than chronological definition of old age, 
claiming that physical markers and not simply the passing of years best defined old age. 
They looked at the correlations between poverty, chronic disease, family history, and 
psychology to determine that the onset of senescence or old age was relative rather than 
uniform. These early gerontologists believed that employment and usefulness would 
stave off the markers of old age. Still, they had little control over industry policies that 
pushed workers out of jobs at the early age of forty. Some factories even retired women 
at thirty-five.15  
 The Committee on Economic Security understood both the harsh economic reality 
of forced retirement and the absolute social necessity of keeping the young employed. 
The committee settled on sixty-five as the marker of old age for its economic feasibility. 
At the time, life expectancy at birth was fifty-eight. Taking their cues from existing state 
pension systems and the recently passed Railroad Retirement System, the committee 
recognized that sixty-five was a number that could be sustainably financed through 
payroll taxation. As historian Andrew Achenbaum writes, “As a result of the Social 
Security Act, old age—defined for administrative purposes as the attainment of age sixty-
five—for the first time became a criterion for participation in several important programs 
at the federal level.”16 The Social Security Act fundamentally changed the relationship 
between the government and its older citizens. From 1935 on, the U.S. federal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 See Chapter I. 
16 W. Andrew Achenbaum, Shades of Gray, 40. 
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government committed itself to the well-being of its unemployed elders, who hereby 
would be defined as individuals over sixty-five years of age. 
 By the 1940s, the pension movement of the 1920s and 1930s had largely 
collapsed. Having achieved the Social Security Act, popular participation in pension-
oriented groups diminished and political organizers focused attention elsewhere. The 
complete lack of political activity on behalf of the elderly led political historian Henry 
Pratt to label this period “the Dismal Years.”17 Then, just as the pension movement 
dribbled to a halt, the field of biomedical research exploded.  
 Science and war proved productive partners. The utilization of penicillin, skin 
grafts, and blood transfusions “enhanced public belief that scientific research offered an 
endless frontier on which a happier, healthier life could be built.”18 After the Second 
World War, Congress went to work, sponsoring a spate of legislation to update American 
health care. According to health policy expert Theodore Marmor, federal spending after 
WWII focused on three areas: “medical research, hospital construction, and federal health 
insurance programs.”19 In the 1940s, the government funded medical research through 
the National Institutes of Health and subsidized 25–30% of postwar hospital construction 
through the Hill-Burton Act (1946).20  
 While the federal government got into the bio-medical business, older Americans, 
responding to the unintended consequences of the Social Security Act, such as forced 
retirement, joined together in community halls and religious institutions to figure out 
where they stood in the postwar order. “By setting an arbitrary retirement age,” the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Pratt, The Gray Lobby. 
18 Victoria Angela Harden, Inventing the NIH: Federal Biomedical Research Policy, 1887–1937 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 
19 Theodore R. Marmor, The Politics of Medicare, 2nd ed., (New York: A. de Gruyter, 2000), xxiv. 
20 Ibid.  
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editors of The Senior Rights Movement argue, “the Social Security Act had inadvertently 
circumscribed the problems of persons over 65 as a distinct set of social problems. As 
such it provided a coherent basis for their solidarity and common identity and gave a 
newfound sense of legitimacy to elderly demands for social justice.”21 The demands of 
the elderly and their advocates in the 1940s remained case specific. While some groups 
required better housing, others requested reemployment programs, or basic social 
services. In 1950, this nascent group of politically conscious elderly collided with an 
energized bio-medical industry and fair-deal policy wonks at the first National 
Conference on Aging. 
 At the behest of the Federal Security Administration (the agency tasked with 
implementing the Social Security Act), a key group of old-age activists met in 
Washington, D.C., on August 13, 1950, for the first National Conference on Aging. Few 
conference attendees agreed on a definition of old age, but all were convinced that it had 
become a serious national problem. They sought multiple solutions to what they 
understood as a complex intersection of needs.22 Eleven years later, at the 1961 White 
House Conference on Aging, a majority consensus on the solution to the problem of old 
age emerged. Expansive conversations on the ethics of intergenerational obligations were 
quieted by advocates for a new kind of American—the senior citizen. By the close of the 
conference, a coalition defined the problem of old age as poverty caused by health failure 
and advocated for a single solution—the creation of Medicare.23 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Lawrence A. Powell, Kenneth Branco, and John B. Williamson, The Senior Rights Movement: Framing 
the Policy Debate in America (New York: Twayne, 1996), 133. 
22 U. S. Federal Security Agency, Man and His Years: An Account of the First National Conference on 
Aging (Raleigh: Health Publications Institute, 1951). 
23 The Nation and Its Older People: White House Conference on Aging (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, Special Staff on Aging, 1961). 
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 A confluence of factors led discrete actors to first narrow and then medicalize 
their definition of care. For one, society came to trust a booming biomedical industry. 
For this reason, funds dedicated to eldercare were often put into medical research and 
hospital growth. In the twenty years covered by this dissertation, the budget for the 
National Institutes of Health grew from 3 million to over 1.4 billion dollars, with chronic 
and end-of-life diseases being a primary focus of research. In addition, the failure to pass 
national health insurance after WWII spurred policymakers in the Truman administration 
to seek alternative solutions. Policymakers zeroed in on the elderly as a group that could 
serve as a catalyst toward universal health care. Subsequent Democratic administrations 
followed suit, pushing for Medicare alongside unions, nonprofit groups, and private 
businesses. The rise of special interest lobbies also helped provide a model for elder 
activists, who in the 1950s and early 1960s banded together to form such groups as the 
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), National Council of Senior Citizens 
(NCSC), National Association of Retired Federal Employees (NARFE), and the National 
Council on Aging (NCOA). Many of these organizations relied on timely political wins 
to shore up participation and funds. This occurred in tandem with the consolidation of 
industries with a significant financial investment in the elderly, such as pharmaceutical 
companies and nursing home providers.  
*** 
 This dissertation returns to the middle of the twentieth century, when discussion 
of the problems of old age remained expansive, the intellectual debates about solutions 
cut across disciplines, and the coalitions that successfully lobbied for Medicare were 
formed. What factors led a seemingly diverse set of parties invested in eldercare to 
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narrow both their definition of proper care and their political agenda? To provide an 
answer, Honor Thy Father and Mother focuses on actors deliberating on the problems of, 
and solutions to, old age in the federal government, nonprofit groups, universities, and 
lobbying organizations. The dissertation follows individuals, such as Oscar Ewing from 
the Federal Security Administration, Nelson Cruikshank of the AFL-CIO, and Ollie 
Randall from the Community Service Society and the National Council on Aging, while 
also closely plotting the dialogue that took place going into and coming out of the first 
National Conference on Aging (1950) and the first White House Conference on Aging 
(1961). In tandem, the personal papers of old age activists and federal archives from the 
Federal Security Administration reveal how various approaches to eldercare transformed 
through dialogue, outside political pressure, and policy viability.  
 The definition of old age evolved throughout the period covered by this 
dissertation. Driven as much by medical knowledge as political wrangling, the phrase 
itself requires careful historical treatment. To fully understand the medical perspective on 
the definition of old age and how it conflicts with and informs the larger policy 
conversation on care for the elderly, this project relies on the personal papers of early 
gerontologists, such as E. V. Cowdry, and such journals as Geriatrics (1946) and the 
Journal of Gerontology (1946).  
  Honor Thy Father and Mother begins in Chapter I with an analysis of how 
physicians and scientists conceptualized old age from the 1940s to the 1950s and 
concludes in Chapter V with the ascendency of the Medical Security Solution at the 1961 
White House Conference on Aging. The intervening chapters trace conflicting models of 
eldercare, the rise of vested private interests, and the feedback loop between federal 
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policies and normative descriptions of the elderly and their needs. Chapter II looks 
closely at the conflicting opinions on the problems and solutions to old age offered by the 
social worker Ollie Randall, the social scientist Clark Tibbitts, and the policymaker Oscar 
Ewing. Chapter III explores how doctors, scientists, religious leaders, and political 
operatives discussed the definitions, the problems, and the solutions to old age at the first 
National Conference on Aging. The penultimate chapter looks at the rise of the senior 
citizen and the relationship between Congressional action and senior group formation.  
 
Historiography 
 Old age has not proved a seductive topic for contemporary historians. Other 
stages of life, such as youth, tend to get more attention. In the past ten years historians 
and other humanities scholars have written only a handful of books and dissertations on 
the topic.24 The great majority of work on this subject has been conducted within the 
confines of social work, under the heading of gerontology, and medicine, in the field of 
geriatrics. This oversight is problematic. There are not enough researchers questioning 
the long relationship between policy and eldercare and little attention is given to how 
certain habits of interaction have evolved historically. In the end, crucial conversations on 
care for the elderly are conducted in a historical vacuum. In the 1970s and 1980s, the 
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24 Jason G. Roe, “From the Impoverished to the Entitled: The Experience and Meaning of Old Age in 
America since the 1950s” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas, 2012); Tony King Yang, “The Needs 
of a Lifetime: The Search for Security, 1865–1914” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 2009); 
Hyung Wook Park, “Refiguring Old Age: Shaping Scientific Sesearch on Senescence, 1900–1960” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Minnesota, 2009); Katherine Anne Otis, “Everything Old Is New Again: A 
Social and Cultural History of Life on the Retirement Frontier, 1950-–2000” (Ph.D., The University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2008); Erin Gentry Lamb, “The Age of Obsolescence: Senescence and 
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scholarly landscape looked different. Historians and social scientists took on the history 
of old age, publishing monumental books tracking the changing position of the elderly in 
society. In a political climate that degraded “old geezers” for robbing the state, these 
scholars created the field of old-age history.  
 The first works on the topic posed the question: when did the elderly lose their 
status in society? In books such as Aging and Modernization (1972), edited by Donald O. 
Cowgill and Lowell D. Holmes, the answer was what they termed modernization.25 These 
authors argued that with the onset of industrialization, American society took a sharp turn 
away from honoring the aged. Factory work rendered elderly workers economically 
useless, which in turn denigrated their social position in society. Five years later, David 
Hackett Fischer in Growing Old in America amended this theory.26 Rather than a sharp 
turn, Fischer claimed that a set of evolving ideas, which occurred before industrialization 
at the close of the 18th century, transformed the position of the elderly in American 
society. The new nation required a different set of religious and political beliefs that 
idealized the spirited energy of youth. From the country’s beginning, the aged—
especially widows–were a blighted afterthought. In 1978, W. Andrew Achenbaum in Old 
Age in the New Land: The American Experience since 1790, challenged Fischer’s 
periodization.27 Achenbaum claimed that despite changing intellectual ideals, the 
economic and professional position of the elderly was relatively stable until the Civil 
War. It was only after the Civil War that the aged increasingly came to be seen as a social 
problem due to a complex confluence of political, social, and economic factors. In these 
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25 Donald O. Cowgill and Lowell D. Holmes, Aging and Modernization (New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 1972). 
26 David Hackett Fischer, Growing Old in America, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977). 
27 W. Andrew Achenbaum, Old Age in the New Land: The American Experience since 1790 (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). 
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works, the authors overlook the flip side of their proposed question, that the elderly might 
have lost their status even as they retained their political prowess.  
 On the heels of Fischer and Achenbaum, Thomas R. Cole and Brian Gratton 
reframed the guiding historiographic question of the 1970s. Rather than focusing on the 
degenerating social position of the aged, Cole, in The Journey of Life: A Cultural History 
of Aging in America (1992), pondered the more elusive question of what it means to grow 
old.28 His work, which centered on social awareness and self-perceptions of aging, 
incorporated the changing scientific discussions of old age and depictions of the elderly 
in popular media. Cole observed the connection between old age and disease along with 
the relationship, documented by other scholars, between the declining position of the 
elderly and the idealization of individuality and youth. 
In Urban Elders: Family, Work, and Welfare among Boston’s Aged, 1890–1950 
(1986), Brian Gratton rejected both modernization theorists (like Cowgill and Holmes) 
and what he calls attitudinal theorists (like Fischer and Achenbaum).29 Gratton returned 
to the primacy of economic factors without positing a clean break from the days when 
people respected their elders and the days they stopped doing so. In place of a general 
study of old age, Gratton focused on a particular group of elders working in Boston 
during a sixty-year period. Attitudinal changes, Gratton argues, did not make the elderly 
dependent, government policies did. In his estimation, working class elders kept their 
jobs until policies mandated early retirement, which pushed the aged into a dependent 
position. While Gratton might put too much emphasis on a single cause, he rightly 
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28 Thomas R. Cole, The Journey of Life: A Cultural History of Aging in America (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992). 
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pursues the complexity of how, when, and why old age is defined as a social problem and 
the varied outcomes of federal solutions. 
All of the historians listed above focus on the position of the elderly in the 
decades before 1950. While many gesture to the complicated problems afflicting the 
elderly in the second half of the twentieth century, their primary research concludes 
where this dissertation begins. The scholarly work on seniors as a political interest group 
picks up where the literature on old age leaves off, interrogating the rise of the elderly as 
a political power.  
Running parallel to the history of old age as a physical and social phenomenon is 
the history of elderly political activism and the senior citizen. This scholarly tradition 
begins with agitation for state and later federal pensions from social groups in the first 
two decades of the twentieth century and often concludes with the creation of the Social 
Security Act in 1935.30 Distinct from the robust literature on the rise of pensions in the 
first half of the twentieth century, The Gray Lobby (1976) by Henry Pratt, Shades of 
Gray: Old Age, American Values, and Federal Policies Since 1920 (1983) by Andrew 
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 For more on the history of the grassroots pension movements of the 1920s and 1930s see Abraham 
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Achenbaum, and The Senior Rights Movement (1996) by coauthors Lawrence Powell, 
Kenneth Branco, and John Williamson, track the rise of multi-issue senior citizen 
political lobbying groups after 1930.31 These scholars draw a distinction between pension 
movements solely concerned with unemployment and the senior citizen movement that 
emerged in the 1960s.  
For Pratt, the major shift occurred when seniors (those over sixty-five) began to 
organize for themselves in the later 1950s and build sophisticated multi-issue 
organizations that could function without a single charismatic leader. Achenbaum follows 
Pratt’s general timeline but places the issue of values at the center of his work. Rather 
than a strict policy history, he traces how certain value debates, such as equity vs. 
adequacy or self-reliance vs. dependency, have dominated political discussions and 
policy outcomes. The essays in The Senior Rights Movement: Framing the Policy Debate 
in America analyze how political consolidation occurred, contributing to this scholarly 
lineage by crediting the labor-senior alliance. In tandem, these books, and others on the 
topic, trace the policy history of the senior-lobby and the creation of Medicare.32 For 
scholars of the pension movement, political agitation concludes with the creation of the 
Social Security Act. For scholars of the senior movement, political agitation begins in the 
late 1950s. This dissertation opens in the decade in between. It does so in order to look 
closely at how a set of ideas attracted the attention of policymakers before a significant 
senior movement developed around them.  
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In Old Age and the Search for Security: An American Social History (1993), 
Carole Haber and Brian Gratton offer a synthesis of aging scholarship from the 1970s to 
the 1990s.33 They break down the available research into four fields: the colonial period, 
the economic status of the elderly, work and retirement, and poor houses. This 
dissertation posits another category, the history of federal care for the elderly. This field, 
indebted to the extensive writings of Andrew Achenbaum, would pose, to name only a 
few, the following questions: How did the elderly become a social problem the federal 
government sought to solve? What solutions did the government offer and why? How did 
federal solutions alter the contours of the problem? Such a field would connect the rich 
literature on the history of old age and senior citizens with the extensive body of work on 
the development of the American welfare state.  
 In recent years, the literature on the American welfare state has emerged from its 
preoccupation with the relative size or strength of the state to an investigation of the 
diverse mechanism of American governance. In addition to looking at federal 
expenditures, scholars in this tradition have pursued, for example, the governing powers 
of public-private partnerships and the extensive tax code.34 Inspired by this scholarship, 
this dissertation focuses both on the more traditional welfare policy of Medicare and on 
the less traditionally studied mechanism of the National Institutes of Health. Scholarship 
on American health care and health insurance relies on and mirrors the history of the 
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American welfare state. It begins by asking why, when other Western and Northern 
European countries were developing national health insurance programs, the United 
States failed to do so.35 Current scholars are building on this body of work by describing 
the mechanisms of the American health care system and its peculiar reliance on private, 
non-state, actors.36  
 In addition to the scholarship on the tools of American welfare policy, historians 
and political scientists have worked tirelessly in the past two decades to describe the 
uneven nature of the American welfare state. They have highlighted the long-instantiated 
distinction between public assistance and social insurance and the way in which welfare 
policies favored white workingmen over women and minorities such as African 
Americans.37 Where public assistance, or means-tested relief programs such as Aid to 
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Families with Dependent Children, retained the stigma of dependency and poverty, social 
insurance, or entitlement programs, most famously Social Security, created standardized 
criteria and prepayment structures for a subset of working men that allowed them to feel 
deserving of the federal boon. This distinction in the organization of the welfare state 
bolstered socially and economically established racial and gender hierarchies. 
 In tandem this literature provides the groundwork for thinking through the 
creation of Medicare. Federal health insurance for the elderly expanded on the successful 
entitlement structure of the Social Security Act, bolstered private insurance, and arose as 
a response to the failure to implement national health insurance. My project relies heavily 
on the rich legislative and political history of Medicare produced by historians, political 
scientists, and sociologists, while highlighting the opinions of the aged and old-age 
activists in the years leading up to the legislation.38 In doing so this dissertation draws 
attention to how interested parties articulated the problem of old age before and after a 
major federal policy was crafted and offers a needed history of how a set of assumptions 
around care for the elderly came to dominate policy conversations in the 1950s. 
 Honor Thy Father and Mother seeks to enrich public and private discourse on 
eldercare by reviving the relevant debates that took place between the close of World 
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War II and the passage of Medicare. Fundamental questions such as what does proper 
care look like, what really are the hardships of old age, and who should be responsible for 
the nation’s elders dominated policy conversations in the 1950s and have since receded. 
This dissertation features these discussions to question how the contemporary eldercare 
system developed and to offer alternative conceptions of the problems and solutions to 
one of the major demographic upheavals of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  
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CHAPTER I  
Old Cells, Aging Bodies, and New Money:  
Scientific Solutions to a Social Problem, 1945-1953 
 
“Until the moment it is upon us, old age is something that only affects other people.”1 
         Simone de Beauvoir 
 
I: Introduction 
 On July 30, 1965, the 57-year-old President of the United States honored the 81-
year-old former President by traveling to Independence, Missouri to sign into law a bill 
that would give America’s elders federally funded health insurance. With the passage of 
Medicare, Harry Truman’s admittedly imperfect policy became Lyndon Johnson’s 
political windfall: Johnson could now claim to have solved the “problem of old age.”  
 The problem of old age started to attract public and political attention in the 
1930s, when the corresponding developments of industrialization, urbanization, and mass 
unemployment collided with the Depression, leaving many of the aged without jobs or 
support from their extended families. These forces affected a group whose numbers were 
on the rise. Advances in public health had transformed life expectancy in America: from 
1860 to 1930 the percentage of the American population over sixty-five had more than 
doubled. In ten years, from 1930 to 1940, there would be an additional 36.5 percent 
increase in this group, at a time when the entire population increased by only 7.2 
percent.2 The so-called problem of old age, which first appeared on the streets of 
American towns and cities, soon became the much-debated subject of social workers, 
academics, and politicians.  
 By 1965, the problem of old age seemed clear. Individuals became old at the age 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
1 Simone de Beauvoir, The Coming of Age (New York: Putnam, 1972), 5. 
2 Statistics compiled by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and quoted in E.V. Cowdry, "The New 
Public Health," The Scientific Monthly. 55, no. 4 (Oct. 1942): 355.  
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of sixty-five and lost their dignity when the costs of illness led to poverty. Medicare, 
then, was an ingenious solution: pay for healthcare for those over sixty-five and relieve 
both illness and poverty for the aged. Yet, in the 1930s and 1940s, scientists and doctors, 
who first confronted rising numbers of elders, came to a radically different definition of 
old age and its problems. They pushed for a biological definition of old age as well as a 
conceptual separation between disease and aging.  
 Led by the cytologist Edmund Vincent Cowdry, these scientists and doctors 
designed a field of inquiry with both a multi- and interdisciplinary bent—gerontology. 
They sought to investigate the basic mechanisms involved in aging life, from plants to 
humans, as well as the reasons behind desolation, poverty, and illness in old age. They 
challenged chronological definitions of old age and offered analytic frameworks for 
discovering what healthy aging could look like. Cowdry and his peers believed that by 
viewing aging through a moral and biological lens they could transform the elderly from 
a social problem into a social asset. To do so, they would have to discover and then 
promote optimal social and medical living choices for Americans at a much earlier age 
than 65.  
 From 1937 until 1953, the burgeoning discipline of gerontology depended on the 
generosity of a single source, The Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation. Ideologically committed 
to Cowdry’s approach to old age, the Macy Foundation sponsored conferences, books, an 
academic club, and a journal dedicated to gerontology. The financial insecurity of this 
arrangement and the transformation of the federal government’s relationship to scientific 
research at the close of World War II pushed gerontological funding from the private to 
the public sector.  
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 In the field of gerontology, money mattered. By the 1950s, research funding from 
the federal government largely came through the newly established, and recently 
enriched, National Institute (and later Institutes) of Health (NIH). Since funding came 
from an arm of the federal government dedicated to curing specific diseases and 
promoting biomedical research, the multi-disciplinary gestalt of the earlier aging research 
agenda waned.  
 In the second half of the twentieth century, the mechanisms of aging would be 
discovered in laboratories, the diseases of old age treated in hospitals, and the social 
problems of the elderly studied in universities. This separation of disciplines, which came 
with vast inequities in financial resources, reduced the possibility of a multi-pronged 
approach geared to enhancing the well-being and status of the elderly. Instead, the 
country marshaled its wartime resources and sought to combat old age as a physical 
pathology with a biomedical cure. By the middle of the 1950s the assumptions that would 
be built into the Medical Security Solution were institutionally entrenched. 
 
II: Old Cells 
 In a St. Louis morgue, five frozen bodies awaited transport. The year was 1947 
and thirty days prior, each of the bodies, ranging in age from newborn to an 80-year-old, 
had been “carefully wrapped,” their skin primed for scientific evaluation.3 In the lab of 
the famed cytologist, E.V. Cowdry, assistants excised isosceles-shaped samples from 
thirty-one regions of the body, immersed the triangles in “1 per cent acetic acid for 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
3 E.V. Cowdry, Zola Cooper, and Warren Smith, “Program of Research on Aging,” Journal of Gerontology 
2, no. 1, (Winter 1947): 31. 
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twenty-four hours,” and then stained the detached epidermis with hematoxylin.4 This 
method allowed the scientists to study “the whole epidermis from within, the ducts of 
sweat glands, hair follicles, and many sebaceous glands.”5 Cowdry liked to say, “While 
we are in life we are in death.”6 This study of skin cells would, in precise terms, prove 
this saying to be true.  
 Cells age, but not uniformly. In the body, some cells divide and reproduce, others 
dry out, wither, and eventually die. Even within these cells, the rate and purpose of aging 
varies. Nerve cells, for example, can live over 2000 times as long as white blood cells. 
The epidermis, Cowdry explained, “is Nature’s most effective frontier tissue. In it, life 
and death are more closely joined than anywhere else.”7 Cowdry fixated on the 
relationship between the dying cells on the surface of the skin and the living ones beneath 
them. Human beings are at once a composite of new cells, aging cells, and dead cells. In 
the skin, “dead epidermal cells act as a shield and protect the living cells within.”8 As 
protectors, they have a necessary, life-giving function. In contrast to the society he saw 
around him, in the body, “aged . . . cells are not consigned to oblivion. They still serve 
the rest and are given positions of great importance.”9 This was neither the first nor the 
last time Cowdry would move seamlessly between the society of cells and the society of 
man.  
 E. V. Cowdry experienced the grand in the particular. This founding father of 




6 E.V. Cowdry, “The New Public Health,” 360. 
7 E.V. Cowdry, Zola Cooper, and Warren Smith, “Program of Research on Aging,” 31.  
8 Ibid., and E.V. Cowdry, “Citizen Cells,” unpublished manuscript, undated, box 142, folder 1, pp. 58-59E. 
E.V. Cowdry Papers, Bernard Becker Medical Library Archives, Washington University School of 
Medicine, St. Louis, MO. 
9 Ibid.  
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best to organize society. In his parlance, he was not only interested in the cell as a 
discrete unit of life but also as a “citizen” of the body. Educated at a remarkable time for 
interdisciplinary science, Cowdry plotted a career that afforded him the peculiar ability to 
be a man of science who aimed to fix what he perceived as an “ethical slump” in “mutual 
responsibility.”10  
 Born in Macleod, Canada, in 1888, Cowdry came to the United States to study 
anatomy at the University of Chicago, where he received a Ph.D. in 1913. From there, his 
rise was meteoric. After obtaining a faculty position at Johns Hopkins, he traveled to 
China to become one of the first professors at the Rockefeller Foundation’s Peking Union 
Medical College. As an associate member of the Rockefeller Institute he traversed the 
world isolating organisms involved in such diseases as malaria and yellow fever. In 1928 
he returned to the United States permanently to head the cytology program at the 
Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis.11   
 Cowdry arrived as a biologist at a pivotal moment in the history of the field. On 
the heels of the vast reorganization of American medical schools in 1910 and 1920 came 
the rise of molecular biology and investigations into the biochemical mechanisms of cell 
performance.12 He also came of age in what Hamilton Cravens describes as the “halcyon 
days of interdisciplinary scholarship in American culture.”13 From the 1920s until the 
1950s, biologists subverted a taxonomic tradition where “the whole was a structure no 
greater than or different from the sum of its parts,” to embrace a holistic vision of the 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
10 Ibid., 58–59.  
''"National Encyclopedia of American Biography, vol. 61, 1981, in box 1, folders 10–11, E. V. Cowdry 
Papers.""
12 Keith Benson, Jane Maienschein, and Ronald Rainger, The Expansion of American Biology (New 
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world where discrete parts interrelated to create a “dynamic, functional unity.”14 Whether 
that whole was defined as the body, a cell, or a disease, by the 1920s scientists from 
numerous branches would have to collaborate to gain true understanding. 
 Cowdry’s early work followed this multidisciplinary model. He claimed that 
cytology was “the center of integration of related sciences. The biologist and the 
bacteriologist, the physiologist and the pathologist all contribute material of the utmost 
importance to our knowledge of cells.”15  In 1923 he published the popular textbook 
General Cytology, which was an edited volume of essays on cell structure, function, and 
mechanisms from across the field.16 In 1930, he even branched out beyond hard science 
in Human Biology and Racial Welfare. As one reviewer put it, “The general theme of the 
volume is man and his place in the universe and the degree of control that he has acquired 
over his destiny.”17 In addition to editing the book, Cowdry contributed a chapter that 
sought to destabilize presumptions about cells and give a basic outline of what scientists 
actually knew about these “vital units.” The word cell, he claimed, “is a misnomer and a 
relic of the past. . . . Vital units are not empty spaces, as the word suggests, but filled with 
a fluid substance.”18 At its most basic level, a cell can be likened to an engine, although, 
Cowdry continued, “it is in every respect a more efficient mechanism. . . . The cell takes 
in crude materials and makes them into finished products (e.g., adrenalin) which 
influence other industries or tissues, themselves composed of cells.”19 Cytologists, 
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Cowdry believed, had the unique ability to see order, variability, productivity, and 
harmony in cellular life. It was a realm of pure remarkable moral beauty.  
 Cowdry lived between worlds, the cellular and the social. When he returned to 
America on the eve of the Depression, he bore witness to droves of impoverished and 
discarded elderly. He could not square this sight with the intergenerational relationships 
he had witnessed in China, where Confucian notions of filial piety continued to structure 
society. In contrast to what he perceived as widespread “neglect” of the elderly in the 
United States, elders in China were “highly venerated.”20 He often wrote that the “neglect 
of the aged is an indictment of modern civilization.”21  
 In this instance and others, Cowdry believed that the cell community represented 
the moral high ground, providing a more humane way to cope with aging cells.22 
According to the historian of medicine Hyung Wook Park, “Cowdry came to think that 
while elderly people were suffering from social isolation and economic hardships due to 
the strengthened age discrimination and destruction of private pensions, the aged cells in 
the body were still actively contributing to the survival of the whole organism as its 
important members.”23 In 1936, Cowdry went public, broadcasting his theory of the 
“body anatomic” and the “body politic” in The Scientific Monthly. 
 “Are methods of regulation within the human body of any interest to those 
responsible for regulation within the nation?” Cowdry asked his readers. He referred to 
the social order of men as the “body politic” and that of cells as the “body anatomic.” It 
was his contention that the “anatomic” had much to teach the “politic.” “It is clear,” he 
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wrote, “that the cells of the body anatomic belong together and live a common life 
dedicated to the welfare of the whole. In these respects the cells are much more social 
than human beings.”24 The relationship between the individual cell and the body 
fascinated Cowdry. “The unity of a human being is more impressive than that of any 
nation, even the most totalitarian one thus far conceived. The individual cells project 
themselves into the whole dynamically, each kind in its own way.”25 To uncover the 
collective, Cowdry focused on its parts. In an unpublished manuscript, aptly titled 
“Citizen Cells,” he describes how cells both individuate and participate. 
 For a general audience, he limited his description of the citizen cell:  
Each cell is made up of a mass of living material enclosed in a delicate, 
yielding, cell-membrane. . . . The living material is of fluid consistency and 
will escape if the membrane is ruptured. It is divided into two parts. The 
outer part is called the cytoplasm and it always contains granular material of 
various kinds, often including droplets of fat. . . . The inner part is known as 
the nucleus. It, in turn, is separated from the cytoplasm by a second 
membrane, the nuclear membrane. . . . In this most secluded region of the 
anatomy of the citizen-cell are located the substances that determine the 
hereditary qualities.26  
 
Of equal importance to the structural similarities between cells are their functional 
differences. With an unsubtle display of politics, Cowdry summarized the purpose of 
various cells as follows: “The muscle cells may be likened to manual laborers. . . . The 
gland cells may be looked upon as manufacturers. . . . The nerve cells are the oldest and 
wisest. . . . The fat cells have something in common with bankers, since they store 
potential, not actual, energy and give it up reluctantly on demand.”27 Holding this entire 
system together are aging and dead skin cells. They “are not only utilized but are given 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
24 Cowdry, “Citizen Cells,” 17. 
25 Ibid., 21 
26 Ibid., 11. 
27 E.V. Cowdry, “Woods Hole Conference on the Problems of Aging,” The Scientific Monthly 45, no. 2. 
(March 1937): 223. 
#+"
positions of great importance. Without this thick, delicate and flexible covering the body 
anatomic could not endure.”28  
 From cellular interaction, Cowdry gleaned an ethics of intergenerational 
obligation. Aging is at once natural and inconsistent; individuals, like cells, will take on 
the characteristics of old age at different chronological ages due to the relationship 
between their social and biological health. “Unemployment” for cells results in “wasting 
and death.” Instead of squandering their skills, cells, such as fibroblasts, can live on “with 
regular duties so light as to be little known. . . . but they are ready to help in 
emergencies.”29  While many cells can live in isolation in Petri dishes, they always 
gravitate quickly to other cells, particularly ones they have had prior “relations” with. 
Even separated from their natural environment, “cells show a marked inclination to 
behave as they did when they were parts of the body anatomic. If taken from the heart 
they contract rhythmically; if removed from glands, they attempt to arrange themselves in 
a kind of glandular structure.”30 From these behaviors, Cowdry derived axioms for the 
body politic. Aged human beings must engage both in useful tasks and in meaningful 
relationships throughout their lives; they cannot be cut off from meaningful work or 
social institutions.  
 Cowdry’s inquiries into the nature of old age came largely through the 
benevolence of the Macy Foundation. This was not unusual in the first half of the 
twentieth century, where dollars for biological research came almost exclusively from 
similar tax-exempt entities, such as the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie 
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Corporation, the Russell Sage Foundation, and the Guggenheim Foundation.31 Before 
World War II, scientists themselves, leery of federal financing, preferred private 
dollars.32 While Cowdry would be able to locate diverse dollar sources for his cancer 
research, for which he would later become world renowned, the Macy Foundation was 
the only institution invested in multidisciplinary efforts to understand the socio-biological 
reality of old age.  
*** 
 In 1872, John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil made Josiah Macy and his sons 
wealthy men. After only a decade in the oil industry, the Macys’ Long Island Oil 
Company became a part of Standard Oil.33 It took fifty years and a subsequent generation 
to come up with a coherent vision of how best to deploy the extra dollars. In 1930, Mrs. 
Kate Ladd, the youngest daughter of Josiah Macy Jr., decided to establish a scientific, 
mission-driven, charity.34   
 Inspired by the tenets of Quakerism and the trials of a lengthy illness, Mrs. Ladd 
dreamed up a foundation that would reverse current medical trends, which atomized a 
patient into body parts, and current philanthropic funding trends, which privileged 
biochemical and physiological research over psycho-biological and sociological 
research.35 In a letter to the foundation she wrote, “Believing, as I do, that no sound 
structure of social or cultural welfare can be maintained without health, that health is 
more than freedom from sickness, that it resides in the wholesome unity of mind and 
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body, I hope that your undertaking may help to develop more and more in medicine in its 
research, education, and ministry of healing the spirit which sees the center of all its 
efforts in the patient as an individuality.”36  
 At the outset, the foundation, named in honor of Mrs. Ladd’s father, valued 
“cross-disciplinary, integrative research that promised practical payoffs.”37 An initial gift 
of five million dollars and subsequent gifts by Mrs. Ladd allowed the relatively small 
foundation (in 1932, the Rockefeller’s principal fund was $147.5 million) to single-
handedly create the field of gerontology.38   
 This process began when the foundation’s leaders encountered Cowdry while they 
were consulting with the National Research Council (NRC), an arm of the federal 
government dedicated to scientific research, in the mid-1930s. At the time, Cowdry 
chaired the NRC’s Division of Medical Sciences and had much to say about the Macy 
Foundation’s program area on lifecycles.39 Childhood and adolescence, Cowdry often 
remarked, should not be the only studied stages of life. Having spent his earlier career 
funding childhood development studies at the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Memorial 
Fund, Lawrence K. Frank, the Macy Foundation’s vice president, understood the skewed 
research emphasis.40 Soon Frank and Cowdry were plotting a way to integrate aging and 
chronic degenerative diseases into the foundation’s program agenda. In fact, both 
believed that the diseases associated with aging would soon be the major health crises 
afflicting Americans.  
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 Cowdry accepted a conservative first project from the foundation: he would edit a 
comprehensive book on arteriosclerosis, a vascular disease that overwhelmingly afflicts 
the aged.  “Man,” the saying went, “is as old as his arteries.”41 Cowdry determined that 
arteriosclerosis is “a chronic disturbance of the vessels which manifests itself by deposits 
of the most varied kinds in the vascular walls.” 42 This process becomes acutely hurtful to 
the body when deposits build up and deform the vascular walls.43  
 Research in arteriosclerosis and other degenerative diseases soon transformed into 
a broader agenda. As one report maintained,  
When the Macy Foundation began its operations, the degenerative 
diseases, though they claimed a large share of the available medical 
care, received less attention from investigators than their importance 
justified. A great body of knowledge turned up in the past decades 
of research has shown that the heart and circulatory system were so 
inextricably interrelated with such other systematic functions as 
those of the kidneys, the nervous system, musculature, and 
metabolism of the whole body that research into the degenerative 
processes must move along many fronts at once.44  
 
In October of 1935, Cowdry pressed a receptive Macy Foundation to broaden its 
involvement in the “problems of aging.” In lieu of the single-disease research model, he 
proposed a multi-disciplinary conference and published symposium that would 
consolidate all the available scientific research on aging. He believed that the best 
scientific and social research could help discover what healthy, productive, and dignified 
aging would actually look like. Nothing of this scope had been previously attempted.  
 Modern scientific inquiry into the nature of aging had commenced in the late 
nineteenth century with the pioneering work of Elie Metchnikoff. Metchnikoff, renowned 
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for his innovative work on immunity, dabbled in what he termed gerontology, the study 
of old age, from the Greek for old man. He came to believe that the lactic-acid bacilli in 
yogurt would deter aging.45  In the early twentieth century, aging again came under 
scrutiny with I. L. Nascher’s textbook, Geriatrics: The Diseases of Old Age, and the 
sociologist G. Stanley Hall’s Senescence: The Last Half of Life.46 Nascher developed the 
term geriatrics as opposed to gerontology to focus attention on doctors’ curing the 
specific ailments of old age.  Even before Cowdry transformed the field of inquiry, these 
scientists offered a radical departure from previous conceptions of aging, which described 
the process as the ongoing ephemeral loss of “vital heat.”47   
 
III: Aging Bodies 
 In the summer of 1937, the Macy Foundation granted Cowdry’s request, funding 
a published symposium and two-day conference at Woods Hole, Massachusetts.48 
Cowdry hoped the conference would ameliorate the missteps of both the scientific 
community and the government. He railed in The Scientific Monthly: “The problems of 
growth, the upswing of the curve of vital processes, are being energetically attacked with 
adequate financial support. Those of aging, the downsizing of the curve resulting 
inevitably in death, are on the contrary shamefully neglected.”49  Money, he claimed, had 
not only been disproportionately allocated to the diseases of youth, but federal dollars in 
the form of the recently passed social security act had, rather than solving the ailments of 
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old age, allowed citizens to assuage their guilt when it came to the elderly. He wrote, 
“Hundreds of million of dollars are appropriated annually to keep old people from actual 
want. This is really conscience money. We know that they suffer in mind and body and to 
pay them a small [fee] is the easiest way out for us. . . . Consequently in the length and 
breadth of the country probably less than $50,000 a year is spent on constructive research 
designed to reveal the processes of aging.”50  
 Cowdry and Frank handpicked the conference participants whose papers were 
published as Problems of Ageing. The goal was to find scholars willing and able to cross 
intellectual frontiers. The duo sought thinkers capable of learning other fields, 
refashioning their basic assumptions, and communicating both the stakes and results of 
their research to diverse audiences. The book came out in 1939 and in the historian of 
gerontology Andrew Achenbaum’s estimation announced “the emergence of gerontology 
as a field of inquiry in the United States.”51 Divided into twenty-five chapters, the 
compilation featured essays on the aging process in plants, protozoa, insects, and 
invertebrates. It looked at the effects of time on the cardiovascular, digestive, 
reproductive, nervous, and urinary systems, the degeneration of lymphatic tissue and 
skeletal structures, as well as the eyes and ears. In addition, chapters examined the 
psychology of old age and current demographics.52  
 Perhaps the most unusual part of the compilation was the introduction written by 
the philosopher John Dewey. Cowdry and Dewey first met while working in China. They 
exchanged tips and pleasantries in 1920 and grew acquainted with one another’s spouses. 
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Cowdry followed Dewey’s career and writings when he returned to the US. In 1930, he 
asked Dewey to submit a chapter on education to Human Biology and Racial Welfare, an 
edited volume on current research on mankind.53 While collecting authors for the 
Problems of Ageing, he again asked for Dewey’s assistance. When the manuscript was in, 
he wrote to Dewey, “I have read with very keen interest . . . your introduction for the 
book on Aging. It is exactly right. You strike precisely the notes which are important in 
bringing our work before the public.”54  
 Cowdry chose Dewey because he wanted the book to open with moral gravity and 
scientific skepticism. “It is a common experience,” began Dewey, “that the solution of 
one type of problem brings with it new and unforeseen problems.”55 “Upon its face,” he 
continued, “the problem of saving a greater number of lives was a similar special 
problem. . . . It was met by improvements in medical care and by improved dietaries and 
measures of public sanitation.”56 Success in the realm of public health and medicine 
extended the human lifespan and inadvertently created the “problem of old age.”57 The 
problem, Dewey argued, existed in important ways outside the confines of medicine. 
“Biological processes,” he reminded readers, “take place in economic, political and 
cultural contexts.”58 All measures to solve the very recent dilemma of old age would be 
“mitigative rather than constructive, unless they are accompanied by changes in the 
cultural social structure which will give the group of older persons a status of moral 
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security and social value as well as material security.”59 A book describing aging through 
scientific modes opened with a humble disclaimer: science and medicine would never be 
enough. 
 Lawrence Frank summarized Problems of Ageing’s findings into four axioms, 
none of which were immediately intuitive to those working in the field. The first was that 
scientists were undecided on whether aging is an “involuntary process which operates 
cumulatively with the passage of time” or a process stimulated by “infections, toxins, 
traumas, and nutritional disturbances.”60 For this reason, students of aging, Frank wrote, 
“are faced repeatedly with the crucial issue of how to distinguish between normal 
senescence and the pathology of old age.”61  In this way, the book made a crucial 
distinction between old age as a set of illnesses and old age as a natural process.  The 
second axiom contended with the prevalent desire to have statistical norms: “Attempts to 
establish statistically derived norms of ageing are often productive of more confusion 
than clarity because they may obscure any real insight into the sequence of events which 
result in ‘ageing’ of different individuals.”62 The penultimate axiom concluded that the 
aging process is not uniform. Not only is it not uniform between different cells of the 
body, different organs, and different systems, but it is also widely variable between 
individuals. Chronological definitions of old age did not accurately reflect biology. The 
work’s final axiom concerned treatment. “In no other aspect of medicine and health-
care,” Frank wrote “is the concept of the psychosomatic unity of the organism more 
important than in the care of the aged, since the older individual faces life with all the 
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emotional patterns of his past.”63 Thus, Problems of Ageing contained no clear guidelines 
on the actual problems of aging. Rather, the work exposed the difficulty of generalizing 
about the aging experience and analyzing old age outside of specific social contexts. 
 Following the Woods Hole conference and the publication of Problems of Ageing, 
the participating scientists created the Club for Research on Ageing. Modeled after 
similar societies founded in Europe, the American version would be well-funded by the 
Macy Foundation and remain active throughout the war.  At the outset, the multi-
disciplinary group took up a broad range of questions: “How and why should aging be 
studied as a scientific and social problem? What were the appropriate experimental 
organisms to investigate senescence? What was the difference between chronic illness 
and ‘normal’ aging? How did the aging of the population affect industry, and what were 
the American corporations’ responses to their aged employees?”64  In 1946, the Club 
became the Gerontological Society and founded the Journal of Gerontology, with, 
unsurprisingly, the financial assistance of the Macy Foundation, to publish its findings.  
 The first issue opened with a statement of purpose by Frank. Gerontology, he 
claimed,  
is not just one more highly specialized discipline, the latest addition 
to the already long and ever lengthening list of “ologies” that make 
up the academic roster. Nor is it merely an applied science, like 
most of engineering and technology. . . . Gerontology reflects the 
recognition of a new kind of problem that will increasingly 
command the interest and devotion of a variety of scientists, 
scholars, and professional workers, all of whom are needed to study 
such problems as human growth, development and aging, ecology 
and regional planning, mental hygiene, human conservation, or 
cultural change.65   
 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
63 Ibid., xvii. 
64 Park, “Refiguring Old Age,” 290. 
65 Lawrence K. Frank, “Gerontology,” Journal of Gerontology 1, no. 1 (Winter 1946): 1. 
#*"
Rather than a single description of the aging body and its ailments, the scholars who 
published in the first issues of the Journal of Gerontology investigated the mystery of 
aging with a tender mix of awe for the biological process that begins at conception and 
sympathy for the suffering of elderly men and women. 
 1946 was a banner year for journals of old age. In addition to the Journal of 
Gerontology, a group of physicians organized the American Geriatrics Society and began 
publishing Geriatrics. The journal from its founding announced a new field of medicine, 
a clinical specialty born of pediatrics, designed to study and treat diseases of old age. 
Teeming, from its opening issue, with ads from pharmaceutical companies claiming to 
cure “urinary antisepsis,” “fat digestion,” “renal toxicity,” and “hypertension,” to name 
only a few illnesses associated with age, the journal Geriatrics had a clear sense of what 
it meant to be old. It meant being sick. The diseases of old age were many. In addition to 
cancer and heart disease, the “incidents of old age” were “postoperative states, 
pneumonia, hepatic cirrhosis, malignancy, fractures of bones, uremia, eye conditions, and 
hypertensive encephalopathy.”66 Mental pathologies, such as “senile psychosis, 
involutional melancholia,” and “menopausal syndrome” accompanied these physical 
manifestations.67 A more general biological perspective on the “aging processes” offered 
by Professor Anton J. Carlson is summarized toward the end of the journal:  
gradual tissue desiccation; gradual retardation of cell division, 
capacity of cell growth, and tissue repair; gradual retardation in the 
rate of tissue oxidation; cellular atrophy, degeneration, increases 
cell pigmentation, and fatty infiltration; gradual decrease in tissue 
elasticity and degenerative changes in the elastic connective tissue; 
decreased speed, strength, and endurance of skeletal 
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neuromuscular reactions; decreased strength of skeletal muscles; 
and progressive degeneration and atrophy of the nervous system, 
impaired vision, hearing, attention, memory, and mental 
endurance.68  
 
To geriatricians, aging was a degenerative state that, once revealed, required intervention.  
 Gerontologists took a radically different approach. Rather than a cure for disease 
they began to strive for an operative and descriptive definition of normal or healthy 
aging.69 Dr. Edward J. Stieglitz, a physician at the University of Chicago and Cowdry’s 
intellectual co-conspirator, described gerontology in terms of constructive medicine. 
“Constructive medicine follows the ancient axiom of war,” he advised, “attack is the best 
defense.”70 More than simply preventative medicine, “constructive medicine has very 
definite positive implications. The objective of obtaining . . . [a] nearly optimum level of 
health for the individual.”71 Old age was not connected to chronology, but rather to a set 
of compounded health risks. If doctors could manage those health risks at an early stage, 
then patients could live healthy and productive lives until they died. 
 Stieglitz, a dedicated clinician, conceptualized geriatrics as a subset of 
gerontology and argued, throughout his career, against a disease-focused model of 
clinical care. In its stead he pushed his vision of constructive medicine, which would 
care, in the most holistic vision of the word, for patients by helping them create long-term 
strategies to manage their physical forms in specific social and economic environments. 
Cowdry reiterated this approach when he wrote, “What is needed is a return of some 
physicians to the old time role of guide, philosopher and friend. . . . Perhaps the greatest 
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economic and humanitarian contribution of public health in the future is to maintain 
socially useful activity as long as possible in this very large fraction of the population.”72 
But to advance this clinical model and support the growing research agenda to define 
healthy aging, the Society would have to secure more funds.  
 As early as 1940, scholars within the Club for Research and Ageing and program 
officers at the Macy Foundation recognized that the field of gerontology faced financial 
problems. Although individual scientists were able to acquire outside funding and even 
government support, interdisciplinary research into aging was not a hot topic. Even the 
most committed gerontologists, Cowdry included, made their careers pursuing more 
traditional and well-financed research projects. The creation of the National Institute of 
Health and the meteoric rise of federally funded scientific research during WWII offered 
Frank and Cowdry an unprecedented approach: they could make gerontology and the 
problems of aging part of the federal government’s scientific research agenda.  
 
IV: New Money 
 For the first half of the twentieth century, the federal government trailed the 
philanthropic sector as a partner in scientific innovation. Federal funds for health and 
science emphasized public health concerns, such as infectious disease and sanitation, and 
were distributed through the Public Health Service, the Hygienic Laboratory, and the 
Department of Agriculture. Government support, moreover, was limited to sparse and 
understaffed government laboratories. Meanwhile, foundations like the ones created by 
John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie brought hierarchy and order to medical 
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education and laboratory research.73 The non-profit and private sector, more than any 
government program, was responsible for modernizing American medicine and 
addressing the great health crises of the early twentieth century.74  
 Preparations for war tipped the balance. War, asserts historian Victoria Harden, 
“revealed the indispensability of science, both pure and applied, to national defense and 
the general welfare.”75 Starting with the National Research Council in 1916, designed to 
promote wartime science research, the federal government eased into funding large-scale 
science projects.76 Although the private sector would continue to be the main source of 
scientific funding until World War II, the First World War set the stage for the massive 
financial and philosophical transition to come.  
 The astounding success of WWII research programs, which resulted in radar and 
the atom bomb, to name only a couple of applications, dazzled the country. Unbridled 
optimism in the curative powers of medicine and the problem-solving techniques of 
biologists, physicists, chemists, and engineers adorned the nation’s headlines.77 As 
Harden writes, “The great achievements in science during World War II . . . enhanced 
public belief that scientific research offered an endless frontier on which a happier, 
healthier life could be built.”78   
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 Following the War, the United States would become the greatest funder of 
scientific research in the world. It offered congressmen a way to promote health, 
research, and government power without funding social programs or redistributing 
wealth. In many ways, research came to be seen as a solution for all health problems. 
Public health initiatives fell to the wayside and a conversation about access to healthcare 
became politically fraught. As the sociologist Paul Starr summarizes, “At home the 
advance of science and medicine, like economic growth, offered the prospect of 
improved well-being without requiring any profound reorganization of society. Liberal 
opinion held that America had transcended the need for drastic political reform by 
incorporating progressive change into its free institutions. Medical science epitomized the 
postwar vision of progress without conflict.”79 For the duration of the twentieth century, 
health research would be the vehicle by which politicians across party lines demonstrated 
their compassion for America’s ailing citizens. 
 More than any arm of government, the NIH came to embody this trend.80 The 
NIH grew out of the Hygienic Laboratory, an arm of the Public Health Service created as 
a bacteriology laboratory to alleviate infectious and contagious diseases. In 1938, the new 
NIH opened its own laboratories on a privately funded estate in Maryland. While the labs 
lay fallow during the war years, their coffers were soon to be filled by a willing Congress.  
 With the world wars seemingly resolved, President Truman had to decide what to 
do with the ever-expanding war-research infrastructure. Vannevar Bush, an esteemed 
engineer and director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD, the 
agency tasked with coordinating war research), urged the President to rethink the 
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government’s relationship to science. In his comprehensive report, Science, the Endless 
Frontier, he argued against the applied “programmatic” science sponsored during the war 
years. In its stead he claimed that basic, fundamental, scientific research would best push 
the country forward. “Discoveries pertinent to medical progress have often come from 
remote and unexpected sources, and it is certain that this will be true in the future,” he 
wrote in his 1945 report. “Further progress requires that the entire front of medicine and 
the underlying sciences of chemistry, physics, anatomy, biochemistry, physiology, 
pharmacology, bacteriology, pathology, parasitology, etc., be broadly developed.”81 The 
Manhattan Project, the OSRD’s greatest success, relied on years of basic scientific 
research. While Bush called for a National Science Foundation, which did eventually 
come into being in 1950, many of his principles and OSRD’s ample funds were first 
absorbed by the NIH, whose budget increased from $180,000 in 1945 to $4 million in 
1947.82  
 This monetary boost came at a time when the federal government began to allow 
grants to go to outside institutions, garnering a set of welcome, and demanding, 
affiliates.83 Universities, private laboratories, and independent scholars could now apply 
to the NIH to receive research dollars. The extramural program, writes health policy 
experts Robert Cook-Deegan and Michael McGeary, “quickly became NIH’s largest 
activity and involved NIH with a whole new set of constituents, namely researchers in 
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universities, medical centers, and other non-profit research institutions.”84 Within years, 
the two continue, “the NIH changed from being the research arm of the federal public 
health enterprise to being the keystone of the national biomedical research enterprise, and 
the more it focused on biological research, especially molecular biological research, the 
more support it enjoyed from its new constituencies.”85 
 The NIH’s most politically effective constituency came in the form of the 
American Cancer Society. As life expectancy grew in the early twentieth century, so did 
the incidence of cancer. Cancer, writes the oncologist and historian Siddhartha 
Mukherjee, “is imprinted in our society: as we extend our life span as a species, we 
inevitably unleash malignant growth (mutations in cancer genes accumulate with aging; 
cancer is thus intrinsically related to age).”86 “Between 1900 and 1916,” he continues, 
“cancer-related mortality grew by 29.8 percent, edging out tuberculosis as a cause of 
death. By 1926, cancer had become the nation’s second most common killer, just behind 
heart disease.”87  
 Cancer terrified the public. The slow, painful, mysterious death that came to be 
known as the “dread disease” haunted popular writers and even prompted the Public 
Health Service (PHS) to dabble in scientific research in the early 1920s.88 As the health 
care scholar Stephen Strickland reports, “it was really cancer that worried people most. 
And it was cancer that gave the people’s elected representatives in Congress an easier 
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handle on biomedical research.”89 By 1937, political will matched public fear and a 
National Cancer Institute (NCI) was created, but, like the NIH, it accomplished little until 
after WWII. The Second World War had rendered cancer, in Mukherjee’s words, “a 
politically silent illness.”90 The philanthropist Mary Lasker and her band of activists put 
cancer back on the public agenda by making the disease a high society cause célèbre.   
*** 
 Mary Lasker embodied the confidence of post-war America. Born Mary 
Woodward in Wisconsin in 1900, she remade herself as a darling of the East Coast 
fashion world by mass-producing women’s professional clothes. In 1939, she fell for 
advertising mogul Albert Lasker. In 1940, Mrs. Lasker found her calling. After 
witnessing her mother’s painful illness and slow death, she declared, “I am opposed to 
heart attacks and cancer . . . the way one is opposed to sin.”91 She modeled her crusade as 
a productive cross between religious evangelism and modern day advertising techniques. 
“If a toothpaste,” she proclaimed, “deserved advertising at the rate of two or three or four 
million dollars a year then research against diseases maiming and crippling people in the 
United States and in the rest of the world deserved hundreds of millions of dollars.”92  
 She mobilized doctors, politicians, fundraisers, advertising executives, journalists, 
and publishers for a total “war on cancer.”93 Lasker soon took over The American 
Society for the Control of Cancer and rebranded it the American Cancer Society (ACS), 
deploying, in Patterson’s words, “aggressive methods of fund-raising.” 94 From that point 
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on the organization would forego lengthy memorandums on the best standards of cancer 
care for an all-out fundraising and ad campaign that would electrify the American 
public.95 By 1948, the ACS had collected a whopping fourteen million dollars. 96 The 
ACS also lobbied on behalf of the NCI, whose budget expanded from $1.75 million in 
1946 to over $14 million in 1947. 97  
 The Laskerites, as Mary Lasker’s acolytes came to be called, were also 
capitalizing on a trend. Single-disease health advocacy had begun earlier with the success 
of the March of Dimes campaign against Polio. 98 “The power of disease advocacy,” note 
Cook-Deegan and McGeary, “became more apparent after the war.”99 In the ensuing 
years, patients and advocates would organize societies around myriad specific diseases, 
as non-profits ceased investing directly in research and put their efforts into lobbying.  
 The American Cancer Society was one of the first health organizations to launch a 
government-focused strategy successfully. They realized that attaining federal backing 
through Congress would rapidly transform the financing and scope of their cause.100 This 
strategy of harnessing scientific prowess to address a single disease challenged Vannevar 
Bush’s post-war strategy of basic rather than applied scientific research and required a 
multi-pronged attack. To subvert the habits of post-war funding, Lasker reignited the 
language of war. From the late 1940s on the effectively branded “war on cancer” would 
entice politicians, citizens, patients, and doctors alike.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
95 Mukherjee, The Emperor of All Maladies, 112-113. 
96 Patterson, The Dread Disease, 172.  
97 Ibid. 
98 Mukherjee, The Emperor of All Maladies, 94. 
99 Robert Cook-Deegan and Michael McGeary, “The Jewel in the Federal Crown: History, Politics, and the 
National Institutes of Health,” in History and Health Policy in the United States: Putting the Past Back In, 
180. 
100 Mukherjee, The Emperor of All Maladies, 113. 
$)"
 In 1948, the Laskerites helped push the National Institute of Health to become the 
National Institutes of Health, plural, by absorbing the newly created National Heart 
Institute. Five other additions were to follow, including the NCI. In 1950, Congress 
permitted the Surgeon General to expand, as needed, similar disease-specific institutes.101 
In this way, the NIH could benefit financially from the rise of single-disease advocacy 
groups, which were eager to fund their specific cause.102  That a hygienic laboratory built 
to cure acute diseases became, in the middle of the twentieth century, a major institute 
attempting to cope with complex chronic disease through research, is part of a larger 
trend noted by Daniel Fox.  
 In his seminal work, Power and Illness, Fox upends the traditional narrative 
regarding scientific research. He opposes the notion that medicine and science progress; 
rather, he claims, they change and adapt to different contexts.103 In the American setting, 
this change developed around a single misstep. Instead of facing the particularity of 
chronic disease as the major health affliction, U.S. policy expanded a health 
infrastructure built around infectious diseases: “Contrary to what most people—even 
most experts—believe, deaths from chronic disease began to exceed deaths from acute 
infections almost three-quarters of a century ago. But U.S. policy, and therefore the 
institutions of the health sector, failed to respond adequately to that increasing burden. 
Today, leaders in government, business, and health affairs remain committed to policy 
priorities that have long been obsolete.”104 For example, for years U.S. policy subsidized 
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hospital growth rather than funding in-home care to help individuals manage long and 
complex chronic diseases. “Most of the people,” Fox continues, “who made and 
influenced policy assumed that the institutions and methods that seemed to be succeeding 
against acute infectious disease could be effective in the struggle against death and 
disability from chronic degenerative conditions.”105 Research institutes, hospitals, 
insurance plans, and late-stage medical intervention are all approaches that work well for 
acute diseases, such as influenza. They are, however, an exceedingly expensive and 
inefficient way of helping patients live well with chronic degenerative ones, such as 
diabetes.  
 The early gerontologists understood this problem. They faced aging as a set of 
interwoven health risks that had to be preempted and managed from middle age on. Still, 
these researchers and clinicians needed to stay afloat and at the end of the 1940s the 
federal government was the single best source for sustained funding. In the 1950s, many 
of gerontology’s founders, including Cowdry, would make a name for themselves in the 
field of cancer research or other single-disease research areas. While they remained 
interested in broad questions about the aging process, gerontology became a footnote to 
their professional careers. 
 In 1941, the Federal government spent $18 million dollars of its annual budget on 
medical research. By 1951, that number had jumped to $181 million ($1.6 billion in 2012 
dollars). If scientists researching aging wanted to compete at a federal level, they had two 
choices: describe old age and its attendant pathologies as curable diseases, à la Lasker, or 
explore the basic biological mechanisms of old age, à la Bush.  
*** 
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 “At first,” remarks Achenbaum, “gerontology was not greatly affected by changes 
in Big Government’s ties to Big Science. Few, after all, did research on ageing in 1945.”  
By 1951, he continues, “the federal government was contributing 75 percent of all direct 
costs for aging research.”106 While the actual dollar amount remained relatively small—
only $283,075 per year ($2.5 million in 2012 dollars)—especially compared to the big 
ticket items like cancer, infectious diseases, and cardiovascular diseases, the impact of 
the funding shift loomed large. 
 The director of the NIH, Dr. L. R. Thompson, accepted the Club for Research on 
Ageing’s invitation to witness its proceedings in January of 1940. After the meeting, the 
Macy Foundation leapt into action, offering to pay for a gerontologist to join the NIH for 
one year.107 By July 1940, Dr. Edward J. Stieglitz took up his post as the first head of a 
national Unit on Gerontology. 108 E. V. Cowdry had this to say about the appointment: 
“[U]nder the able direction of Dr. E. J. Stieglitz. . . . A new kind of public health is being 
conceived. It is a union of what is best in medicine and sociology.”109  
 In 1946, the NIH expanded its interest in aging, creating the Gerontology Study 
Section (GSS), a funding program designed to promote multidisciplinary research into 
aging. Three years later, the unit disbanded, rendered ineffectual by the number of 
discipline-based applications. As Hyung Park writes, “Ironically, the multidisciplinary 
approach to aging that the GSS hoped to encourage became a major cause for its 
disbanding. . . .”110 Scientists, rather than applying to pursue work in a multidisciplinary 
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category, merely applied within their chosen discipline or to the specific disease they 
sought to cure. Arguably, the only successful gerontological program within the NIH in 
this period was Nathan Shock’s research center. Shock, previously an assistant professor 
of physiology at the University of California Medical School, replaced Stieglitz in 1941 
when the Macy Foundation support expired.111 
 Nathan Wetherill Shock was fluent in numbers. The son of a mathematics teacher, 
he received his first degree in chemical engineering, his second degree in organic 
chemistry, and finally his Ph.D. in physiology in 1930 from the University of Chicago. In 
1932, Shock took a position at the Institute of Child Welfare at the University of 
California, Berkeley, where he was first exposed to the benefits of longitudinal studies on 
humans with a study that tracked 100 ten year olds for eight years.112 He would later 
become famous for a similar study tracking aging.113  
 In 1941, he took this expertise to the NIH, where he became head of the Unit on 
Gerontology, which under his care eventually became the internationally renowned 
Gerontological Research Center.114 According to Achenbaum, “Shock transformed the 
federally supported GRC into a highly visible research center and site for training 
investigators interested in basic ‘mechanisms involved in aging’. When Shock arrived in 
Baltimore in 1941, he had one lab assistant; when the GRC in 1975 became the 
Intramural Program of the new National Institute on Aging, he was overseeing the 
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activities of 175 researchers and visiting scientists.”115 Shock accomplished this feat 
through his devotion to the hard sciences, particularly biology, and his ability to allow 
researchers in other fields to tangentially relate their work to aging.116  
 He limited inquiry to two main questions: “What are the underlying biological 
factors that produce what we perceive as aging?” and “What are the mechanisms that 
produce impaired performance with age?”117 The laboratory conducted studies on the 
effects of time on kidney and heart function, as well as on “sensory capacity” and 
metabolic recovery after exercise.118 The goal for Shock and his collaborators was a fuller 
understanding of the influence of time on basic biological functions; there was no 
immediate cure, disease, or policy goal in sight. In this way, the GRC became a 
monument to Bush’s postwar dream of federal scientific funding. Gerontology, as a 
government-funded area of scientific research, abandoned the pursuit of scientifically 
informed standards for healthy aging to research the biological mechanisms that could 
prevent aging itself.  
*** 
 In 1955, the Macy Foundation offered a wish packaged as a fact: “Medicine as a 
science and an art has now come full circle, from concern with man as the basic unit of 
interest in organs and systems of the body, then to study of the cell, and now at last back 
to recognition of man as an indivisible unit of mind and body.”119 For the previous ten 
years, gerontology had embodied this belief; scholars from across fields had collaborated 
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and combined approaches to change the way individuals prepared for old age and treated 
the elderly. The next ten years would be markedly less holistic; for those within the halls 
of political power, scientifically facing the problems of old age would come solely to 
mean curing the diseases of old age and researching the processes of aging. Until the end 
of his life, Cowdry rejected this dualistic biomedical approach.  
 Spending the bulk of his career researching cancer, a problem of relentless 
growth, he would remain one of the country’s strongest advocates for the study of 
deterioration. He wrote, “Aging is taboo, while cancer is all the rage. . . . Of the two, 
knowledge about aging and action springing from it are more needed than new facts 
about cancer.”120 For Cowdry, as it was later for Susan Sontag, society’s fixation on 
cancer was not without reason. The disease fit the zeitgeist of the time, its metaphors 
evoking the rhetoric of battle, capitalism, and technology.121 Although pharmaceutical 
companies, hospitals, nursing homes, longevity specialists, and eventually research 
scientists and politicians would try to envelop the language of aging in that of cancer, as a 
war to be won, Cowdry claimed otherwise. He wrote, “Old age, unlike all other hazards 
of life, is crushing because there is no way to avoid it. An individual may, perhaps, avoid 
both cancer and the atom bomb; at least, he has a fighting chance of doing so. But his 
only way to avoid aging is to die young.”122  
 Old age, he pleaded, could not be conquered or cured; it had to be faced. 
Cowdry’s voice echoed in schools of social work, public health departments, and 
gerontology programs across the country. But in the halls of NIH-funded labs his 
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approach gave way to the relentless desire to discover, to solve, and to end old age. In the 
late 1950s and 1960s, politicians followed suit, describing old age as a social problem 
and not a social asset, as a curable disease and not a natural process—thus, the body 







CHAPTER II  
From Personal Care to Federal Care: 
Two Solutions to the Problem of Old Age, 1949-1950  
 
“Will you still need me, 
Will you still feed me, 
When I'm sixty-four?” 
   -Paul McCartney, The Beatles 
 
I: Introduction 
 In 1949, old age, as a demographic problem, attracted federal attention. Fourteen 
years after the Social Security Act established a chronological mark for the aged, 65 and 
over, Oscar Ewing, the director of the Federal Security Agency, invited a group of 
experts on aging to Washington, D.C., to determine how the federal government should 
best approach “the problems which arise with the aged population.”1 In an amorphous 
field, sparse with data, specialists, and working options, two authorities stood out: the 
self-trained social worker Ollie Randall and the University of Chicago-trained sociologist 
Clark Tibbitts. The two arrived in Washington with careful articulations of the proper 
definition of the elderly, the afflictions that beset them, and the appropriate solutions.  
 The data exposed troubling trends. Americans were living longer and reproducing 
less. In 1900, 3.1 million Americans, just 4.14% of the total population, were over 65. By 
1950 the number would jump to 12.3 million, 8.1 % of the population. Dips in birthrates, 
despite the baby boom, exacerbated this upward shift. Two rather than five children 
homes had become the norm and this augured a dependency crisis, as familial, financial, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 “Proceedings of the Committee on Aging, United States Public Health Service,” April 22, 1949, folder 
051.2, box 129, record group 235, Federal Security Agency, National Archives, College Park, MD.  
! "#!
and social responsibilities fell solely to the middle aged.2 As demographers described the 
problem of old age in terms of scale and dependency, a growing class of physicians and 
biomedical researchers described the health afflictions of old age through research into 
degenerating or deformed cells. For the geriatricians, the problem of old age was the 
affliction of chronic disease, the next frontier for a medical profession emboldened by 
sharp reductions in infant mortality; old age was not a social trend but a biological 
disease with potential medical cures. 
 Randall and Tibbitts incorporated, responded to, and challenged both of these 
models in their comprehensive visions of proper eldercare. The aged could not be fully 
described or treated as a set of data points nor could physical disease be isolated from 
social context. While Randall and Tibbitts agreed on the scope and complexity of the 
problems, they offered productive differences on how the problems should be solved. 
Where Randall relied on a highly individualized local model, which I call personal care, 
Tibbitts believed that the problems required a centralized, or federal, solution.3 
 In the Spring of 1949, it seemed that the continuum between Randall’s personal 
care and Tibbitts’s centralized care would set the intellectual parameters for a national 
discussion on the problems of and solutions to old age. Yet as Randall and Tibbitts 
stepped into the Federal Security Agency meeting, a third option was brewing. At the 
exact moment social workers and social scientists recognized the mounting problems of 
the elderly, the Truman administration, frustrated with thwarted attempts to pass 
government sponsored health insurance, settled on the aged as the key to a new political 
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strategy of incrementalism. Social Security beneficiaries, Ewing and others claimed, 
could be the first recipients in an incremental approach to bring health insurance to all. 
For Randall and Tibbitts the mounting numbers of the elderly was a social problem. For 
the Truman administration, it was a solution. This divide would eventually limit the 
content of the Randall-Tibbitts debate and establish a federally-funded medical solution 
to the problems of old age.  
 
II: Ollie Randall and Personal Care 
 Ollie Randall paid attention to words: home, time, living, loss, illness and 
independence. She fixated on them, obsessed over how they were deployed, and 
imagined how they could best be put to use. A philosopher of care, her ideas came from a 
professional life devoted to the extreme and mundane hardships faced by New York’s 
elders. 
 Randall, a prolific writer and speech-giver, left her own story. Born on 
September 3, 1890 into a large extended family, she grew up in a household that valued 
both adventure and duty. By her own admission, her professional interests paid homage 
to her childhood. Her father came from a long line of Rhode Islanders and in the late 
1880s ventured out west to try his hand at ranching where he met her mother, a 
schoolteacher from Illinois. The family soon returned to Rhode Island. Mr. Randall took 
up work in the newspaper business and Mrs. Randall stayed home to raise their four girls. 
The family—great-grandparents, grandparents, parents, and children—lived on the same 
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street.4 “We had a great, big house on Cranston Street,” recalled Randall, “and then they 
built a small house out of what had been the barn and that’s were I was brought up.”5   
 Responsibility mattered in the Randall household. Every morning, at precisely 
10:00 a.m., Ollie would bring her great-grandmother her morning blend. She wrote, “I 
grew up in a family with a lot of older people in it. I counted on them and they counted 
on me.”6 Each of the girls went to the Baptist church on Sundays and took jobs to pay for 
college. At the time, multi-generational households were an American norm.  As late as 
1948 only 4.5% of elderly men and 3.3% of elderly women lived in institutions, while the 
vast majority moved in with their children.7 
 In the first decade of the twentieth century older people had yet to be recognized 
as a distinct category of the needy.8 Tossed in with other needy groups in local 
poorhouses, they were the nonspecific wards of religious societies and new scientific 
charities. Social workers, policy makers, health care professionals, and charity workers 
all struggled with how to deal with their particular plights. In her 60-year career, Randall 
would change that. “When I started,” she recalled, and “wanted to work with the old 
people they thought I was nuts. Nobody was bothering with old people.”9 Randall 
attributed her ability to see the afflictions of the elderly to the relative ease of her own 
grandmother’s final years. Her proximity to a good old age and a good death showed 
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Randall the possibilities of aging with dignity. It also taught her that even in the best 
situations, aging is a period of life fraught with the complexity of loss.  
 She often told the following story. As a young girl she happened upon her great-
grandmother talking to herself. The aged woman looked at her granddaughter’s perplexed 
stare and said, “‘Sit down over there and I’ll tell you something that will be handy one 
day for you. There comes a time in every woman’s life (when) she must talk with 
someone who understands about living and life. At 104 I don’t think there is anyone 
around who knows more about life than me.’”10 Recognition of the intangible hardship of 
emotional isolation continued to inform Randall’s philosophy of care even as she 
struggled to address the acute ailments of America’s discarded elders: unemployment, 
homelessness, and chronic disease.  
 After graduating from Pembroke College in 1912, Randall secured a position at 
one of the few agencies in the country with a program for the elderly: the Association for 
Improving the Condition of the Poor (AICP).11 Within a few months she ran all of the 
organization’s programs dedicated to elders. She loved the job and quickly took to her 
boss, who, in her estimation, “was not held down by . . . habits and all the rest of it.”12 At 
the agency, she tried to figure out which programs did and did not effectively serve their 
population, ensuring that the services responded to an actual rather than just a perceived 
need.13 She described her position as follows: “if you’re in social work working with 
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people, your job is to know what those needs are. What the people need, not what you 
need.”14  
 With the coming of World War I, Randall embarked for Paris to work for the Red 
Cross, setting up a program for wounded soldiers. There, she learned how to create 
functioning systems from scratch. She wrote, “What you did, in those days, because there 
was no precedent, was that you did what you could with what there was.”15 Randall came 
to believe in this approach, consistently breaking through bureaucracy and customs to 
solve problems. “The only training I got,” she boasted, “was to be given the job to do.”16 
When she returned to AICP at the end of the war, her philosophy of care had the 
following attributes: respond to need, act flexibly, and bypass bureaucracy to get the job 
done. 
 The employees of the AICP recognized, before the federal government did, that 
new labor practices in the early 20th century would disproportionately affect the aged (at 
the time defined as anyone over 40) and consequently set up two programs, a sheltered 
workshop and a summer camp. At the Old Men’s Toy Shop, AICP ensured “that 
individuals who were not able to compete in the labor market because they cannot cope 
with the demands of time or production” remained employed.17 The shop not only offered 
“protected working conditions for older people,” but also helped continue “the habit of 
work as it has been known to many of them . . . in such a way that there is self-respect 
retained because there is a weekly pay envelope.”18  
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 In 1916, the AICP complemented the shops with Sunset Lodge, a summer 
vacation home for the aged. For three weeks every summer, the elderly cared for by the 
AICP became “part of a large community of camps for girls, small children, and family 
groups” at Sunset Lodge.19 The important idea, Randall pronounced, was that the elders 
“do as others do.”20 They lived with people of all ages and celebrated the summer the 
way other Americans wished to celebrate the summer at the time, outdoors.21 While 
Randall enjoyed assisting in these programs, the two institutions she spearheaded, Ward 
Manor and Tompkins Square House, both defined her career and arguably transformed 
eldercare in the country.  
 In 1926, William B. Ward of the Ward Baking Company donated an estate in 
Dutchess County, New York, to the AICP for a permanent home for the elderly.  Randall 
reminisced, “I’ll never forget seeing Mr. Ward sit down and draw a check for $75,000. I 
never saw anybody do it before and I’ve never seen anybody do it since but that’s what 
he did when he handed it over to us.”22 From its founding until 1945, Randall managed 
Ward Manor, which became a physical articulation of the values of its inhabitants rather 
than its founder or manager. 
 Randall recognized that her residents came to the Manor because they had 
nowhere else to go. Many suffered from debilitating financial and emotional loss, 
arriving at Ward Manor feeling useless and discarded. In addition to creating a physically 
adequate space, she wanted to restore in her residents the feelings of dignity and self-
worth. To do so, she believed the Manor had to be self-governing. “What we tried to do,” 
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she related, “was to get self-government in the home for the old people. . . . But I mean 
they would take responsibility and be taking over. Because it was where they were living. 
And that hadn’t been done in any home for the aged up to that time.”23 Participation, in 
this model, was not a choice but a requirement. Randall observed that residents suffered 
when they weren’t truly needed. Hobbies and activities did not carry enough weight to 
give meaning and purpose to a resident’s day. For this reason the Manor required that 
every well person “share in some of the work of the home to the extent of his physical 
ability.”24 
 With the infrastructure for Ward Manor taken care of, Randall began her next 
project: a housing unit for semi-dependent living.25 Responding to a dearth of housing, 
rising unemployment, and extended life years without a pension, Randall set out to create 
low-cost apartments that would suit the aging body. Her team “planned a house which 
would have rooms for sixty old people—furnished or unfurnished as desired; 
housekeeping or not as desired; elevator; plenty of plumbing; a dining room and cafeteria 
with food at cost, a recreation room, a roof garden.”26 Although the residents would not 
have access to in-house nursing care there would be “a resident hostess whose business it 
is to know whether anything is needed.”27 For all of this, the cost would only be $20 a 
month. For the site the team chose Tompkins Square Park—an area that even Randall 
agreed could be construed as questionable. She saw beyond the park’s shady reputation to 
its given amenities. The park, she wrote, “has Wanamakers within walking distance; 
Christodora House, which opens all its doors to our family of tenants; churches of all 
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denominations; library; bus which goes by the door; and it is a place which is real in the 
hearts of our local political leaders for every tenant is a potential voter.”28 The aged 
would be integrated rather than set apart from the social, spiritual, and political life of the 
neighborhood. Randall believed in this project to such a degree that she actually moved 
in upstairs.  
 After creating two old-age homes, Randall came to be haunted by the word home. 
Institutional living, for most, is a last resort. It is the culmination of financial, physical, 
and familial loss, a desperate conclusion to a series of living arrangement mishaps. For 
this reason, Randall understood that there was something almost cruel in the title “home 
for the aged.” “Home,” she lectured in 1940, “is not merely a residence or a dwelling 
place to us—it is a place around which most of the precious memories of our life cluster, 
and one which we have shared at one time or another with loved ones of our families.”29 
“Even at best,” she continued, “a home [for the aged] . . . is an impersonal substitution for 
a very personal place—no matter how poor or how good it was, or how good our 
substitute may be.”30 The article before the noun mattered. Professionals working in the 
field had a mandate to make “a home” or “the home” work, and to do so they needed to 
focus their attention on making residents feel “at home.”  
 To start, Randall advocated that caretakers learn as much as they could about their 
residents to help parse the idea of home. What qualities did they associate with home? 
What did they need to feel a sense of belonging and community? Did they need 
chaplaincy, work, or a kitchen? Once physical needs were met institutions had to think 
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carefully about emotional ones. The question of independence was crucial in this respect. 
Elders “are not children,” Randall reminded audiences across the country. One cannot 
ignore the challenges of transition or impose a set of rules that infantilize men and 
women who have made independent decisions their entire lives.31   
 Independence, Randall astutely realized, was always an illusion. “None of us is 
genuinely ‘independent’ of others.” For Randall, this was an empowering and not a 
limiting discovery. Once one realized that independence was a helpful feeling rather than 
an empirical reality, then it was possible to “achieve for the old person a sense of 
independence in any setting.”32 Homes had “the responsibility of adapting their facilities 
to the needs of the old people, rather than attempting to insist that old people conform to 
the facilities offered.”33  Equally important to a sense of independence was a sense of 
meaningful association and usefulness. For this reason, she often said: “The household 
and not the house is the most important factor in an institution.”34 
*** 
Randall’s professional experience as a caretaker to New York’s elderly within but 
especially outside their own homes informed how she defined old age. “Time was when, 
folks were divided into two groups,” exclaimed Randall, “‘the quick or the dead.’”35 By 
the 1940s, life had come to be measured in stages: childhood, adolescence, adulthood, 
and old age. In Randall’s estimation, one entered a stage of life because of a confluence 
of factors, not neat chronology. This was especially true for the ill-defined stage of life, 
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old age. “The other day,” she related, “I sat in a meeting in which some of us were 
talking of clothing budgets for the ‘aged,’ and a board member of the committee said 
‘What do you consider an aged person?’ The answer came, for we were thinking in terms 
of public assistance, ‘sixty-five years or over’. ‘But’, came the shocked voice of the 
board member, ‘I am 65, and I am not aged!’”36  
 While the passing of days, weeks, months, and years could externally mark 
numerical age, Randall, like E.V. Cowdry, recognized that old age is something far more 
relative—experienced, despite the official demarcation, in the ephemera of subjective 
judgments. Still, in addition to governmental mandates, with the passage of the Social 
Security Act, that defined old age as beginning at 65, employers and doctors sought other 
demarcations. For employers, old age occurred when an individual could no longer work. 
This definition had its own subjective character depending on the nature of the work, the 
biases of the field, and the whims of the employer. For doctors and other medical 
professionals, old age came to be conflated with chronic disease. It was, above all, a 
physical state of decay, clearly viewed through the lens of heart disease and cancer. 
Randall fought off both of these definitions. She maligned employers for forcing able-
bodied men and women out of the workforce and squandering American manpower. She 
also reminded doctors “that the chronically ill are persons of all ages, and that all aged 
are not chronically ill.”37 
 Aging, she pronounced, is a natural part of the process of living. What do “we 
really think,” she asked, “when we let ourselves think of ‘growing old?’ Most of us 
instinctively avoid thinking of it at all, at least for ourselves, either consciously or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Randall, “Care of Old Folks Now and in the Future.”  
37 Randall, The Chronically Ill Who Live in the Community,” Date?, folder 404, box 34, Ollie Randall 
Papers. 
! ##!
unconsciously. Many shudder emotionally away from the bogey it presents.” “We forget 
then,” she continued, “that aging, or growing older, is happening to every human being 
each moment, each hour, and each day he is privileged to go on breathing. . . . Growing 
old is a natural process, as natural as growing into adolescence and into adult life.”38 No 
one has a problem with the growing part of this equation. The word growing, she noted, 
“implies constant change, and usually change for the better.” The problem is the second 
part of the phrase, old. “So, growing old is generally conceived of as a process of growth 
up to the period of old age, the beginnings of which occur at different times in growth for 
every human being, but which, when it is reached, is considered to be a kind of ‘dead 
end.’”39 Old age, it seemed to Randall, was too often conceived as something outside of 
the flow of time, the static end of a life marked by change.  
 For Randall, the final stage of life was defined not by a lack of development, but 
by a different set of developments. If adulthood could be understood as a period of 
attainment—such as money, spouses, and children—old age could be seen as the 
opposite: it was the stage of life marked by departure. “Old age,” Randall wrote, “is a 
period of losses—loss of family, of friends, of job, of health, of income, and most 
important of all, of personal status.”40 It doesn’t begin at the same time for everyone. It 
begins when the losses trigger unexpected needs. As a social worker, Randall addressed 
the question of old age at the point that it became a problem to be solved. She relied on 
an operative definition that assumed a kind of emotional or physical disability.  
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 Old age, she argued, had to be defined by looking at the needs that arose from 
external losses and internal responses. The kind of loss that propelled one into the stage 
of old age was acutely personal and could only be understood within the parameters of an 
individual’s life. The elderly, she insisted in speech after speech, were not a group that 
shared common traits and needed common aids. Rather than easily placing people inside 
or outside the category of the aged, Randall’s definition pushed caretakers to see the final 
stage of life as a trajectory marked by profound individualism, which, nonetheless, relied 
on the social world. 
*** 
 According to Randall, the ailments of old age came in two categories: the external 
and the internal. Among the former were the problems of financial insecurity, health 
failure, and lack of adequate living arrangements. Among the latter were the crises of 
social isolation, personal status, and self-worth. Aspects of these issues were timeless, 
having afflicted elderly men and women throughout history, but more often they were 
created and compounded by modern conditions of industrialization and urbanization.  
 American industries discarded older workers, forcing out able employees. Thus, 
one of the first forms of loss was financial. “[I]t is a fact that in our disregard of aged 
people we are as carelessly wasteful as we are of other material resources…Older people 
are not kept on their jobs; they are not rehired if they’re fired; they are forced to retire 
whether they are ready or not; they are forced to dependency whether they want it or 
not.”41 By the late 1940s, life expectancy averaged approximately 68 years. Industrial 
workers, some retired at 40, had to contend with 20-odd years of life without adequate 
funds for themselves and their dependents. Compounding professional losses came 
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physical ones. Even without the trials of cancer or heart disease, eyesight, hearing, 
agility, and strength dwindled in old age, complicating the obligations of daily life and 
commonly tipping the family budget towards increasing health care costs.  
 The financial burden of professional and physical loss challenged not only aged 
individuals but also their families. Randall lamented the trials of intergenerational 
conflict, which tended to spike when working adults had the dual burden of providing for 
both their parents and their children. “I am not sure you will agree with me,” she began, 
“but it seems that while we can intellectually accept the fact that as a practical or physical 
measure several generations cannot easily arrange to live together, there is a distinct lag 
between the acceptance of this and any change in attitude toward what we can or do 
accept in the matter of family relationships.”42 Living spaces have radically changed, she 
continued; “The large family mansions in which it was expected that the older people 
would continue to live, with the younger generations joining them in different degrees of 
independence, or dependence, are familiar to us in real life as well as in fiction. But it is a 
phenomenon rapidly disappearing today because of industrial and social factors. For us 
working with older people in the crowded city, the situation in which it is physically 
possible for this plan of living to obtain is practically non-existent.”43 Chronic disease 
made these already complicated living situations worse. 
 Empathizing with the challenges of caretakers, Randall wrote:  
There is nothing which taxes one’s patience more than caring day in, day out, 
for the needs of the old person whose chances of progress to restoration of 
health are negligible or nonexistent, but whose daily needs continue on the 
same, if not on an increasingly demanding level. This is also true in those 
cases of mild mental affliction—which include loss of memory, lack of 
orientation, forms of suspiciousness which may develop into what we speak 
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of as a persecution complex, and confusion which often creates intolerable 
disorder in the household. 44  
For these families, she recognized, there were not enough options. Few places offered 
adequate and affordable institutional care and even fewer provided appropriate mental 
health services. Moreover, home care programs could rarely provide enough resources 
for older persons or their depleted caretakers. Health and proper housing were, therefore, 
two of the most critical problems facing elders and their families. 
 Still, Randall argued that the greatest afflictions of old age were not the external 
ones but the feelings of isolation and uselessness that accompanied them. She recognized 
that the loss of community and purpose diminished an aged individual’s sense of self. To 
fully explain this process, she focused on the issue of time. 
 “Time,” Randall mused, “has a very new and different meaning for us as we near 
the end of the road. It has, strangely enough, a sharply reduced value, in that, as we have 
more of it to use personally as ‘leisure time,’ with less skill or practice in so using it, it 
becomes a kind of drug in the daily market of our lives. Time becomes synonymous with 
boredom. . . . The past is now longer than the future can possibly be.”45 “Killing time,” 
she continued, “a common pastime among older people, is a murderous activity in more 
ways than one since it kills so much more than time. It kills initiative, interest, and in the 
end it can kill the personality of the person who indulges in the practice too often and too 
long.”46 To Randall, there is nothing meaningful, productive, healthy, or even deserved 
about a life bereft of purpose. She writes, “to feel useless or unimportant to others as well 
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as to one’s self is the most devastating experience a person can have.”47 The experience 
of uselessness, be it within one’s professional or familial life, leads to a personal crisis of 
value. When a person stops believing he is useful to others, she wrote, “he ceases to be 
important to himself.”48 “If we are to understand old people, we must first realize that old 
age constitutes a genuine threat to practically all which has been held dear, with the major 
threat being to the intrinsic importance of the individual to his community, to his family, 
but even more devastating, to himself.”49 Thus, “[i]f we can salvage that value—that 
sense of ‘intrinsic importance’—to an elderly person, whether dependent or independent, 
we have made I think our greatest contribution to his personal contentment.”50 
 Weaving together the subjective emotional ailments with the material and 
physical ones, Randall ranked the problems of old age in the following order: the loss of 
personal status, financial strain, family friction, housing, illness, social isolation, and 
unfulfilled spiritual needs. 
*** 
 Randall, never one to indulge in too much talk, had solutions. Old age could not 
be magically or medically ignored, cured, or perpetually staved off. It had to be dealt 
with, its inevitable hardships understood, and its unnecessary pains ameliorated. Four 
groups, according to Randall, had responsibilities in this area: middle-aged individuals, 
the family members of elders, public and private institutions, and finally the federal 
government. 
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 Randall had an unwavering conviction that old age is “essentially one’s own 
personal business.”51 In tandem with her notion that elders can only be understood and 
cared for as individuals, she believed that each individual had an obligation to prepare for 
his or her own old age. “While, I have said, it would be disastrous to live with our eyes 
and our minds always directed beyond the present to this future, which every one of us 
secretly or subconsciously hopes to reach, even while we may shudder away from the 
thought of it, I believe it important for us to recognize that our present tendency to push 
the thought away, to close our minds to it, is proving to be equally disastrous in its 
results.”52 
Americans must acknowledge that they will age, that they will lose abilities, and 
that they will die. This is the only way to cultivate good habits that will serve oneself and 
one’s family in the later years. It is not society’s job to do this, thought Randall; it is 
one’s own.  
 It is “our personal business,” Randall exclaimed, to “prepare intellectually for 
changing satisfactions as the years are added one by one. . . . If we think we’d like to read 
and want to derive pleasure from it when we have time, we should develop the habit of 
finding time for reading at last a half hour or an hour a day now.” 53 Regarding our own 
health, she preached, “it is our personal business to know more than the mere 
diagnosis . . . . We should focus our attention not on how we are to die of it, but how we 
may live with it.”54  
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 Randall’s model for successful aging was her mother. “For ten years,” she wrote, 
“I have watched my own mother making with some effort, very carefully concealed, the 
change in status and identity attendant upon ceasing to Mrs. Randall, a person of 
substance in her own community.”55 She lost her home, her husband, and her community. 
Yet despite these hardships, Randall’s mother knew enough about herself and her own 
habits to adjust to a life without those identity stabilizers. She knew after years in a house 
filled with family that she could not live alone. With the assistance and support of her 
children she decided to split her time between the homes of each of her daughters. Rather 
than take on a position outside the family, she tried to become as helpful as possible 
within her children’s homes. It was now possible, wrote Randall, “for her to fit quietly 
into the family life of each home, keep herself busily occupied, and so useful that she is a 
real loss when she moves on.”56 Even still, with the comforts of financial independence, a 
nourishing place to live, and social intimacy, the affliction of the loss of status pressed 
on. Her mother, she commented, in these settings came to be defined through her 
subordinate relationship to her children. Randall admired that her mother had accepted 
the reality of her position and managed to successfully adapt: “being deprived of the 
status to which she has been accustomed, and an identity of her own, apart from that of 
being our mother, her habits of life are making it possible for her to accept the role which 
circumstances have brought her in old age.”57As the middle aged have an obligation to 
prepare for old age, aged individuals have an obligation to try to adapt and to make 
themselves useful in the environment they find themselves in.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 Randall, “Old Folks in the World of Today,” 1947?, folder 402, box 34, Ollie Randall Papers, 11.  
56 Ibid., 10-11. 
57 Randall, “The Psychological Aspects of Aging,” May 28, 1947, folder 403, box 34, Ollie Randall Papers, 
11.  
! $*!
 The burdens of old age, Randall recognized, were rarely borne solely by the aged 
individuals, but also by their younger family members, who provided financial and 
emotional assistance. She recognized that while family living arrangements in the 
twentieth century had changed, religious and political ideals surrounding the family had 
not. She wrote, “In our Christian communities we have been taught early to ‘Honor thy 
father and thy mother.’ There is no finer precept for family life. Perhaps we need to re-
examine, not the precept itself, but the manner in which it can find acceptable expression 
today.”58 The family, she argued, “is the fundamental unit of our society and our 
democracy,” and yet it bears the “brunt of all the aspects of the industrial changes, the 
geographical shifts, and the general social apathy.” 59 We do not need to change our 
definition of the family, she insisted, “but we may change our ideas of what is a natural 
living arrangement for members of a family, if the individuals who compose it are to be 
happy and self-sufficient persons in the community.”60  
 Primarily, Randall believed that it was “the personal business” of the family to 
create a workable living arrangement. Ideally, elders should remain in their home and 
caretakers should have ample support from the community. Circumstances, however, 
often make this arrangement both physically, financially, and emotionally impossible. It 
is at this point that responsibility shifts from the individual and family to the immediate 
community and larger government. Randall described the transition. “[W]e are 
transferring upon our collective shoulders the burden, hitherto assumed largely by the 
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family and the intimate community, of giving support to retired and destitute old people. 
We and other nations have, as a collectivity, assumed the responsibility of filial duty.”61  
The responsibility, thought Randall, once assumed had to be met. She wrote that the 
“speed with which middle age, if not old age, has overtaken us individually and 
collectively had caught everyone short. There is unpreparedness in every aspect of 
economic, social, and personal life for this dividend of years granted to us.”62 The most 
immediate need was housing.  
 Once in-home care ceased to be an option, families were left to navigate a barren 
landscape of inadequate institutions. In the 1940s, older individuals and their families had 
the following alternatives to in-home care. They could choose between varieties of 
boarding houses with different kinds of caretakers, such as foster families, nursing homes 
adjacent to or affiliated with hospitals, private or public homes for the aged, and state 
hospitals. “I don’t believe I need to remind you that until recently in this country there 
were only two plans for caring for dependent elderly people—the county almshouses or 
city homes, and homes so-called, established by churches or fraternal orders. . . . And the 
conditions in these we may agree probably even beggared the descriptions of a Mr. 
Dickens. In many places they still do.”63 The available options were not only physically 
inadequate but philosophically missed the mark. “Then too the homes in many instances 
believe that once a person was accepted, and provided with the essentials of living such 
as food and shelter, it was up to that person to ‘take it and like it.’ If he didn’t, the fault 
was his. He was a charity charge and independence of thinking was something he was 
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supposed to have left outside the door when he entered it.”64 Communities had to not 
only build new homes and fix existing ones, but they also had to fix the collective vision 
of these homes.  
 On an exploratory trip to Sweden in the 1930s, Randall pointed out a “particularly 
lovely building” to her bus driver.65 She often told of his response. “Why that’s the 
village home for old folks,” he told her, “When you see the biggest, finest kept house and 
garden in the village, you know that is the home for old folks. They deserve the best we 
have.”66 Randall recognized that on a strictly material level, many American homes 
rivaled Sweden’s. Yet, at a certain point, material comfort didn’t matter if the residents 
and the community felt discarded and disrespected. In our homes, she wrote, “we have to 
reestablish the individual in his own estimation.”67 To do so, the old folks home had to be 
a point of pride for the entire community.   
 Although Randall spent much of her time refining the purpose of the old age 
home, she knew that the need for such a home represented broader challenges. For 
society, the issue was not old age per se, she noted, but the soaring number of elderly. To 
cope with this problem of scale, Randall recommended that nonprofits, foundations, and 
local governments begin a rigorous process of data collection in order to fully understand 
the mutual or conflicting needs of individuals as they related to employment, health, 
housing, and family life. To cope with a systemic problem, Randall believed one had to 
extend listening skills beyond the aged themselves. For this reason she wanted the data to 
reflect the holistic needs of the community rather than the particular needs of the elderly. 
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For example, she urged family agencies to “discover what effect the presence or absence 
of older people in the family has upon the family.”68 
 In tandem with data collection, she called for a serious reevaluation of the mental 
and physical capacity of those deemed aged. She wanted to divert efforts from the 
disabilities of aging to the abilities of the experienced. She wrote: “I cannot help but feel 
that what we are essentially saying to our older people is ‘Get out of the way. We will see 
that you don’t go hungry; we will treat you with a good deal of quite inexpensive 
deference, we will, perhaps, dole out a little to add to what we have you save up 
yourselves but, nevertheless, get out. Cultivate the art of growing old gracefully—
whatever that means—but don’t by any chance do anything useful enough to command a 
wage or a salary.’”69 In addition to the “reorganization of business and industry in order 
to conserve and utilize precious and currently wasted manpower,” Randall called for a 
“similar reorganization of other social institutions, such as the school, the church, the 
social services, and civic and governmental units.”70 Schools had to prepare children to 
think about living longer, adult education classes had to be offered, and social services 
had to move from a youth- centered approach to one that included multiple generations 
and elders. Randall tasked local government, non-profits, and religious groups with the 
previous list of obligations. Health care professionals had a different set of 
responsibilities. 
 Randall had a nuanced understanding of illness and disability. Patients do not 
need a diagnosis or straight prognosis, she claimed; what they need is a careful analysis 
of “the degree of need established by the degree of disability for the several types of 
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services—medical care, physical care, including personal services and attendance as well 
as nursing care, services to meet social and emotional need . . .”71 The goal of care, she 
contended, must lie in “a fuller use of the individual patient himself, in spite of, or 
because of, his disability.”72 For this reason, Randall was wary of the new institutional 
entity called the nursing home, where disability became identity and purposeful work 
came to be replaced by days of waiting.  
 For Randall, the majority of the responsibility for the problems of old age fell to 
individuals, their families, and their communities. Still, she believed that the federal 
government had to continue its involvement and do a better job intervening. She wrote, 
“We have in the United States today one of the most effective and largest Social Security 
programs which has ever been developed. . . . However, if one scrutinizes it and analyzes 
it as to what it actually provides, you may agree with me that ‘social security’ is 
something of a misnomer, for what we have in fact is a program of ‘economic security.”73 
Randall believed that the federal government had “a moral and real responsibility for 
seeing that people do not rust out, but wear out gradually as active members of the 
communities in which they live.”74 If business or industry could not “find ways and 
means of providing sheltered opportunity for work to older people,” then the government 
should “develop the machinery to profit by the productiveness of older persons who may 
be denied the chance to function in other settings.”75  
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 Randall arrived in Washington optimistic and cautious. She understood the 
magnitude of the problem, the real possibility of solving aspects of the crisis, and yet 
remained extremely modest about the kind of care that would work. She distrusted 
systems that could not accommodate particularities and bureaucratic institutions that lost 
sight of individual responsibility and agency. She called for a collective rethinking of the 
aged’s position within the family, the local community, and the broader society. Not only 
should elders be conceptualized and cared for as part of a family unit but each individual 
should understand that he or she will, if lucky, get old. 
  
III: Clark Tibbitts and Centralized Care 
 Clark Tibbitts excelled in meetings. He knew how to run them, participate in 
them, and organize them. He even knew how to make them productive. He was a 
statistics man, educated in the social sciences, and devoted to fixing problems at a macro 
level. In 1929, he received a PhD in Sociology at the University of Chicago, studying 
under the luminaries William Ogburn and Ernest Burgess.  He went on to a joint career as 
an academic and a policy analyst. His interest in aging came not from his family but from 
his academic and professional life. He believed that with the help of good research and 
good ideas, the federal government could solve major social issues, such as old age.76   
 Tibbitts did not begin his career interested in the elderly. Like many sociologists 
at the time, his early work focused on immigrant politics and urban blight with one 
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eccentricity, a fascination with organized crime.77 During the Depression, Tibbitts left his 
post as a sociology instructor at the University of Michigan to become the Coordinator of 
Urban Research at the Federal Emergency Relief Administration and later the Field 
Director of the National Health Survey for the U.S. Public Health Service, where he first 
came across the afflictions of the elderly.78  
 The Survey sought “to determine the amount of sickness experienced by the 
general population.”79 To begin, Tibbitts had to create an operative definition of sickness. 
He wrote: “Sickness itself is difficult to define. When is one sick and when not?” For the 
purpose of the study they settled on what he argued was a subjective definition: “those 
who were disabled or unable to perform their normal duties . . .”80 The ability or inability 
to “perform one’s usual work is not an objective item,” acknowledged Tibbitts.”81 Still, 
the canvassing pressed on and the staff managed to determine two categories of disease: 
the acute and the chronic. The acute diseases, such as scarlet fever and smallpox, “last 
only a short period and can be cured without much cost.”82 Not only could families 
economically carry the cost of care, but medical advancements had widely reduced the 
number of acute disease cases.  
 Chronic disease was another matter. The “long” and “disabling experience” of 
cancer, heart disease, arthritis, diabetes, and crippling conditions required expensive 
treatment. Moreover, chronic disease threw the “breadwinners out of work” and 
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demanded “constant attention.” The whole family, Tibbitts lamented, “may have to 
organize around the sick person—young people who wish to get married . . . have to stay 
home to care for the parent.”83 Tibbitts observed that while medicine had eliminated 
many acute diseases, chronic diseases would continue to grow in importance. There were, 
he wrote, “more old people” and “city life doesn’t provide care.”84  
 Tibbitts also observed the correlation between poverty and poor health. He wrote: 
“Disabling illnesses of all kinds increase as income drops. There is 57 percent more 
disabling sickness among persons who are on relief than among persons in families 
having annual incomes of $3,000 or more. Chronic disease is 87 percent more frequent at 
the bottom than at the top of the income scale.”85 Not only did poverty reduce access to 
health care, but this reduced access plunged families deeper into poverty. The plights of 
the parents, he knew, determined the financial and then the physical opportunities of the 
children. When, in 1938, the University of Michigan asked him to return to run the 
recently created Institute of Human Adjustment, Tibbitts had come to the conclusion that 
the problems of soaring numbers of elderly afflicted with chronic disease would pose a 
great burden to the United States.  
*** 
 In 1937, the estate of Horace and Mary Rackham made a six million dollar 
bequest to the University of Michigan to found an institute dedicated to “applying the 
findings of science to those problems of human imbalance.”86 Horace Rackham, a former 
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Ford Motor Company for free and invest in the fledgling company. Rackham devoted his 
fortune to helping the intellectual community in Detroit and the University of Michigan.87 
Rackham’s institute would help foster social adjustment through social service centers 
with active research arms. It began operations with a speech clinic, a psychological clinic, 
a vocational guidance demonstration center, and a community center.88  
 The term social adjustment had purchase in 1937. By 1942 its overuse prompted 
Verne Wright in his broad literature review of the topic to lament, “many authors use the 
term ‘adjustment’ or ‘social adjustment’ but they rarely define it.”89 Ernest Burgess, 
Tibbitts’ mentor at Chicago and later Chairman of the Committee on Social Adjustment 
at the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), had an operative definition based on 
Josiah Stamp’s The Science of Social Adjustment (1937). Burgess noted that Stamp had 
used the term to mean “societal adjustment,” which had two components: the first is the 
“adjustment of society and its institutions to the changing situation. . . . The other half is 
the adjustment of individuals to the changes which are taking place and to the social 
situation.”90 From the outset Tibbitts and Burgess believed that aging in the United States 
was a problem of societal adjustment.  
 For eleven years, from 1938 to 1949, Tibbitts directed the Institute and worked to 
establish the societal adjustment problems of the elderly as equal to those of children and 
adolescents. By 1943 Burgess, who was then 57 years old, joined Tibbitts on his quest. 
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His Committee on Social Adjustment at the SSRC focused its attention and funds on this 
question of “old people.”91 Their argument went as follows: Since the creation of Social 
Security, old age had become “recognized as a national responsibility,” and yet there had 
been few if any “systematic studies” on older people outside of their need for economic 
assistance. 92 In short, older people had been studied as a category of the worthy poor but 
not as a comprehensive minority group. The Committee decided to put together a 
subcommittee on adjustment in later maturity and invited Clark Tibbitts to participate and 
to assist in designing a research conference on the topic.   
 The conference, held in Chicago on June 24th and 25th, 1944, opened with a 
“Definition of Old Age,” by Ruth Shonle Cavan, another Chicago trained sociologist. 
Cavan urged her listeners to rethink old age in terms of someone’s “age role” within a 
community. She commented, “The age role that a person plays is determined in large part 
by the group of which he is a member. The group, whether a factory organization, union, 
school board, or neighborhood, defines old age, not in terms of years alone but in terms 
of capacities, mannerisms, interests, appearance.”93 Like Randall, Cavan agreed that an 
individual’s age role also existed as a subjective state and she requested that scholars ask, 
“How do people define old age for themselves? Under what conditions do they feel 
old?”94 In 1944, there was still some hope that a better non-chronological definition of 
old age could be achieved and therefore studied. The rest of the conference focused on 
creating methods to actually study what proper adjustment to old age looked like.   
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 In 1948, the SSRC finally published a record of its early studies on elders in 
Social Adjustment in Old Age: A Research Planning Report. The text opens with a 
defense of the project that places the problems of old age in line with the afflictions of 
other minority groups—such as African Americans, adolescents, or criminals—and goes 
on to relay the particular predicament of demographic realignment: “Thus the dynamics 
of a continuing decrease of the younger and a continuing increase of the older population 
groups constitute one of the characteristic demographic phenomena of our time—a 
phenomenon fraught with social implications.”95 The problems posed by this 
demographic reality intensify with urbanization, “the reduction in living space per family 
unit, the resulting shift from a three-generation to a two-generation family system, and 
the increase in standards of living and care which are considered appropriate to make the 
fulfillment . . . [of] traditional obligations increasingly difficult.”96 This new social crisis, 
the report asserted, would benefit from a social scientific approach based on accurate 
descriptions rather than mere aspirations.  
 For this reason, the report abandoned Cavan’s proposal of studying age roles. In 
its stead, SSRC scholars recommended accepting the definition of old age imposed by the 
Social Security Act. The reality of age typing had to override the dream of its 
disappearance. “Hardly ever before has a culture permitted such a degree of 
chronologically exact age typing for all people,” Otto Pollak, the report’s editor, wrote.97 
“In our present-day culture . . . with its birth registration and frequent use of birth 
certificates, mathematical awareness of chronological age has led to a situation where age 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 Otto Pollak, Social Adjustment in Old Age, 2.  
96 Ibid., 3.  
97 Ibid. 
! %+!
typing is based not so much on manifestations as on expectations of changes with age.”98 
Pollak thought, “social research must recognize the existing social situation and use the 
existing society’s definition of old age which is still predominantly chronological.”99 The 
only exception to this rule arose in particular systems. For example, if age typing in 
industry defined the elderly as over 40 then social scientists have an obligation to take on 
that definition while studying that system. Social science cannot, the argument went, 
create optimal conditions without studying suboptimal ones first. Although possibly 
detrimental, age typing was the current social reality, and researchers had to assume its 
existence. The report did not mention whether or not academics would contribute to age 
typing by solidifying its presence with such studies.  
 With a chronological definition of old age in hand, the report described the 
problems elders faced: “Problems of old age arise therefore chiefly in two ways: (1) as 
the result of declining physical or mental capacities which make it difficult or impossible 
to satisfy one’s needs in ways previously employed, and (2) the individual reaches the 
chronological age which places him in the old age group as defined by society.”100 The 
first condition focused on loss that occurs naturally due to the biological process of aging. 
The second refered to the pressures imposed by or correlated with societal attitudes.  
 Tibbitts contributed to this formulation by focusing on how changes in societal 
attitudes could actually deter physical and mental deterioration. He wrote: “The 
generalized popular notion about older people appears to be that they are physically and 
mentally deteriorated; eager to withdraw from responsibility and from social participation 
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people has revealed . . . that mental decline may be greatly retarded through the exercise 
of mental capacities; that most people do not wish to withdraw from work or from their 
fellows; and that they wish to retain a large share of responsibility for their own 
management.”101  
 To keep older people mentally alert, in better health, and thus out of poverty, 
Tibbitts believed the federal government had to be involved in combating stereotypes and 
putting the elderly back to work. For this reason, adult education became the cornerstone 
of the Tibbitts’ answer to the problems of old age. He came to this solution through two 
professional endeavors at the institute: a survey of elders and the first adult-learning 
courses in the country. In tandem, these projects offered precision to his overall theory 
and led him to advance a particular ideal of government involvement in the problems of 
old age.  
  Following the conference, the SSRC and the Institute partnered to launch a pilot 
study of the “Socio-Psychological Problems of Aging.” In Washtenaw County, Michigan, 
the Institute conducted “comprehensive interviews with one hundred older residents.” 
This project, the first of its kind to have “older people identify the problems of aging in a 
free-interviewing situation,” sought to generate “a detailed list of the problems attendant 
upon aging,” gather “information regarding the variety of adjustments (and 
maladjustments)” and offer a “hypothesis for further investigations.”102 Through this 
study, Tibbitts concluded that the elderly want, in the following order, financial security, 
physical health and comfort, living arrangements (ideally in their own homes), affection, 
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activity, and religion.103 The desire for spiritual solace at the end of life featured 
prominently in Tibbitt’s encounters with the aged and he came to believe that houses of 
worship could help alleviate the psycho-social ailments of old age.  
 Financial and physical health, affection, and activity—four out of a list of six—
could all be tackled, to some degree, by keeping elders intellectually and professionally 
engaged. As early as 1944 he partnered with Wilma Donahue, head of the Psychology 
Clinic at the Institute, to launch the first university courses that would be “given to older 
people themselves on the topic of problems, adjustments, and activities in later maturity 
and old age.”104 Tibbitts was immensely proud of these courses as they proved that old 
age could be planned for and that the aged wanted to remain intellectually active. The 
courses demonstrated that the elderly could be professionally retrained and would be 
willing to take on other forms of work. A year after they offered the first class, the duo 
brought the course to cities across the Midwest and Canada. In addition they aired 
twenty-six radio shows and planned the first comprehensive conference on aging, “Living 
through the Older Years.”105  
 By 1949, Tibbitts believed that the problem of social adjustment in old age could 
be alleviated through widespread adult education that would extend from the individual 
to industry. For this to be effective, he believed the country needed a central authority, 
like the Federal Security Agency (FSA), to call national attention to the problem and 
offer local groups comprehensive and accurate information.  
 Tibbitts also voiced concerns about leaving such a large social problem in the 
hands of discreet groups more eager to fund medical research into longevity than social 
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research into problems like employment.  “Society,” he wrote in a letter to John L. 
Thurston, Assistant Administrator for Programs at the FSA, “has placed a premium on 
longevity (and) is supporting research on disease in a rather handsome fashion.”106 
Medical research, Tibbitts argued, cannot be the only form of intervention into man’s 
later years. He continued, “Poorly conceived, narrow, and expensive plans for meeting 
some of their needs will become a growing plague on the total community. It is time now 
to study the entire situation with the view to giving older people well-rounded 
satisfaction within the limits of the ability of the community to pay.”107 The federal 
government had to step up first to educate society and then to balance and organize a set 
of hodgepodge approaches to eldercare that exacerbated, rather than solved, problems.   
 In 1949, Randall and Tibbitts had arrived at similar ends through different means. 
The social worker and the sociologist would describe the problems of old age with the 
same words: housing, employment, intergenerational tension, and self-worth. Yet, 
beneath this surface, cleavages existed. While Randall saw the value of a single 
clearinghouse for data, best practices, and a coherent American reeducation campaign, 
she remained extremely wary of monolithic models of care that did not envision the aged 
as capable of self-governance. Tibbitts had a more optimistic vision of government 
involvement. For him, statistics accurately described a problem of such magnitude that 
federal intervention was necessary. Most importantly, the two ascribed responsibility in 
opposite directions. For Randall the chain of responsibility began with the individual. For 
Tibbitts it began with the state.   
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 At the exact moment the SSRC and the Institute for Human Adjustment called for 
federal attention to the problems of old age, the Truman administration sought a political 
solution to the stalemate around universal health care. Thus, while Randall and Tibbitts 
arrived at the FSA meeting hoping to alleviate the ailments of America’s elders, the 
Truman administration was about to devise a plan to use the potential political clout of 
the elderly to push universal health care through Congress.  
 
IV: A Federal Solution to the Problem of Universal Health Care: 
 In 1942, Fortune magazine announced the American public’s support for National 
Health Insurance at a whopping 74%.108 It seemed just a matter of time until the United 
States offered every citizen the right of healthcare. In 1944, President Roosevelt called 
for an “Economic Bill of Rights” proclaiming that every American had the “right to 
adequate medical care.”109 With Roosevelt’s untimely death, Harry Truman took up the 
mantle and tried unsuccessfully to push national health insurance through the clenched 
jaws of the Republican Congress.110 After leaving office, Truman reflected, “I have had 
some bitter disappointments as President . . . but the one that has troubled me most, in a 
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personal way, has been the failure to defeat organized opposition to a national 
compulsory health-insurance program.”111 
 The President’s tepid approval ratings, the postwar Congress’s conservative bent, 
and the powerful alliance of anti-national health insurance special interest groups led by 
the American Medical Association combined to thwart health insurance legislation from 
1945 to 1947. In 1948, the President resigned himself to the fact that national health 
insurance would have to be an “ultimate aim” rather than a proximate one.112 A new 
tactic was required. The President asked Oscar Ewing, his new head of the Federal 
Security Administration (the implementation arm of the Social Security Act), to convene 
a National Health Assembly and complete a 10-year health plan.113 The medical 
community and the advocates of national health insurance would have to work together.  
*** 
 Oscar Ewing had the right amount of ambition. Born in Greensburg, Indiana in 
1889, he took up political posts as a point of duty. The valedictorian of Indiana 
University came from a long line of ardent Democrats and began running for office in 
high school. More than political power, Ewing craved an interesting life filled with 
diverse people, ideas, and responsibilities. In college, he decided to major in philosophy 
to focus on how to “put things together and make sense out of . . . the meaning of the 
whole rather than breaking down the parts.”114 His proclivity for coherence and 
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completeness helped him pull ideas and people together. As a student at Harvard Law 
School he earned the praise of his professors and peers, many of whom found themselves 
at the other end of the political spectrum. In his career as a lawyer, Ewing managed to 
move smoothly between the private and public sectors, representing railroads, 
pharmaceutical companies, and the aluminum industry, while prosecuting high-profile 
criminals for such crimes as sedition and treason.115 
 In the early 1940s, Ewing’s political astuteness and social adroitness propelled 
him into the position of consigliere to the Democratic Party. President Roosevelt 
appointed him assistant vice chairman of the Democratic National Committee, where, in 
the 1944 convention, he supported Senator Harry S. Truman for Vice President. When 
Truman became President, he wanted Ewing to head the Federal Security 
Administration.116 
 Despite eventually concerning itself with the challenges of longevity, The Federal 
Security Agency (FSA) had a brief lifespan of 14 years. In 1939, this sub-cabinet level 
agency subsumed the previously independent Social Security Board, which was tasked 
with implementing the goals of the 1935 Social Security Act. In that year, the FSA 
merged the Social Security Board, the Public Health Service, the Office of Education, the 
Civilian Conservation Corp., and the U.S. Employment Service under the same roof. The 
Agency’s mission was too vast. By the time Ewing took over the agency in 1947, the 
Social Security Board once again attained institutional independence as the Social 
Security Agency with Arthur Altemeyer as Commissioner. In 1953 the FSA dissolved 
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when President Eisenhower reorganized and renamed this hodgepodge social service 
agency the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.  
 Ewing took up the post of head of the Federal Security Administration in 1947 
with little social policy experience and no agenda. It was clear that Truman didn’t appoint 
him to the FSA for his professional experience as a social service administrator. Rather, 
he appointed him because he knew politics. Ewing recalled, “The Federal Security 
Agency was politically a very sensitive position. Its activities affected every man, woman 
and child in the United States, and the President wanted someone heading the Agency 
who would be alive to the political consequences of what might be done.”117 At the 
outset, Ewing had two goals: to help enact the administration’s agenda and to boost the 
President’s image.118  
 Ewing’s fight for national health insurance came at the President’s behest. The 
spar with Congress, Ewing observed, “took place before I was Federal Security 
Administrator, before I even got interested in national health insurance.” “After I became 
Administrator,” he continued, “I realized that President Truman was strongly in favor of 
national health insurance. . . . Accordingly, at the request of the President, I called a 
conference to consider the health problems of the country, not merely national health 
insurance but every phase of health problems that faced this country.”119 Ewing 
recognized that he had to turn the conversation away from health insurance to health care 
if he wanted to cultivate a productive conversation between organized opposed interests. 
His conference, the National Health Assembly was such a success that even the vitriolic 
head of the American Medical Association, Dr. Morris Fishbein—one of the greatest 
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opponents of national health insurance—told Ewing that “it was the best conference that 
had ever been held in this country on health problems.”120 The conference presented 
Ewing and the Truman administration with a glimmer of hope. National health insurance 
as previously conceived might be off the table, but perhaps some kind of compromise, 
under the guise of health care, could be reached.121 
 Improbably, the famed publisher William Randolph Hearst, Jr. put Ewing on the 
path to actually developing national health insurance for the aged. At some point in 1949, 
Ewing recalls, Hearst “invited me over for cocktails.”122  
He and I were talking and he said, “I’m very much in favor of your idea for 
national health insurance. But the thing that worries me about it is that if 
anything went wrong, if it didn’t work, the upheaval that would result would 
be catastrophic because we would have a completely different system of 
medicine”. Then he added, “Isn’t there some small segment of the problem 
that you could pick out, apply your health insurance program to it, use it as a 
pilot plan operation?” This suggestion made a great deal of sense and it 
started me on my search for a limited program.123 
 Ewing left the party and immediately called the three Social Security big wigs—
Arthur Altmeyer, Wilbur Cohen, and Isadore Falk—“to ask them if there was some part 
of our program for national health insurance that we could put out, get it going and use as 
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a pilot plant operation.”124 They trio hedged. Louis Pink, a dear friend and former client, 
handed Ewing the idea of the elderly. Pink, an insurance expert with New York Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield, suggested “that the Government try to do something for the over 
sixty-five group so that the health insurance companies would have some actuarial data 
that would enable them to insure the over sixty-five group. He said that without such 
actuarial data an insurance company wouldn’t know what premiums to charge or what 
risks the insurance should cover.”125 When Ewing came back to Altmeyer with this idea, 
it seemed to him that the trio had already imagined this option. At the close of the 1940s, 
a new strategy for national health began to emerge; health insurance would mirror the 
history of voting: enfranchisement would be incremental, offered to one group at a time.  
*** 
 When Randall and Tibbitts arrived in room 5051 of the Federal Security Building 
on April 22, 1949, FSA Assistant Administrator John L. Thurston announced his desire 
that the day be a “cross between a seminar and a Quaker meeting.”126 The goal of this 
spirited and erratic discussion would be a “blueprint” for federal involvement in the 
problems of the aged. What began as a conversation soon turned into a plan: the FSA 
would host the first National Conference on Aging. Originally designed by Randall and 
Tibbitts to foster a productive national dialogue on the problems of, and solutions to, old 
age, the Conference would, inadvertently, establish the elderly as a visible voting bloc 
with attendant lobbying groups. In the decade following the Conference, the National 
Council on the Aging (NCOA) and the National Council of Senior Citizens (NCSC) 
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would come into being and build a vibrant political coalition that advanced iterations of 
the Truman administration’s novel policy plan, nicknamed Medicare. For a decade to 
come health care would trump personal care as a solution to the problems that afflicted 
individuals over 65 years of age. 
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CHAPTER III  
Dependent Not Old:  
The First National Conference on Aging, 1950–1952  
 
“We live in time—it hold us and moulds us—but I’ve never felt  
I understood it very well.”1 
                           Julian Barnes, The Sense of an Ending 
  
I: Introduction 
 “You should live so long,” chirped N. S. Haseltine, in a snarky Washington Post 
piece. “And because you will,” he continued, “national experts convened here to talk over 
what should be done for you.”2 The day was August 13, 1950; the place was Washington, 
D.C, where over 5000 “out of towners” descended on the sweltering city to attend a 
conference-packed weekend. In addition to the meagerly populated National Conference 
on Aging, the Army and Navy Union of the U.S.A, the International Typographic Union, 
the Croatian Fraternal Union of America, and the Pi Phi Fraternity competed for 
broadcast minutes.3 With only 816 people in attendance, the National Conference on 
Aging, at the stately Shoreham Hotel, still managed to capture the country’s attention. 
Newspapers from California to New York reported on the massive implications of this 
recently discovered social problem. 
 For one thing, the guests were colorful. The infamous Dr. Francis E. Townsend 
arrived prepared to push his latest pension plan, $150 a month for everyone over sixty.4 
Then came the “Texas cyclone,” an avuncular figure with “the longest name, longest 
beard, and longest tongue of Texas,” Arlon Barton Cyclone Davis, to advocate for pay-
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as-you-go pensions and demonstrate his sixty-nine years of impeccable health.5 
Representatives arrived from General Electric, Eastman Kodak, The Josiah Macy 
Foundation, life insurance companies, hospitals, and social welfare agencies. Eric 
Johnson, president of the Motion Picture Association of America, the unstoppable health 
advocate Mary Lasker, scholars and activists such as Clark Kerr, E. V. Cowdry, and Ollie 
Randall, as well as labor leaders Walter Reuther and Nelson Cruikshank, hunkered down 
for back-to-back sessions on the indignities and challenges faced by America’s elders.  
 For three days, interested parties gathered to confer on the “problem of old age.” 
Despite a wide range of professions represented, and lively exchanges of opinion, the 
participants arrived at surprisingly similar conclusions. Whether they attended the 
meeting on “Employability and Rehabilitation” or “Living Arrangements,” these new 
experts claimed that the hardships of old age could be discussed primarily through the 
language of dependency. Rather than culling from Ollie Randall’s expansive terminology 
of personal care, the conference participants came to believe that the problem of old age, 
for both individuals and society, was the emotional and physical toll incurred by financial 
and physical needs. The aged in America had become a dependent class. This crisis of 
dependency had clear solutions: create programs that would allow the elderly to remain 
financially and physically independent.  
 The first National Conference on Aging achieved mixed results. Although the 
Conference established the elderly and their hardships as national issues, replete with 
federal committees and popular journals, the goals stated by the conference participants 
came to be overshadowed. In a matter of years, politicians, reformers, and the elderly 
themselves recast the expansive, multifaceted, and intergenerational problem of 
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dependency into the specific hardship of poverty caused by mounting health-care costs. 
Solutions transformed as well; job-retraining programs gave way to data collection 
initiatives, and the emphasis on early health-care interventions disappeared, as the quest 
for health insurance for those over sixty-five years of age took on a political life of its 
own. The lasting results of the first National Conference on Aging would be the 
demonstration, albeit nascent, of the growing power of America’s senior citizens and the 
marriage of this power with Oscar Ewing’s hospital insurance program.  
 
II: The First National Conference on Aging 
 In 1950, Oscar Ewing had problems. Since taking over the Federal Security 
Agency (FSA) in 1947, he had become a maligned figure in Washington. As the fall man 
for Truman’s thwarted National Health Insurance program, Ewing acquired a slew of 
high-profile detractors. In the summer of 1949, the Los Angeles Times reported that 
Ewing’s “bumptious personality” thwarted Truman’s plan to create a cabinet level 
welfare department.6 The newspaper noted, “[T]he 60-to-32 vote by which the Senate 
vetoed the plan and thus killed it…stemmed from distrust of Ewing,” who would have 
been slated to run the department.7 In a profile titled “Ewing: Deeply Sincere Man or 
Designing Politician?” The Sun attempted to get a handle on the vitriol. Was Oscar 
Ewing, “a quiet, mild-mannered, deeply sincere man who left a lucrative law career to 
serve his country,” or a “skillful, designing, power-thirsty politician bent on fastening the 
‘welfare state’ tighter and tighter upon the American people.…” The article concluded on 
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a favorable note, subtly blaming the anti-health-insurance lobby for skewering a man 
motivated by a duty to give all Americans independence.8  
 Ewing, of course, sided with The Sun and often shared the following story: In the 
late 1940s, his friend Mike Gorman received a call from Clem Whitaker, head of the 
same advertising firm, Whitaker and Baxter, that the American Medical Association 
(AMA) had hired to turn the country against national health insurance. Gorman told 
Ewing that Whitaker said, “‘…all you have to do to beat it is to give it a bad name, and 
have a Devil. America’s opposed to Socialism, so we’re going to name National Health 
Insurance ‘socialized medicine.’ That gives it a bad name. And we’ve got to have a 
Devil, we first thought of making President Truman the Devil, but we believe he’s too 
popular. But this man Ewing is a perfect Devil, and we’re going to give him the works.’”9 
The plan worked. In the late 1950s, years after Ewing retired from the FSA, congressmen 
still urged him to stay away from the hospital insurance bill he helped create, lest the bill 
be tarnished with his name.10 
 On July 16, 1950, the House shot down Truman’s second attempt to get a cabinet-
level position for welfare, this time titled The Department of Health, Education, and 
Security. Again the Los Angeles Times reported, “[O]pposition in the House was based 
on the fear that the plan would be an entering wedge for socialized medicine, of which 
Mr. Ewing is a leading champion.”11 On August 3, 1950, just a week and a half before 
the National Conference on Aging, Representative Frank Buchanan dragged Ewing in 
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front of the house select committee to investigate lobbying to defend his “propaganda 
foundry.”12 The Chicago Daily Tribune carried the story: “Under the searching 
examination of Rep. Clarence Brown, Ohio Republican, there was nothing for it but to 
put on a bold front, and this Ewing did, proclaiming that it was ‘not only his right but his 
duty’ to propagandize in favor of the Truman compulsory medical insurance program.”13 
What a relief it must have been for the battered Ewing to spend his next few weeks on a 
topic everyone—conservative, liberal, rural, and urban—could sympathize with. 
Eventually, everyone, if they were fortunate, got old. 
 Ewing gathered the press on June 7, 1950, to announce the Conference. On behalf 
of President Truman, he began, the Federal Security Agency had recently issued 
invitations to “to a large number of individuals and organizations…asking them to join in 
a National Conference on Aging.… It is our hope that this Conference will discuss and 
develop helpful attitudes and perhaps policies in the various aspects of this problem, and 
that it will examine the broad effects of the so-called aging process, the extent of 
population changes, and their social and economic implications.… I earnestly hope that 
out of this Conference will come a greater understanding of what is happening to 
America as a result of our lengthening life span, and some indication as to how to make 
these changes strengthen the health, the happiness, and the well-being of all our 
people.”14 The FSA had actually been gearing up for this Conference since 1949, when 
Ewing first invited experts, like Randall and Tibbitts, to D.C. to discuss the plight of the 
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aged.15 Moreover, the impetus came less from Truman and more from Ewing, who was 
presented with this mounting social crisis by reformers at the same time he settled on the 
aged as a solution to his own political problems.16 Still, Ewing’s spin worked. He visited 
the aged at Welfare Island for a New York Times photo op and wrote op-ed essays for 
papers including the Washington Post.17 For the moment, the horrific plight of the 
destitute aged overshadowed his political misfortunes. The press soon wrote about the 
FSA and Ewing as saviors of America’s impoverished grandpas and grandmas. 
 The push towards public relations did not undermine the content of the 
conference. Organized around eleven subject areas (Population Changes and Economic 
Implications; Income Maintenance; Employment, Employability, and Rehabilitation; 
Health Maintenance and Rehabilitation; Education for an Aging Population; Family Life, 
Living Arrangements, and Housing; Creative and Recreational Activities; Religious 
Programs and Services; Professional Personnel; Aging Research; Community 
Organization) the three-day meeting in D.C. produced a wealth of data, recommendations 
for further research, and consensus policy recommendations.18 Structured and populated 
by non-governmental activists and hosted during the early days of the Korean War, the 
conference reflected the broad interests and shared values of a country ready to mobilize 




15 See Chapter II. 
16 See Chapter II. 
17 “Oscar Ewing Visits Aged on Welfare Island,” New York Times, July 20, 1950: 35; “Our Old Folks Have 
‘New Lease on Life’; How to Enrich It?” Washington Post, July 2, 1950: B2. 
18 Man and His Years: An Account of the First National Conference on Aging (Raleigh: N. C., Health 




 On the evening of August 14, Ewing welcomed his esteemed guests. “Since the 
call was first issued for this Conference on Aging, a great deal has happened on the 
international scene. The attack on the Republic of Korea has, of course, had tremendous 
repercussions. Overnight the whole focus of our national thinking has been sharply 
altered.”19 War, Ewing believed, would remind Americans that the country needed its 
workers. The problem of old age, he contended, was also a problem of manpower. From 
the Conference’s opening banquet, a focus on work and employability would characterize 
this national gathering on the problems of old age. Discussions within all of the eleven 
subject areas reflected this preoccupation with work and usefulness, but two areas best 
illustrate the contours of this trend: “Population Changes and Economic Implications” 
and “Health Maintenance and Rehabilitation.”20 
 Man and His Years, the published proceedings of the Conference, opens with a 
demographic rather than biological description of old age. In the section titled 
“Population Changes and Economic Implications,” a group of thirty-two participants, 
with academic backgrounds in economics, statistics, and sociology, as well as 
professional experience in life insurance companies, medicine, and welfare programming, 
sought to describe what the aged population across the country actually looked like. To 
begin, they had to agree on a working definition of the aged. “It was immediately evident 
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that any attempt to discuss the problems of an aging population demanded a clear 
understanding of what ‘old age’ means, as well as an understanding of the factors that 
together make up the problem,” the group opened their summary. Like the social 
scientists at the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), the Conference attendees 
decided that age was relative and that, for the purposes of composing a study they would 
settle on the arbitrary age of sixty-five offered by the Social Security Act.21  
 Without context, the numbers seemed neutral. An early glance at the 1950 census 
predicted that those over sixty-five represented 8% of the population, totaling 12.4 
million.22 The census also demonstrated that while life expectancy at birth had rapidly 
increased, longevity had remained static; millions more were able to reach the age of 
sixty-five, but life expectancy at sixty-five was only a year and a half more than it would 
have been in 1900.23 As the participants filled out these numbers by looking at 
geographic distribution, gender, and employment trends, the picture began to look bleak. 
 While young people move, older people “stay put.”24 Even with the small 
migration of older people to Florida and California, “it is the migration of young adults, 
leaving the old folks behind, that is affecting the various differences in age composition 
in geographic areas.”25 The result would be large swaths of older Americans without 
nearby children to move in with or rely on during a health crisis. Still, the group 
concluded, the statistics in this area were greatly lacking and required further study. On 
the subject of gender, the group had data. “In 1900,” they reported, “men 65 and over 
outnumbered women. Today there are about 90 men to every 100 women in that age 
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group.”26 When talking about the problem of the aged, they noted, they were often 
discussing the problem of non-working widows.27  
 In addition to this issue of widows, the group noticed a trend toward the 
“decreasing employment of men 65 years and over.”28 “The percentage of men remaining 
in the labor force after 65 years of age dropped from 68 in 1890 to 42 in 1940.”29 
Although the drop paused during World War II, the numbers were moving in the wrong 
direction.30 The combination of non-working widows and non-working men over sixty-
five meant that a massive dependency crisis was looming. Adult and middle-aged 
Americans would have the dual task of financially supporting children and parents. 
 The group concluded, however, that dependency was not inevitable. “We have a 
resource going to waste, and the problem is how to utilize that resource.”31 The problem 
of old age, the group concluded, is distinctly not chronological in nature: it is “the 
inability to continue earning…either because of a decline in physical power or because of 
prevailing social attitudes and policies.”32 Since the problem is truly one of “economic 
invalidity,” which can potentially affect individuals of every age, the solution, they 
determined, must not be age-centric. The country should look carefully at every type of 
economic invalidity and determine the best way to the put the most people back to work. 
When the primary solution of new employment opportunities and job retraining programs 
fails, the group advocated a government-sponsored safety net. Dependents, they 
concluded, will always exist and should be provided for through “cash benefits for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Ibid., 20. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid., 23. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 31.  
32 Ibid.  
! '(+!
individuals who need financial assistance, and services of one type or another for those 
who are chronically ill or whose health is otherwise impaired and who require medical, 
nursing, or domiciliary care, or housekeeping services in their own homes.”33 
Dependency, they aptly explained, while largely economic, was often related to health 
concerns. It was up to the leaders in medicine, pharmaceuticals, hospitals, and nursing to 
determine the exact contours of the relationship between illness and old age.  
 Tellingly, the title of the section devoted to health was not “Health Care” or 
“Health Coverage” but rather “Health Maintenance and Rehabilitation.”34 Leaders of 
major medical, nursing, hospital, and non-profit groups at this time still emphasized 
strategies to avoid chronic disease and rehabilitate patients; if these were not an option, 
they advocated palliative care.35 Edward Stieglitz was on the planning committee, and his 
vision of constructive medicine pervaded the goals of the group. They summarized, 
“[T]he emphasis through was on the preparation for later life, on the prevention of 
disease and disability, and on the promotion of the best health attainable by the 
individuals. Convinced that the aging can and should play a more active role in our 
society, the section stressed positive health for older people.”36 
 The group began by trying to “identify the health and medical needs of older 
people and then to explore the ways in which these needs could be met.”37 As usual, 
definitions proved unwieldy. Rather than proposing concrete definitions for “older 
people” or “health,” the working group located six assumptions or guiding principles. 
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The first, relativity of health, concluded that, even for an individual, health is relative and 
can “always be improved.”38 The second principal was that individuals should “strive for 
optimum health or that degree of health which will lead to well-being and a satisfactory 
adjustment to life.”39 Optimum health they also recognized as relative, however, subject 
to the “limitation of medical therapeutics, and the physiological consequences of 
aging.”40 Aging, the group’s third working assumption, “is biological change, associated 
with the passage of time, which manifests itself in modifications of organic structure and 
function.”41 Chronological categories, such as “later maturity” for the ages between forty 
and sixty, could be located and labeled, but the addition of years was not the “greatest foe 
of older people.”42 The single greatest threat to a dignified old age, as the group 
determined in aging and disease, their fourth guiding principal, is actually disease, or the 
“insidious, often unrecognized, and progressive impairment of health.”43  The 
penultimate principal, accent on the individual, insisted that aging was a uniquely 
individualized process that both requires an individualized approach from health 
professionals and a commitment to his or her own health by the elderly.44 The concluding 
assumption, which the group said “shaped much of the discussion of the section,” was 
“that older people must not be put in a special pocket or segregated from the rest of 
society. It is one thing, ran the thinking, to devote special attention to the long-neglected 
health needs and problems of the aging. It is quite another to consider the needs in a 
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vacuum or to meet them by setting up new and separate machinery totally unrelated to 
existing health services.”45  
 The “Health Maintenance and Rehabilitation” participants also offered 
conclusions that opposed the prevalent assumption that hospital growth offered the best 
solution to the health-care needs of the country. By the time of the conference, hospitals 
had overtaken the nation as the appropriate provider or space for modern clinical care.46 
In thirty years, between 1920 and 1950, the number of general hospitals grew by 17.4% 
and hospital beds-per-capita increased by 34.5%.47 By the mid-twentieth century, 
hospitals had effectively seduced Americans with, in historian Charles Rosenberg’s 
words, the “allure of innovation.”48 They did not start out that way. 
 In the nineteenth century, the hospital, Rosenberg writes, “was something 
Americans of the better sort did for their less fortunate countrymen; it was hardly a 
refuge they contemplated entering themselves.”49 Marked as a place frequented by the 
indigent and dependent, the hospital had a tarnished reputation.50 Those who could afford 
to retained private medical care in the comfort of their own homes, avoiding the shame of 
institutional care. As scientific discoveries, such as antiseptic surgery, enabled doctors 
not just to care for the ill but to cure them, the hospital’s standing rose. Between 1870 
and 1910, the hospital, the sociologist and historian Rosemary Stevens writes, was 
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“transformed from an asylum for the indigent into a modern scientific institution.”51 In 
addition to the success of the veterans health system after World War I, positive 
outcomes in the fields of obstetrical deliveries, appendectomies, and tonsillectomies, 
made hospitals acceptable and necessary spaces of care for more and more Americans.52  
 By the 1920s, middle class Americans expected to pay for medical care received 
in hospitals. A “mixed economy” emerged where charity and proprietary hospitals 
competed for patient dollars.53 When the Depression hit, middle-class Americans 
bemoaned the rising cost of health care. In 1918, hospital expenses in Columbus, Ohio, 
came to 7.6% of an average family’s medical bills; by 1929 a national survey estimated 
costs at 13%.54 By the 1950s, remarks Paul Starr, “it was the poor, rather than the rich, 
who stood out as different from the rest of the society.” 55 Although hospitals and clinics 
were originally built for the poor, by the 1930s, impoverished Americans could barely 
afford medical care. The Depression forced the federal government’s hand as the 
extraordinary health needs of the nation overwhelmed the private medical system. 
Federal medical relief came through such entities as the War Food Administration, the 
Children’s Bureau, and the Veterans Administration.56 As this was still inadequate, a 
comprehensive national health insurance program seemed to be the necessary solution. 
Comprehensive health insurance, as part of a larger social insurance policy, succeeded in 
Europe while withering politically in the United States. This divergence, hotly debated by 
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historians, is often explained through the strength of socialist parties in countries 
including Germany, Britain, and France.57 In the European model, health or sickness 
insurance was always part of a broader social agenda to provide an economic safety net.58 
In contrast, when health insurance reappeared as a political option in the United States 
after the Depression, it became solely associated with paying for medical bills.59 Despite 
support from the majority of Americans and two consecutive presidents, Roosevelt and 
Truman, federally sponsored health insurance was quashed by the AMA’s expensive 
public relations campaign and Congress.60 
 With national health insurance off the table politically, Congress and President 
Truman looked for ways to enhance and expand health care for all Americans. Trying to 
expand health care without upsetting the AMA or approaching the issue of coverage led 
U.S. policy makers in two directions: they could fund scientific research or hospital 
construction.61  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 See Daniel S. Hirshfield, The Lost Reform: The Campaign for Compulsory Health Insurance in the 
United States from 1932-1943 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); Ronald L. Numbers, Almost 
Persuaded: American Physicians and Compulsory Health Insurance, 1912-1920 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1978); Lawrence R. Jacobs, The Health of Nations: Public Opinion and the 
Making of American and British Health Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Beatrix 
Hoffman, The Wages of Sickness: The Politics of Health Insurance in Progressive America (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Lawrence R. Jacobs, The Health of Nations: Public Opinion and 
the Making of American and British Health Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Jill S. 
Quadagno, One Nation, Uninsured: Why the U.S. Has No National Health Insurance, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); Rosemary A. Stevens, Charles E. Burns, and Lawton R. Rosenberg, History and 
Health Policy in the United States: Putting the Past Back In, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
2006); Paul Starr, Remedy and Reaction: The Peculiar American Struggle over Health Care Reform (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2011). 
58 Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, 238. 
59 Compulsory health insurance first appeared as a political option during the Progressive era. See Beatrix 
Hoffman, The Wages of Sickness: The Politics of Health Insurance in Progressive America (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Starr, Remedy and Reaction. 
60 See Monte M. Poen, Harry S. Truman Versus the Medical Lobby: The Genesis of Medicare, (Columbia, 
MO: University of Missouri Press, 1996). 
61 See Stephen P. Strickland, Politics, Science, and Dread Disease: A Short History of United States 
Medical Research Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Rosemary Stevens, In Sickness 
and in Wealth: American Hospitals in the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 1989). 
Also see chapters I and IV for more on the development of scientific research. 
! '("!
 As early as 1942, the American Hospital Association (AHA) organized a 
commission to shore up support for hospital expansion.62 With millions of returning 
veterans afflicted with complicated wounds, the hospital industry was desperate for aid. 
“Almost without dissent,” reports Starr, “two hospital construction programs were 
adopted immediately after the war—one to expand the Veterans Administration hospitals, 
the other to aid the nation’s community hospitals.”63 The 1946 Hospital Survey and 
Construction Act, commonly known as the Hill-Burton program, solidified the hospital, 
and later its old-age affiliate, the nursing home, as the natural and necessary place for 
health care in America.64 In twenty-four years, starting in 1947, Hill-Burton brought 3.7 
billion dollars of federal funds and 9.1 billion dollars in matching state funds to hospital 
construction.65 Between 1946 and 1952, general hospital admissions increased 26%.66 
For the first time, Americans across the country had access to hospital care. Citizens 
could experience the positive effects of Hill-Burton; the negative ones were more 
complicated to see.  
 As beacons of modern medical prowess, hospitals had to keep up with the latest 
biomedical research and technologies. Unlimited expansion and technological growth, 
while arguably good for medical care, also meant rising costs, for the hospital and 
consequently its patients. A pivotal study conducted by Milton Roemer and Max Shain in 
1959 concluded that the rise in the number of hospital beds had the effect of pushing 
doctors to hospitalize patients, creating an unending feedback loop. The rise of the 
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hospital begat the unending need for more hospitals. As Paul Starr summarizes, “[A]s 
hospital beds were built, physicians admitted patients they would otherwise have treated 
at home. ‘A half century ago,’ they noted, ‘only the most desperately ill were 
hospitalized; cases of pneumonia, tonsillectomies, deliveries, heart attacks, fractures were 
treated at home or in the doctor’s office. Today not only are these cases hospitalized, but 
so are cases of multiple-tooth extractions, psychoneurosis, epilepsy, diabetes for insulin 
stabilization, or any obscure condition for diagnosis. All this is made possible by an 
increase in the relative supply of beds, and reciprocally it creates pressures for continual 
expansion of the bed supply.’”67 The conference attendees in the “Health Maintenance 
and Rehabilitation” section wanted to reverse, or at least stall, this trend.  
 They asserted that the bulk of medical spending must be used for early 
intervention. Rather than attend to disease at the end of life, they argued that health-care 
professionals should focus on preparing middle-aged individuals for years of optimal 
health in their homes. The emphasis should remain on creating the “well person” rather 
than coping with the sick one.68 For this reason, isolating the elderly from other age 
groups in terms of health care did not make sense. The group wrote, “[H]ealth programs 
for the aging should be developed within the framework of our total health services. 
Further fragmentation would be wasteful and would perpetuate an undesirable social 
concept.”69 Finally, although the group agreed that hospitals were necessary for health 
care, they advocated a move away from institutional care: “[I]n the opinion of the section, 
the current tendency to rely almost exclusively on institutional care, is wasteful and 
inadequate. For acute phases of chronic illness, hospital facilities are undoubtedly 
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necessary. But for many aged persons, care in the home may lead to better physical and 
emotional adjustment.”70 The group determined that designing a healthcare system that 
would prevent the physical ailments associated with old age and keep the elderly within 
their communities would dramatically reduce physical dependency. 
 By the end of the conference, attendees conceptualized the problem of old age as 
one of financial and physical dependency, which was not essentially correlated with 
chronology. They believed the best programmatic solutions would extend human beings’ 
capacity for usefulness throughout their lifespan. The hardships of old age could be 
mollified with early intervention health care, job retraining, and a recasting of the social 
reputation of the elderly. When all else failed, the non-profit sector and the government 
should provide a monetary and goods-based safety net. At the close of the conference 
proceedings, Clark Tibbitts, reflected these conclusions through a final set of predictions: 
“It appears reasonably safe to predict, therefore, that within the course of the fairly 
immediate and long-term future there will be: Increasing appreciation of the importance 
of older people in the national manpower mobilization program; Increasing momentum 
of a national movement for conservation, reclamation, and utilization of our human 
resources; Increasing interest and action by public leaders, press, radio and television, 
conferences, institutes, and other educational forces; Steadily changing attitudes—on the 
part of labor and industry, the community, older people themselves; and ultimate solution 
of a major national problem through the processes of American democracy.”71  
 The Conference concluded on August 16. Within weeks the precise content 
results morphed into a diluted national commitment to the elderly. The Washington Post 
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August 16 article was one of the last to reflect accurately the emphasis on employment: 
“The changing national attitude toward ‘the aged’ has been publicly recognized by 
President Truman in his simple and wise message to the National Conference on Aging. 
The message called for elimination of arbitrary age limits on retirement and the 
determination of methods for making use of the experience, knowledge and obvious 
productivity of those aged in a technical sense only.”72 The National Conference would 
indeed change the position of elderly within the federal government, the states, and the 
country at large, but it would do so in a way that promoted chronological age and lost 
sight of the intergeneration problem of dependency. 
*** 
 In 1949, Ollie Randall dazzled FSA employees with her vast expertise on the 
problems of old age. As one of the few individuals everyone agreed was an expert on this 
issue, her opinions mattered.73 A year later, much had changed. Ewing opened the 
National Conference on Aging by giving Randall an award but closed it by giving Clark 
Tibbitts the power to create actual policy.  
 Randall had been marginalized almost immediately following the April 22, 1949, 
FSA meeting.74 On July 1 of that year, she followed up with John Thurston, the FSA’s 
assistant administrator, writing, “[I]t has therefore occurred to me that one of the first 
steps might be the consideration of a plan to call together an assembly similar to the 
National Health Assembly called by Mr. Ewing in 1948.”75 She received only a curt reply 
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five months later. 76 Ollie Randall would be credited for bringing the plight of the elderly 
to the attention of the nation and receive accolades from those within the federal 
government, but she would never officially join their ranks. When Ewing presented 
Randall with an award on the opening night of the Conference, he stated,  
There are, in fact, few aspects of the problems with which this Conference is 
concerned, on which Miss Randall does not speak with authority. She has 
dealt with legislatures and with business and industry.… She has labored 
unceasingly to develop medical facilities for the aged and to establish 
educational programs. She was the Director of the first modern housing 
project for older people. She has worked with many communities in many 
parts of the country to develop programs of a similar nature and has labored 
unceasingly to change attitudes toward the aged.… For all this, Miss Randall, 
I salute you as a true pioneer in the field in the problems of the aging. And in 
behalf of this Conference, I take great pleasure in awarding you this 
Citation.”77 
 
Randall accepted the award graciously and left at the end of the conference to push her 
vision of personal care for the aged in cities across America. She would start her own 
organization, The National Council on Aging, serve on New York State’s joint legislative 
committee on problems of the aging, spearhead a multi-year Ford Foundation grant on 
the aged, and be instrumental in conceptualizing best practices of care for the needy aged.  
 Tibbitts fared better in terms of attaining power within the federal government. 
On January 24, 1951, Ewing appointed Tibbitts chairman of the FSA’s new Committee 
on Aging and Geriatrics.78 He left the University of Michigan to run the Committee, 
which had as its mission, “to keep itself informed as to emerging problems and 
knowledge in the aging field, to explore implications for federal departments and 
stimulate interest within them, and to aid the country in other appropriate ways in making 
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sound and fruitful adaptations to our aging population.”79 Tibbitts, an academic by 
predisposition, believed that education and awareness, in and of itself, would lead to 
change. The Committee’s essential position within the FSA would be as a clearinghouse 
for all things relating to aging. They would assist in data collection, field requests, and 
promote a better vision of aging across the Untied States. To alter the public attitude on 
aging, Tibbitts partnered with radio and TV stations, adult education programs, and, in 
June of 1951, began publishing the journal Aging. The Committee’s collected 
information showed results. In two years, the National Conference on Aging and the FSA 
had put the problems of old age on the national agenda.  
 The Conference helped to create the first publically recognized specialists on the 
elderly. When the FSA first toyed with the idea of a national meeting, staff members had 
a difficult time locating more than 500 people working on the issue.80 Finding experts 
who could talk on the topic was, Thurston recalled, a challenge: “It was recognized that, 
while many people were interested in various aspects of the problem, there was little 
systematic knowledge on which to organize a definitive program. Likewise, there was, at 
the time, no adequate identification of persons qualified to talk on the numerous phases 
of the subject.”81 Within months, the FSA had collected 2,000 names of individuals with 
useful experience in the field of aging. By January of 1951, that number had jumped to 
10,000.82  
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 The first national conference also begot more conferences, publications, and 
commissions. From 1950 to 1952, the FSA recorded fifty conferences across the United 
States dedicated to the plight of the elderly.83 The sessions took place at universities, at 
welfare societies, and at the state level. In August of 1950, only New York and 
Connecticut had official commissions on aging. By 1952, fifteen states had established 
commissions or similar entities to study and take care of their elderly, and more states 
followed.84 In addition, in the two years following the conference, forty-four universities 
decided to offer courses on aging, many in the category of adult education.85 And as 
scholar Henry Pratt notices, “as many articles are listed in the standard geriatrics-
gerontology index for the six-year period ending in 1955 as in the entire forty-eight years 
preceding.”86  
 Immediately following the Conference, the Bureau of Labor Statistics created a 
position “in the aging field,” the Housing and Home Finance Agency began to analyze 
housing options for the aged, the Public Health Service and the Bureau of Old Age and 
Survivors Insurance created new research initiatives, and the Bureau of Public Assistance 
added improvements for the elderly.”87 Most importantly, the Conference established the 
FSA as the administrative coordinator for all things having to do with the elderly.  
  If Tibbitts overplayed the significance of the Conference, scholars have 
underplayed it. Positioned between the pension movement of the 1930s and the Medicare 
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activism.88 Henry Pratt, an expert on the rise of the senior citizen lobby, declared in his 
1976 book that the 1950 Conference “did not achieve any dramatic results.”89 This 
estimation is shortsighted. The Conference altered the position of the elderly, as a social 
group, within the federal government, pushed the ailments of the elderly to the forefront 
of public discussions, announced the potential voting power of the elderly, and inspired 
the first draft of what would become Medicare. As Tibbitts remarked, “[C]onferences, in 
themselves, are not action programs. Nevertheless, they are essential; they provide for 
exchange of ideas, threshing out of problems, and stimulation of new activities.”90  
 
III: Hospital Insurance 
 Ten days after the National Conference on Aging came to a close, Ewing’s 
strategy of limiting health insurance to the elderly got a major boost. On August 28, 
President Truman signed into a law an amendment that expanded social security benefits 
to ten million more Americans.91 From 1950 on, the formerly limited Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance would now be open to such laborers as domestic servants and 
agricultural workers, to name only a few.92 For the crafters of social security, such as 
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Wilbur Cohen and Isadore Falk, this was the dream. From the origins of federal welfare, 
there existed a distinction between “public assistance” and “social insurance.” “Public 
assistance,” writes historian Michael Katz, “is means-tested relief. It is what we usually 
think of as welfare.… Social insurance is not means tested. It is an entitlement for 
everyone eligible by virtue of fixed, objective criteria, such as age, disability, or 
unemployment, and its benefits cross class lines.”93 Where Old Age Assistance carried 
the stigma of welfare and the “unworthy” poor, Old Age and Survivor’s Insurance did 
not. With the 1950 amendments, more Americans would qualify for the contributory 
social security benefits than for the stigmatized old age assistance.94  
 Ewing considered the passage of the 1950 amendment one of the great successes 
of the Truman administration and his own political career. In addition to the benefits for 
all Americans, the amendment gave Ewing an unprecedented opportunity. As Jaap 
Kooijman notes, “[T]he amendments of 1950 made the social security program dominant 
in the American welfare state, providing universal coverage to the majority of Americans. 
Linking a national health insurance program to the social security system made more 
sense than in the years before since the number of Americans included within the system 
had increased.”95 Now, more than ever, Ewing recognized the benefits of advocating for 
chronologically based health care coverage. 
 The Conference had also given Ewing more confidence and ammunition. He had 
garnered support from the private insurance industry and the hospital industry and had 
marshaled public sentiment on behalf of the elderly. Unlike the large number of 
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conference attendees in social work, medicine, or other health care fields, representatives 
of insurance companies fought to define old age chronologically. After congratulating 
Ewing on the Conference, R. McAllister Lloyd, president of Teachers Insurance and 
Annuity Association of America, had this to say: “[O]f course, there are many objections 
to a fixed chronological age but the alternatives have been found to be worse, and I 
believe it would be harmful to the pension movement in this country to have the 
Conference make a recommendation that fixed retirement ages are not desirable.”96 In 
addition to insurance companies benefiting from retirement plans, private hospital 
insurance programs were interested in having the government determine and take on the 
risks of insuring those over sixty-five.97  
 In 1951, Ewing made some headway with the hospitals. He realized, after meeting 
with New York hospital representatives, that these institutions wanted and needed more 
government aid. They could not say so, however, because of the power of the AMA.98 He 
wrote, “[T]he truth about the matter is that in this day and age, whether anyone likes it or 
not, both our schools and hospitals have got to depend on tax money, because the taxing 
units are the only ones that can really raise money to meet these gigantic needs. The 
American Medical Association came out—as I recall, they didn’t want the government to 
contribute to medical research. They were going to raise 10 million dollars a year for 
medical research. They raised about $600,000, the first year and then abandoned the 
effort.”99 There were two ways to persuade the hospitals to support some form of federal 
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insurance. One, to show doctors how this program would not affect their salaries, and 
two, to let the AMA realize that they were fighting grandparents, not socialists. 
 Most importantly, Ewing saw, first hand, the potential political power of the 
elderly. Before the Conference even began, the Washington Post mentioned the elderly as 
a voting bloc. In “Elderly Bloc in Politics: Fogyism or Wisdom,” the journalist Malvin 
Lindsay took Ewing’s bait. “The elderly may be getting pushed around in the business 
world,” he wrote, “but they are getting more strongly entrenched at the ballot box every 
day.”100 Fifty percent of voters, Lindsay claimed, would soon be over sixty-five. 
Politicians would rapidly awake to the fact that individuals over sixty-five had enormous 
political potential. Uses of the phrase Older Person in the Congressional Record, notes 
Pratt, went “from six in 1953 to a full column in 1955 and one and one-half columns in 
both 1956 and 1957.”101 The Conference gave visibility to the problems and growing 
power of the elderly. Now it was up to Ewing to create the legislation.  
*** 
 Ewing had to convince the brains behind Truman’s social security legislation to 
offer a limited version of national health insurance.102 In 1949, Arthur Altmeyer, Wilbur 
Cohen, and Isadore Falk, Ewing recalled, “were completely wedded to national health 
insurance and didn’t want to take less.”103 In fact, in reaction to Ewing’s suggestion of a 
constricted national health insurance bill, Falk composed a document with alternatives to 
age limitations.104 Quickly, however, the group came around. After talking to Cohen and 
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Falk, Ewing remembered Altmeyer telling him, “‘[I]t’s perfectly feasible, and we will try 
to help out, if you think that’s the wise thing to do.’ He indicated that he would much 
prefer national health insurance, but he would bow to my judgment on that, if I thought 
that this was the politic thing to do.” 105 By 1951, Cohen and Falk had buckled down and 
completed all of “the technical work” necessary to write the legislation.106  
 To craft a politically feasible program, writes Theodore Marmor, Ewing, Cohen, 
and Falk “assumed the administration could most easily build an issue majority in the 
Congress by narrowing previous demands and tailoring them to meet the objections of 
critical congressmen and pressure groups.”107 Thus, the legislation avoided the four major 
objections to national insurance: “(1) general medical insurance was a ‘give-away’ 
program, which made no distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor; (2) it 
would substantially help too many well-off Americans who did not need financial 
assistance; (3) it would swell utilization of existing medical services beyond their 
capacity; and (4) it would produce excessive federal control of physicians, constituting a 
precedent for socialism in America.”108 
 Cohen and Falk found a way to integrate health insurance into the newly 
expanded and nationally respected Old Age and Survivors Insurance program. By 
limiting health-care benefits to Social Security recipients over sixty-five (and their 
spouses), they avoided a means test, as well as charges that they were giving benefits to 
the undeserving. In this case, the elderly would have prepaid for their benefits. Moreover, 
as Cohen and Falk would show statistically in the coming year, the elderly could not 
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afford private insurance nor would private insurance cover the elderly. The next step was 
to limit reimbursements in such a way that would mollify the AMA. Without proper 
infrastructure to deter or manage chronic disease, the elderly entered hospitals at greater 
rates than the young, and once they entered, they stayed for twice as long as other 
patients.109 This rise in admissions and lengths-of-stay came at a time when the cost of 
hospital care was exponentially expanding.110 The idea of confining national health 
insurance to hospital care had been alive since 1944, when it was suggested and then 
dismissed by the Social Security Board.111 Now it came back as a crucial way to make 
Ewing’s plan viable.  
 In 1949, Falk prepared a document, which offered incremental approaches to 
universal health care. In “Some Alternatives to Comprehensive National Health 
Insurance” he offered the pros and cons of restricting national health insurance to hospital 
coverage. He wrote: 
The most common of such proposals suggests a start with hospitalization 
only. Then, after this is well established and operating smoothly, it is 
proposed to organize the medical benefits (physicians’ services)—perhaps 
first in the limited form of physicians’ services for hospitalized cases (in-
patient care), later extending this second benefit to services for non-
hospitalized cases attended in the out-patient department or clinic of the 
hospital, in the physician’s offices and in the patient’s home. On this pattern, 
additional services would become insurance benefits at later stages, in one 
sequence or another (laboratory services, unusually expensive prescribed 
medicines and commodities, dental care, home-nursing, etc).112  
 
While there were numerous advantages to such an approach, not the least of which was 
avoiding having to negotiate immediately with physicians, dentists, nurses, laboratories, 
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and pharmaceutical companies, to name a few, Falk recognized there were also important 
risks.113 “Insurance limited to hospital care,” he argued, “would invite excessive 
hospitalization of insured persons and would lead to excessive capital expenditures for 
construction costs, and thus would needlessly raise the cost of sickness care.”114 
Furthermore, “since the insurance would operate only after a patient is sick enough to be 
hospitalized, the insurance system would be neglecting its opportunities to provide 
incentives for preventative care and for care early in illness.”115 Still, hospital insurance 
was a start, and in 1951 it looked like the best political option. As Wilbur Cohen would 
later surmise, “anyway, it’s all been very Hegelian. The state and federal proposals for 
compulsory health insurance were the thesis, the A.M.A.’s violent opposition was the 
antithesis, and Medicare is the synthesis.”116 
 On June 25, 1951, Ewing was ready to announce. He gathered the press to the 
FSA offices at 330 Independence Avenue and read the following words: “I am 
recommending that the President include in his legislative program a plan which would 
provide hospitalization insurance up to 60 days a year for persons 65 and older and 
dependents of deceased persons insured under Old-Age and Survivors Insurance 
system.”117 This, he claimed, was a simple program. Patients would have the costs of up 
to sixty days a year of hospital care completely covered. Moreover, the cost of these 
visits would be paid directly to hospitals with existing social security payroll deductions. 
The program, he emphasized, would not require any new taxes.118 Finally, the states 
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would retain control over how the program was administered. “The plan,” he 
emphasized, “contemplates decentralization of administration wherever possible through 
the States. Payments to a hospital would be made in accordance with an agreement 
entered into between the hospital and the State, or between the hospital and the Federal 
Security Administrator when a State does not wish to administer the program.”119 Ewing 
took the next seven months to gather more data on insurance costs for the elderly and 
persuade members of Congress to submit the bill.  
 Responses to Ewing’s announcement were either lukewarm or vituperative. The 
Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, and New York Times highlighted the fact that in 
addition to wage earners over sixty-five and their spouses, care would also be “made 
available to widows of insured wage earners and surviving children under eighteen.”120 
They also remarked on the palpable demand by quoting Ewing. “These people as a 
whole,” the New York Times quoted, “need much more than the average amount of 
hospitalization, they have much less than average income with which to meet the costs of 
hospitalization, and much less than average opportunity to obtain insurance.”121 Still, 
journalists agreed that opposition to the program would be fierce.  
 Of all the articles from this moment, “Bait for the Elderly” in the Chicago 
Tribune stands out for its vitriol. “Oscar Ewing,” the piece opened, “is reported to be 
planning to spring a New Deal vote catching trap for older people which makes the 
various pension schemes that have come out of California look like a dime a dozen 
dodges.”122 That was only the beginning. The article went on to say, “[T]his is an 
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invitation to oldsters to take a bed at the expense of the public. It would encourage 
imaginary illness and malingering on a wholesale scale, for the beneficiary would be 
given encouragement to hunt up a hospital and provide himself with food.… Pretty soon 
the New Dealers would control most of the medical facilities and personnel in the 
country.”123 Although loose on a few facts, the conservative press got two things right: 
Ewing did hope this would be a first step toward national health insurance, and he did 
believe the elderly voters would advocate for the policy. From this program, the article 
continued, “it would be but a short step to consummating the plan for government 
medicine for everyone,” and “The New Dealers can hope for perpetuation in office by 
buying up the votes of the elderly.” 124 Ewing countered, “It is difficult for me to see how 
any one with a heart can oppose this thing.”125 
 In January of 1952, Ewing wrote to President Truman: “In accordance with your 
request, I hand you herewith a memorandum outlining the proposed Old-Age and 
Survivor’s hospitalization insurance plan. I strongly urge that the plan be made a part of 
the President’s Program.”126 For the last year, despite Ewing’s pleas, Truman had hedged.  
As Ewing conveyed, “the President was quite reluctant to give up his fight for national 
health insurance. I mean, temperamentally, President Truman did not like to give up a 
fight. He felt that the best way to get something done was to keep on fighting for your 
ultimate goal, but if you have to, if you have settle for less, well, settle. Whereas I 
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to some extent.”127 Ewing composed this letter to persuade. He began with the issue of 
need. Voluntary insurance, he claimed, had almost completely left out individuals over 
sixty-five and their beneficiaries. This program will cover a needy group, it will avoid 
invading “a field of any substantial interest” to the profit or non-profit companies, and it 
will “give badly needed assistance to hospitals in the form of payments for many services 
now given free to charity patients.” 128 Moreover, Ewing continued, the program has 
private and congressional support.  
 Months before, Ewing had quietly convinced the Catholic Hospital Association 
that this program would help in the fight against Communism and endeared, or so he 
thought, Congressional leaders such as Senators George, Hunt, Kerr, Hill, Murray, and 
Lehman, as well as Speaker Rayburn, to the program.129 After enumerating his list of 
what came to be precarious supporters, Ewing concluded with an argument he knew 
Truman would like: “[Q]uite apart from all my other reasons for urging the inclusion of 
this plan in the President’s Program is the fact that its enactment will give us experience 
in administering a small segment of your national health insurance program before the 
entire program is put into effect. This pilot-plan experience will be invaluable in the 
development of the most comprehensive program.”130 This was not defeat. This was 
another way to win Truman’s battle for national health insurance. Or so he thought. 
 On April 10, 1952, Senators James Murray (D-Montana) and Hubert Humphrey 
(D-Minnesota) introduced Ewing’s hospital insurance bill in the Senate while 
Representatives John Dingell (D-Michigan) and Emanuel Celler (D-New York) 
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introduced it in Congress.131 Truman gave Ewing permission to move forward but never 
truly put his weight behind the program. Neither the Senate nor Congress had hearings on 
the bill. Ewing recalled, “they couldn’t even get hearings on Medicare, when I had it 
introduced.”132 In the fall of 1953, the situation looked bleak. The Truman administration 
had failed to implement national health insurance and failed to enact restricted hospital 
insurance. “But with the end of the Truman administration,” remarked Ewing, “also came 
the end of any real pressures for national health insurance.”133 What did not end, 
remarkably, was the pressure for Medicare.  
 As Ewing and Wilbur Cohen predicted, “the Eisenhower people… didn’t seem to 
realize the immense political potential of this group.”134 As the cost of medical care 
continued to rise, so did the organizational capacity of the elderly. “Between 1953 and 
1963, expenditures for all health services more than doubled. The price of hospital beds 
rose 90 percent, while physician’s fees increased 37 percent.”135 Local old age groups, 
religious societies and Golden Ring Clubs began to agitate for help, and a new lobbying 
group, The National Council of Senior Citizens, pushed congressmen towards enacting 
Ewing’s hospital insurance program. These groups rapidly abandoned the content of the 
early debates on aging.136 The definitions and solutions to the problem of old age voiced 
at the first National Conference on Aging gave way to the language of political 
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expediency. The AMA now had to battle with an organized front of aged activists, who 
demonstrated that America’s deserving grandfathers and grandmothers were suffering 
from poverty caused by health failure. The federal government had the obligation to help 
American children care for their parents in a healthcare system spinning financially out of 
control. 
*** 
 Later in life, Ewing liked to deny the connection between the first National 
Conference on Aging and his hospital insurance program. He did so for an important 
reason. Perhaps more than anyone else involved in the insurance program, he realized 
that Medicare did not solve the root problems of old age in America. He understood that 
sixty days of hospital insurance per year once one turned sixty-five would not assuage the 
dependency crisis. “No,” Ewing said in 1966, “no, there wasn’t any particular 
connection,” between the Conference and the legislation.137 The Conference, he related 
again in 1969, “dealt with the problems of aging and many of those are not within the 
health field. The older generation have environmental problems, problems with relatives, 
and many other problems outside of the field of health.”138 Still, there is ample evidence 
that Ewing knew just how to use the Conference to serve his political ends. It wasn’t that 
Ewing didn’t care about the elderly, he did. It was just that he was a political realist on a 
practical mission, and the elderly were key to his success.  
 First, Ewing knew through his experience with the National Health Assembly that 
public assemblies and conferences, if well attended by the press, could galvanize the 
American public. As he related in a 1966 oral history, “[O]ur job was a job of educating 
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the public on it, and once the public was educated on it, the Congress came around very 
fast.”139 Ewing made sure that the presidents of Columbia Broadcasting and of the 
Motion Picture Association had a seat on the Conference’s advisory committee.  
 Most importantly, the conference gave Ewing an idea. To fight the AMA, he 
originally wanted to organize an American Patients Association.140 After August 1950, he 
realized that the elderly could be that association. The numbers were on his side: “You 
had 19 million people over 65, and you had 185,000 doctors,” he said. Although it would 
take another few years for the nascent old age lobby to organize around Medicare, senior 
citizen councils across America would prove Ewing right. The first National Conference 
on Aging would provide the foundation to make Medicare a political reality. It would not, 
however, save Ewing’s reputation.  
 For fifteen years following the Conference, Ewing remained persona non grata in 
Washington, D.C. Even when congressman Aime Forand (D-Rhode Island) submitted 
new versions of Ewing’s bill in Congress, he deferred Ewing’s persistent offers of help. 
Ewing himself understood that he was a political hindrance. He quietly assisted the 
proponents of Medicare, Forand, Nelson Cruikshank of the AFL-CIO, and Senator 
Patrick McNamara (D-Michigan), but more often he stayed away from the fight.141 In the 
1960s, Lyndon Johnson remembered the 1952 hospital insurance bill. As Ewing recalled, 
“President Johnson was very gracious about one thing. In view of President Truman’s 
having, in his administration, been the sparkplug that brought about the first introduction 
of the legislation, President Johnson went clear out to Independence, Missouri, to sign the 
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bill in the presence of former President Truman; and President Johnson asked me to 
accompany him on the trip.”142  
 Between 1950 and 1965, the contours of American politics around health policy 
transformed. The power structures shifted in Congress, interest groups lost and attained 
influence, and the Medical Security Solution beguiled the country. More than just the 
politics changed. By the middle of the 1950s, the conversation around the problems of 
old age grew ever more anemic; chronological age came to be an accepted way of 
dividing the old from the young, aging became a disease to be solved, and death came to 
be understood as an unnatural rather than natural occurrence. The American state, having 
taken up the obligation to care for its aged citizens would, inadvertently, create the 
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CHAPTER IV 
From Many Came One:  
Senior Citizens and The Health Care Consensus, 1953-1960 
 
“But the crowning glory of old age is influence.”1 
           Cicero 
 
I. Introduction 
 At the start of 1957, Congressman Aime J. Forand was easy to miss. Although he 
held a coveted position on the House Ways and Means Committee, he kept a low profile. 
Slightly balding, bespectacled, and dressed in ill-fitted suits, he had few legislative 
victories or public accolades. His fellow congressman from Rhode Island, John E. 
Fogarty, was a different matter. Fogarty, dashing and with a full head of hair and a bow 
tie, was a political superstar. Fellow congressmen and journalists across the nation called 
him “Mr. Public Health,” credited him with building the National Institutes of Health and 
saving the lives of millions of Americans.2  
 But 1957 proved to be an unusual year. Newly labeled senior citizens organized 
and agitated for change. At golden age clubs, city rallies, and letter writing campaigns 
they urged their officials in Washington to “do something” on their behalf. Their voice 
and their vote were persuasive. The recently merged AFL-CIO also pressed for change. 
Under the able leadership of its head of Social Security, Nelson Cruikshank, the AFL-
CIO revived Ewing’s dormant bill and began a nine-year skirmish to pass federally 
funded health insurance for the elderly. Congressman Forand would become the face of 
the bill, while Congressman Fogarty would squirm, for a time, in its shadow.  
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 Although a Democrat and outward supporter of Forand’s plea to give health 
insurance to social security recipients, Fogarty would come to advance an alternative to 
federal health insurance for the aged. As the National Institutes of Health’s most ardent 
supporter, he believed that the problem of old age could be ameliorated through bio-
medical research into the diseases of old age, a government office solely dedicated to 
coping with the problems of the aged, and initiatives that stimulated local and state 
action. Fogarty believed that bio-medical advances would eventually cure the diseases of 
old age; Forand believed that the elderly first needed to be able to afford available 
medical care.   
 In January of 1958, Fogarty offered a solution that he believed would stall rash 
action on the Forand bill, allow some time for the states to articulate their own policies, 
and remind elder Americans that politicians across the country cared about their plight. 
He proposed a White House Conference on Aging (WHCA), which would take place at 
the start of 1961.3 For the second time, the government would host a national gathering 
on the problems of old age. This time, the capacious definitions of old age, its attendant 
problems, and the appropriate policy solutions would be largely tapered into a single 
phrase: health insurance.   
 In the decade since the Federal Security Agency’s 1950 Conference on Aging, 
convergent trends aligned and a powerful coalition made up of labor activists, 
Democratic politicians, and even a presidential candidate came to believe that the 
problem of old age, which they primarily understood as financial indigence due to 
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considerable medical needs, could be solved by extending social security to cover limited 
health care. This logic became so persuasive that even objections to the Forand bill came 
to be packaged in alternative health insurance or health care proposals.  
 In the lead-up to 1961, the Forand coalition accrued strength by strutting its secret 
weapon: a mass of politically toned seniors with the proven power to swing elections. 
This septuagenarian force came to believe that health insurance would relieve their 
ailments, convincing the nation that old age need not be bravely faced when it could be 
legislatively solved.  
 
II. Bye Bye Oldsters Hello Seniors 
 Following the first National Conference on Aging in 1950, cities and states across 
the country feted their oldsters. In 1953, Chicago lauded its seniors with a festival titled 
“Golden Years for Oldsters,” a campy celebration where a crowd of over 1000 crowned 
an elderly couple at a “golden wedding.”4 In 1954, the city followed up with 
“Seniorama,” a theatrical “Tableaux” highlighting the many craft skills of Chicago’s 
oldsters.5 In states from California to Georgia to Pennsylvania, governments and welfare 
groups offered the aged free weeks at summer camps and catered sailing trips.6 In New 
York, the welfare department and the St. John’s Guild entertained 600 elderly with a 
cruise to Bear Mountain replete with “sandwiches, milk, fruit juice, and cookies.”7 And 
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in California, Glendale Family Services received rave reviews for giving every oldster a 
dollar in a Christmas card at its annual Christmas Dinner.8  
 Aged Americans did not mind the pandering or the praise. What they did mind 
was being called “oldsters.” Following a riveting performance by an “orchestra of 
septuagenarians,” Samuel Samuels of the William I. Sirovich Day Center at 203 Second 
Avenue, faced a crowd of 400 aged New Yorkers in 1953 and announced: “‘We don’t 
want to be called ‘old man or old woman, we are senior citizens.’”9 Three years later, the 
conundrum of what to term old people prompted the Journal of Lifetime Living to 
conduct a survey where they asked “mature men and women” what they wanted to be 
called. Oldster was officially out, elder was “slightly more acceptable,” and the winning 
term, embraced by over 53% of those polled was “senior citizens.”10 Even a “little brown 
lady with silver hair” prickled when a reporter for the Pittsburgh Courier deigned to use 
the phrase “golden years.” “We don’t like the word,” she replied. “We prefer to be called 
‘senior citizens.’”11 By 1958, the name change had crossed the Atlantic where elders in 
the U.K. requested the title “senior citizens” at that country’s annual conference of the 
Institute of Housing.12  
 The term senior citizen first arrived in the printed media in 1938, in a Time 
magazine article about politics in “the great and screwy State of California.” In a state 
prone to fear its “oldsters,” the Democratic candidate for senator, Sheridan Downey, 
Time reported, “had an inspiration to do something on behalf of what he calls, for 
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campaign purposes, ‘our senior citizens.’”13 The term lay dormant during the war, only to 
resurface with a vengeance in the 1950s.  
 In 1952, Thomas C. Desmond, the great advocate for the aged and New York 
state senator, announced the country’s first “Senior Citizens Month” with an admirable 
statistic, “New York State’s elderly citizens are producing an estimated total of 
$1,000,000,000 a year in goods and services.”14 Other states, such as Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, Illinois, Florida, and Maryland, to name only a few, soon followed by 
offering their own Senior Citizens Day, Week, or Month.15 In 1956, New York City 
trumped them all by actually renaming Times Square “Senior Citizens Square” for a 
twenty-four hour period. By 1959, Senator Norris Cotton (R-New Hampshire), proposed 
a bill to make the movement national and declare the fourth Sunday in September, 
“Senior Citizens Day.”16 
 In less than a decade, seniors’ push to rebrand worked. The aged had transformed 
themselves from needy and grateful charity recipients called oldsters to capable and 
strong senior citizens. They went from a group whom others talked for and about, to one 
with its own increasingly public and persuasive voice. In the 1950s, commented 
sociologist Arnold Rose, “the elderly themselves…became ‘aging conscious.’”17 The 
term itself reflected the burgeoning self-awareness that one’s chronological situation 
could be fabricated into a vibrant political identity. This transition was aided, and 
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arguably even prompted, by the creation and rapid growth of senior centers and golden 
age clubs following the Social Security Act and World War II. 
*** 
 Centers for older people began cropping up across the country in the early 
1940s.18 Designed as hobby, leisure, or social clubs for a new class of retired elders, these 
centers offered a warm place to play checkers, practice sewing, or simply have much 
needed conversation. By the early 1950s, religious groups and local governments across 
the country had opened centers for the elderly. As a representative from the Episcopal 
Church remarked to the Washington Post in 1952, “hundreds of clubs known as Golden 
Age, Senior Citizens, Senior Leaguers, and other names have mushroomed all over the 
country. Their object is to provide programs to keep persons 60 and over interested and 
youthful.”19 As local papers filled with announcements welcoming any retirees to weekly 
meetings, checker tournaments, and craft contests, crowds soon required larger spaces. In 
1957, the demand even prompted the city of Chicago to build a twenty-room 
headquarters for more than 700,000 participating seniors.20  
 By 1957, there were over 200 golden age clubs in the State of New York alone, 
peppered from Staten Island to Niagara Falls. Their origins were as varied as their stated 
purposes. Senator Desmond claimed that they were “true ‘do it yourself’ operations,” 
often created by a “single senior citizen.” The really successful ones, he observed, the 
ones with energized leaders and top-notch programming, strategically affiliated with 
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service clubs, large organizations, or religious groups.21 Even Desmond seemed to realize 
that these clubs, which presented themselves as simple social organizations, could 
quickly become more robust forums for social action. 
In a profile piece for Commentary Magazine, Sylvia Rothchild charted such a 
transformation at a golden age club called Hecht House in Dorchester, Massachusetts. 
She described an opening day filled with anxious elders waiting at the door. Six men 
arrived an hour early and, with nowhere else to go, spent the time “fingering their 
newspapers” and “waiting for someone to open the door.” Each day, the crowd grew, 
twelve became twenty-five and soon elders across the area “poured into the center.”22 
Like similar clubs, the one at Hecht House was meant to be a lounge, “where older 
people could meet friends, read, hear lectures, play checkers and other games.”23 And 
again, as at so many other meeting areas throughout the country, social workers and 
volunteers urged members to “govern themselves.” Rothchild described how the group 
“rapidly elected officers, appointed committees, and began to make their own rules, play 
their programs, and become independent of their sponsors.” This process and the club 
itself “meant so much to each individual”; it was not an addition to busy lives, Rothchild 
argued, it was their lives. The club “was a substitute for work,” she continued, “a more 
comfortable home…for many it was the only contact with the world.”24 !
 “Though they came for recreation, they did not leave their problems at home,” she 
wrote.25 Discussions drifted from the need for more part-time jobs, to the intricacies of 
old age assistance, hospital care, and housing. Participants asked the appointed group 
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worker at Hecht House to invite speakers on these topics and gather useful information. 
On one particular day, Rothchild reported an interchange among a group of men who 
often shared competing tales of who had the “worst landlady.” One man described his 
urgent need for “a room and a bathtub for five dollars a week,” and tried to “interest the 
community in a lowcost housing project for older people.”26 The conversation escalated. 
A few days later, Rothchild recounted, the oldest man in the club walked in and declared, 
“‘Men we need to be strong and fight the politicians.’”27 The elderly began to slowly  
turn their attention to politics and transform themselves from the recipients of inadequate 
charity to organized senior citizens.  
 Although much political organizing in senior clubs arose organically, other forms 
were strategically implanted. In his study of golden age clubs in Cleveland, Ohio, the 
historian William Graebner argues that the movement was always a form of top-down 
social control. Responding to fears that elders had become political pawns in Hitler’s 
Germany or Francis Townsend’s pension movement, social workers, welfare agencies, 
and academics in Cleveland decided that America’s aged would be best controlled 
through community integration. In Graebner’s words, “The Golden Age Clubs were 
designed to reintegrate an embittered and isolated older generation into American social 
life and, more important, to insure that older persons properly studied political issues, 
voted for major party candidates, shunned Townsend and other undesirable leaders, and 
otherwise acted like reasonable and responsible Americans.” By 1952, Cleveland-style 
golden age clubs had mushroomed to 35 clubs with over 2000 members across the 
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Midwest and East Coast.28 Whether the senior citizen movement emerged through 
manipulation or spontaneous need, by the middle of the 1950s politicians and social 
scientists began to take notice.  
 In a prophetic article published in the 1954 issue of The Journal of Gerontology, 
political scientist Abraham Holtzman turned his attention to the peculiar rise of 
“independent political action” by America’s aged population.29 Opening with a bit of 
narrative history, he reminded readers “protection for the old was provided in varying 
degrees by most of the major countries of the world long before our Congress was 
compelled to deal with this problem in the depression decade of the 1930s.” While forces 
such as industrialization, urbanization, and reduced infant mortality affected America and 
Europe equally, a strong labor movement and Socialist party in European countries, 
Holtzman argued, “preempted the role which old age pension movements fulfilled in the 
United States.”30 The pension movement and its incarnation in broader senior political 
agitation was simply due to a lack of a strong labor movement that could have obtained 
more expansive social programs from the federal government. Today, he augured, “An 
aggressive, influential labor movement now concerns itself with politics. Its leaders have 
committed themselves to a campaign, political as well as economic, to ensure the future 
security of their members.”31 He predicted that the aged would “continue to agitate 
American politics.”32 Holtzman was right. The newly merged AFL-CIO and its 
unflappable head of Social Security, Nelson H. Cruikshank, would serve, inspire, 
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persuade, partner with, and sometimes simply use senior citizens to advance its political 
agenda, which at the close of the 1950s was a focused drive to give social security 
recipients health insurance.  
 
III. If At First You Don’t Succeed… 
Nelson Cruikshank and the Revival of Health Insurance for the Elderly 
 
 Nelson Hale Cruikshank was a tall man with clear values. Born in the 
undistinguished town of Bradner, Ohio, to a distinguished father, he grew up in a 
household with an uncompromising sense of right and wrong. His father began his career 
as a grain dealer and soon established a “sizeable business,” representing the Cruikshanks 
on the Toledo produce exchange.33 His son recalled a religious man who was ahead of his 
time. A man who brought the teachings of Walter Rauschenbusch and Harry Ward to the 
dinner table and was as impeccable with his words as his actions.34 In one story, the 
younger Cruikshank liked to share, his father stood up to the entire Toledo exchange. The 
other merchants wanted to “push him to the wall” if he didn’t agree to set the price of 
grain paid to all the farmers, and the elder Cruikshank “stood on the floor of the exchange 
of said, ‘You can ruin me and you can make me bankrupt, but you can’t make me do 
this.’”35  
 His father survived that Toledo coup, only to succumb, years later, to the financial 
upheaval of the Depression. “The grain business,” his son recalled, “was pretty well 
shot.”36 Despite growing up with resources, Cruikshank had spent his youth working. He 
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started as a deck hand on freighters on the Great Lakes, where he joined his first union, 
the Seafarers’ Union.37 With his father’s income diminished, Cruikshank decided to help 
his family by paying his own college tuition at Ohio Wesleyan, a Methodist university 
attended by his father, grandfather, and grandmother. At Ohio Wesleyan, Cruikshank 
studied economics and theology. After graduation in 1925, he enrolled at Union 
Theological Seminary after hearing that Harry Ward was on the faculty and Reinhold 
Niebuhr might be coming.38  
 Cruikshank began his ministry as the country’s fortunes decomposed. He started 
out as an assistant pastor of a small church in Brooklyn, but soon moved into relief work, 
or what he described “as the only expanding industry…in the city.”39 He eventually took 
over the relief work for the Brooklyn Federation of Churches and realized that the 
Protestant church, unlike the Catholic Church or agencies such as United Jewish Appeal, 
did not have a highly functioning social service agency, because it had previously catered 
primarily to middle-class families. After a few years building the agency, Cruikshank 
decided that he was just “putting shin plasters on a sick economy.”40 He moved to New 
Haven, Connecticut, and, for a few years, cobbled together a career between churches 
and the Workers’ Education Bureau. In 1933, he got his first stint as a part-time labor 
organizer, for the American Federation of Labor.41 Although he would eventually settle 
down in a permanent position with the AFL, he spent the interim years bouncing between 
the Works Progress Administration, Farm Security Administration, and the War 
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Manpower Commission. In 1944, the AFL hired Cruikshank to direct the organization’s 
Social Security department.42 His first order of business was to coordinate the national 
health insurance lobbying efforts of the AFL and the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO), at the time one of the few points of agreement between the two 
great labor organizations.43  
  The AFL and the CIO hoped that something like Britain’s National Health 
Service would take hold in the United States.44 From 1944 until 1954, Cruikshank fought, 
unsuccessfully, for national health insurance while pushing for the expansion of prepaid 
group practice plans at a local level. As Jennifer Klein writes in her pivotal book, For All 
These Rights: Business, Labor, and the Shaping of America’s Public-Private Welfare 
State, “During this initial phase of health insurance activism the labor movement saw 
health security as a two-tiered project: a federal government subsidy for insurance 
nationally and group practice plans at the community level.”45 Cruikshank believed that 
the country’s retired workers deserved health security as a right and that addressing their 
health care needs was a policy priority worth pursuing from every angle.  
 One of the more interesting and less reported failures of this partnership was 
labor’s support of the Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York (H.I.P.), an HMO-style 
health collective started by Fiorello La Guardia in 1944. H.I.P. offered prepaid medical 
care through group practices. As one flyer advertised, for  “one modest premium,” 
members of H.I.P. would receive “comprehensive care” from family doctors, specialists, 
and surgeons. Preventative care, home care, and hospital care would all be covered 
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without “bills,” “claim forms,” or “red tape.” And with H.I.P. “doctors don’t earn more 
when you’re sick. They’re paid to keep you healthy.”46  
 In 1949, Cruikshank traveled to New York to reach out to “more than a score of 
ranking AFL leaders,” and explain the value and urgency of programs like H.I.P. AFL 
leaders, he told the crowd, “must not wait for Congress to pass compulsory national 
health insurance.”47 On January 15, 1954, Cruikshank publically supported H.I.P. before 
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce:  
As our members continue to gain experience with the orthodox type of 
commercial insurance and medical society plans, that experience is being 
reflected in increasing dissatisfaction and disillusionment. Some unions 
have found the answer by joining comprehensive, group-practice 
prepayment plans such as HIP and Permanente.... I believe that plans of 
this type have a great potential and hold great promise as one avenue 
toward a solution of the health problems of a substantial number of the 
people of this country. They stand as an example of what can be done, and 
of what the commercial insurance and medical society plans so notably 
fail to do.48  
 
While the AFL sought to bolster H.I.P., the American Medical Association sought to 
destroy it. The organization used its medical code of ethics to condemn “any public 
advertising designed to attract prospective members for a prepaid group-health plan.”49 
Without public advertising, programs like H.I.P. would never be able to compete. 
Although the AMA would eventually reverse this ruling, the damage had been done. 
When the AFL and CIO joined forces , they wanted a new strategy, one that no longer 
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relied on the specter of national health insurance or the precarious stature of prepaid 
groups plans.  
 The merger of the AFL and CIO in 1955 united over 15 million workers.50 Even 
before the merger took place, both organizations had revved up their political organizing, 
partly in reaction to the 1952 Republican election sweep.51 After the merger, the AFL-
CIO kept up the momentum, establishing a Social Security Committee with Cruikshank 
at the helm and setting up a multiyear lobbying strategy to reduce the shortcomings in the 
social security act.52 
 When it came to Social Security legislation, observed Cruikshank, “there was no 
ideological difference between the AFL and the CIO.” His little department “was the first 
point of agreement.”53 In the spring of 1955, the AFL-CIO leadership decided that “there 
were two major gaps” in the Social Security Act they wanted to close: “[O]ne was the 
lack of coverage for permanent and total disability, and the other was the hospital or 
medical protection for the retired.”54  National Health insurance had failed to draw 
support for over a decade, and the AFL-CIO craved a new strategy.  
 Cruikshank, perhaps more than anyone at the time, knew the struggle ahead. He 
had been studying, and losing to, the AMA for over fifteen years. Even his past wins 
were, in retrospect, strategic losses. In the 1940s, he had started with Morris Fishbein, the 
combative spokesman for the AMA. Cruikshank wanted to expose him for a fraud: 
“People just wouldn’t believe that here was a sheer propagandist, a guy that just made up 
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evidence as he needed it. And he developed that trick, incidentally, of always giving 
something that sounded like an absolutely authentic statistic. If he wanted to say that 
around 15 percent of a certain group suffered mortality from this or that, he wouldn’t 
know at all, but he would say at ‘15.36 percent.’”55 Cruikshank watched as Fishbein 
developed his false-precision technique, first on the radio and then on television, where 
no respondent had the time to counter his numbers. Eventually, Cruikshank realized that 
the best way to deal with the AMA and Fishbein would be to “debunk the man and not 
his facts.”56 If he could destabilize Fishbein’s veneer of honesty, all of the facts would be 
subject to doubt.  
 Cruikshank’s eureka moment came in the form of a small article, “Dr. Pepys’s 
Diary,” written in the Journal of the American Medical Association. There, Fishbein’s 
week-long trip to London was recorded in delicious detail. After an entire week spent 
cavorting about town, the eminent doctor spent exactly “an hour at the headquarters of 
the British Health Service.” After asking about “some of their forms” he “dashed…to the 
airport and read a detective story on the way from London to Paris.”57 On February 22, 
1949, on the nationally broadcast “Town Meeting on the Air,” Cruikshank loaded his 
bullet. As doctors piled into the public event, a lone labor lawyer approached Cruikshank 
and asked, “How can I help you?” Cruikshank responded, “Ask Fishbein what he knows 
about the British Health Service.” As audience questions rolled in, the lawyer stood up to 
face Fishbein and asked, “[H]ave you had a chance to study the British Health Service, 
and what is your appraisal of it?”58 Fishbein responded “yes” and went on to give his 
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abysmal review of the Service. Seizing his moment, Cruikshank leapt to the floor, 
grabbed the microphone, and with the article in hand  “read the damn thing.” He told the 
audience how Fishbein “was dined by Lord Moren, how he was out at the races at Ascot, 
how he was here and there, the whole week, and then said, “and finally he ended up with 
one hour,” at the British Health Service, “before he dashed off to the airport and put his 
nose in his detective story.”59 The audience revolted, Fishbein was discredited and 
eventually barred by the AMA from being on air. Cruikshank had a short moment in the 
sun before he realized his blunder. His personal triumph was a major political misstep. 
The only result from this hubristic performance was that, “the AMA got an awful lot 
smarter.”60 
 Cruikshank would not make that mistake again. To achieve any form of health 
insurance, the AFL-CIO would have to ploddingly outmaneuver and outwit this 
commanding organization. In 1956, he decided to go slowly and assess the AMA’s 
legislative strength. He wanted a “limited objective” and an “attainable” goal.”61 Before 
attempting health insurance for the aged, the AFL-CIO would test the AMA’s muscle 
with disability insurance.62 As the political scientist Robert Hudson would later surmise, 
“if anyone had a better claim than the elderly to the title of deserving poor it was the 
disabled worker.”63 The disability insurance bill, which had come close to passing before, 
was modest in its approach. It added to the existing social security program cash benefits 
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for totally and permanently disabled persons aged fifty and over.64 In addition, the bill 
avoided the sting of socialized medicine by allowing private medical practice to retain its 
payment structure.65 Still, the AMA opposed the bill, because some physicians worried 
that the government would be interfering in the doctor-patient relationship by offering a 
standard for determining if a person was disabled, despite a provision that left the 
determination up to doctors.66 
 On July 17, 1956, the Disability amendment to the Social Security Act passed the 
Senate, but only by a hair. Cruikshank, breaking Senate rules, was ambling up in the 
gallery when Lyndon Johnson, gestured for Cruikshank to join him “in that little private 
office of his.”67 Johnson, peering at Cruikshank demanded, “How many votes do you 
think you’ve got.” When Cruikshank responded, “we had about 50,” Johnson countered, 
“You have like hell. You’re about three votes short right now.… I’ll tell Walter George 
to keep on talking for an hour and in that hour you’ve got to round up those three 
votes.”68 Johnson suggested the three names, Cruikshank got the votes, and in 1956 
Americans got disability insurance. For the AFL-CIO, the win on disability was, in 
Cruikshank’s words, “a kind of wedding ceremony.” Disability insurance demonstrated 
“that the AMA could be defeated.”69 It was now time to tackle health insurance for the 
aged.70 
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 The idea for Medicare, Cruikshank always claimed, came from the people not the 
leadership.71 “We never had to sell the medicare notion at all,” he recalled, “There were a 
lot of demands for it.”72 “Our people were really hurting…people that were middle-aged 
and trying to send their kids to school were being hit by the old people’s medical bills 
and union meetings all over the country were discussing this…. This was a felt need. 
There was nothing cranked up about this at all.”73 While the impetus might have bubbled 
up from the bottom, Cruikshank wasted no time unifying old age groups to pursue his 
legislative agenda. In the waning months of 1956, he launched a multiyear, multipronged, 
full-force battle to secure health insurance for retired Americans. 
 Cruikshank took up where Oscar R. Ewing left off, working with Robert Ball, I. 
S. Falk, and Wilbur Cohen on a bill that would retain the logic of the 1952 Murray-
Dingell bill but extend coverage.74 Labor leaders wanted to retain the same health 
coverage they had won through collective bargaining.75 As the journalist Richard Harris 
notes in his treatment of Medicare, “pressure from the membership was to gain for a man 
and his wife during retirement years the same protection they had while employed.”76 
While the bill’s crafters settled on a 0.5% tax increase, sixty days of hospitalization, and 
another sixty days of nursing home care, they were split on the extent of other forms of 
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coverage.77 Some believed that the bill should include insurance for doctor visits, or, at 
the very least, surgical benefits.78 Cruikshank, despite a renewed sense of power, 
recognized that he would never get through Congress with such an overt challenge to the 
AMA and nixed anything directly affecting physicians. Ever the strategist, he also 
thought that politicians in support of the bill could blast on the trail “Look, we’re not 
doing anything with the doctors…. We’re not touching the doctors. What are you 
squawking about?”79 The team settled on surgical benefits, an inclusion that liberal 
physicians who supported the bill actually objected to, claiming “if you just had the 
surgical benefits, you would be putting a premium on carving people up.”80 The 
compromises did not worry Cruikshank, who never expected the bill to actually pass. In 
1957 he held, “we didn’t expect to pass it, not that year or the next year. When you first 
put in a bill like this, you put in a couple of things that you know you may have to give 
away and also it’s a kind of an educational bill and so you stake out what you want.”81 In 
1957, Cruikshank did not need a perfect bill, what he really needed was a congressman 
willing to put his name on the document.  
 He started with a congressman from Tennessee, Jere Cooper, chairman of the 
Ways and Means Committee, the committee largely in control of social security and 
income taxation.82 Cooper supported the bill but simply did not want to take on a big 
fight while in poor health. After Cooper, Cruikshank and the AFL-CIO’s Director of the 
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Department of Legislation, Andrew Biemiller, went down the ranks of the Ways and 
Means Committee. His team failed to persuade the all-powerful Congressman Wilbur 
Mills (D-Arkansas) to join the effort and finally approached the fourth-ranking member 
of the committee, the unassuming congressman from Rhode Island, Aime Forand.83 
 
IV: Becoming Mr. Senior Citizen 
 Until he entered Congress, Forand had little financial stability. Born on May 23, 
1895, in Fall River, Massachusetts, he moved to Rhode Island at the age of twelve and by 
thirteen had to leave school.84 His father had developed cataracts and was quickly going 
blind. With his father out of work and a family of ten to support, Forand started working 
sixty hours a week in a local cotton mill. With “ten mouths to feed on $8 a week,” he was 
still “determined to get some kind of education.”85 He saved up about fifteen cents a 
week and used the money to take extension courses in shorthand and typing. He 
eventually worked his way up to the weaving shed of the mill, “cleaning bobbins as 
they’d come off the looms,” so he could practice his typing in the afternoons. This was a 
man who knew how to master a skill: “When the radio came in I sat by the radio and I’d 
take down all the speeches I could. When I’d go to church, I’d take down the sermons. I 
was taking advantage of anything that was coming down the pike.”86 Before leaving to 
fight in World War I, he secured a job as a bookkeeper at a local metal company, but 
when he returned home as a sergeant major, steady employment eluded him. He drove a 
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three-ton gravel truck, a dump truck, “did pick and shovel work,” and worked in a 
grocery and a bakery. In his words, “It’s easier for me to say what I did not do than what 
I did do.”87  
 In 1922, he started his career in politics, working odd jobs to support a position in 
the state legislature. After a short stints as a journalist, a congressional aide, and an expert 
on state veterans’ relief for the governor’s office, he ran for Rhode Island’s 1st 
Congressional district. In 1936, Aime Forand packed up his belongings and took his first 
relatively stable job as a United States congressman.  
 Outside of his coveted position on the Ways and Means Committee, Forand had 
little to show for his congressional career in 1957. Although he had carved out a set of 
legislative interests, including the plight of veterans and the unemployed, few of his bills 
ever passed.88 In 1949, he lost a public fight to increase benefit payments to the 
unemployed. 89 When Cruikshank first approached Forand, the congressman vacillated. 
“Seizing” on Forand’s hesitation, Cruikshank and his colleagues pushed forward, 
persuading him, wrote Harris, with repeat visits, “descriptions of the bill’s merits and all 
sorts of assurances to ease his misgivings.”90 At the very close of the session, on August 
27, 1957, Forand agreed to submit the bill. Cruikshank remembered the event as 
“perfunctory” and told the following story: “Finally, when we were pressing him, it was 
near the end of the session, he said, ‘Well, you boys assure me that this is all right and 
that this is soundly drawn,’ and we said, ‘Yes.’ He said, ‘All right, I’m just not going to 
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have time to read it, but I’ll put it in and I’ll read the speech.’ That’s how it became the 
Forand bill.”91  
 In Forand’s recollection, his interest in health insurance for the aged was anything 
but perfunctory. He explained his commitment through his own family’s history with 
poverty and the debilitating health of his father.92 And, to those who asked, he eagerly 
related his long legislative commitment to this issue: in 1923 he helped the Fraternal 
Order of Eagles provide pensions for seniors, throughout his career he committed himself 
to soldiers’ relief, and from the “minute” he got into Congress he “seemed to gravitate to 
the welfare field.”93 In 1957, Forand believed that Cruikshank and crew came to him 
because his “record was established in the welfare field…they knew I’d been searching 
for something.”94 In his memory, he even made some changes to the bill before deciding 
to drop “the bill in the hopper.”95 Despite divergent origin stories, the outcome of 
Forand’s decision to submit the bill was conclusive. Congressman Aime Forand became 
Mr. Senior Citizen, the great champion of America’s ill and deserving elderly.  
 Forand did not have to wait long to reap the rewards of attaching his name to the 
bill. Before he submitted the document, Cruikshank had contacted the Providence 
Journal’s Selig Greenberg, a journalist with an interest in the problems of old age. 
Greenberg and the Journal praised the bill and Forand for such a progressive piece of 
legislation. “Before long,” quipped Harris, “Forand had become far more interested in the 
measure and far more optimistic about its prospects.”96  
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 The Providence Journal was just the beginning. Within a year, citizens across the 
country joined, the Forand “crusade,” as journalist and policy maker James Sundquist 
termed it.97 The bill’s immediate popularity took everyone, even Cruikshank, by surprise. 
Was this a sign of the AFL-CIO’s spectacular organizing, a truly grassroots effort from 
seniors, or a reaction to the AMA’s publicized objections? Aime Forand often remarked 
that the “AMA has published this bill better than I could have done myself.”98 The AMA 
would eventually increase its lobbying budget “five-fold” to fight the policy.99 On 
October 11, 1957, the Congressional Quarterly reported “Lobbies and population figures 
are pushing Congress toward a decision on Federal medical insurance for the aged.”100  
 By 1958, the bill had become so popular that presidential hopeful Senator John F. 
Kennedy sent staff members over to Forand to help draft his own version.101 Within three 
years, legislation that had barely made it to the floor, Sundquist observed, “would 
become what some considered ‘the foremost issue in the presidential campaign.’ It would 
be the subject of more congressional mail, at least in some offices, than any other bill.”102 
The prospect of an actual bill that would reduce the costs of old age ignited seniors and 
gave the movement something specific to rally around. For almost a decade, elders had 
been urging that something be done on their behalf. Now, they had a policy, centers to 
help them organize, and the strength of the AFL-CIO. If elders voiced a myriad of 
problems in the early 1950s, by the late 1950s they were mobilizing around one solution, 
the Forand bill.  
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 As Zalmen J. Lichtenstein, program director of the Council of Golden Ring 
Clubs, recalled “thousands of elderly people were involved in conferences, neighborhood 
meetings, distribution of scores of thousands of leaflets printed in English, Italian, 
Yiddish, and Chinese, in door-to-door canvassing. Clubs, centers, and groups of retirees 
of churches, synagogues, trade unions, and others joined in this mass education program 
to enlighten the community about the importance of social security and the need to 
expand it by including medical care.”103 While some of these groups acted alone,  
Lichtenstein’s collection of Golden Ring Clubs explicitly followed “the same legislative 
goals and objectives as the Social Security Department of the AFL-CIO.”104  
 As elder constituents broadcast their support for the bill, congressmen like John 
Fogarty, had to face facts. If they were not going to overtly support Forand, they had 
better find another way to appease the agitated throngs of seniors demanding that 
something be done in Washington. In 1958, to keep his reputation, “Mr. Public Health” 
needed his own solution to the problem of old age. 
 
V. Mr. Public Health and The Soft Opposition 
 Compared to Forand, Fogarty had an easier go at childhood. One of six children, 
he graduated high school in Glocester, Rhode Island, and followed his father into the 
bricklaying profession. In 1936 he was elected president of the Bricklayers and Masons 
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Union, Local No. 1., a title he kept until he won his first Congressional campaign in 
1940.105 
 Fogarty excelled as a congressman, garnering power, legislative victories, and 
hundreds of accolades and awards. He served the second district of Rhode Island for 
forty-seven years and died, at his Capitol Hill office, the day the ninetieth Congress 
opened.106 Fogarty had a brand: across the country his name became synonymous with 
health. He was the  “political architect of the federal government’s vast program of 
medical research,” as one reporter put it in 1967. “It is no exaggeration to say that for the 
past 15 years he was politically the single most important person in medical research in 
the United States.” 107 As the chairman of the Subcommittee of the House Appropriations 
Committee responsible for Labor, Health, Education and Welfare, Fogarty tended to the 
budget of the National Institutes of Health, bolstering its funds from 3 million in 1947 to 
1.4 billion in 1967, the year of his death.108 He played a pivotal role in the expansion of 
funding for medical research that hoped to ameliorate the diseases of old age, such as 
cancer and heart disease. While few understood why he cared about medical funding, 
everyone understood how he ably procured his super-sized budgets.  
 Fogarty, who started his congressional career in naval affairs, began angling for a 
more powerful appointment at the close of WWII.109 As the junior congressman from 
Rhode Island, he reached out to Forand, his senior colleague, asking for his assistance in 
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securing an appointment on the Committee on Appropriations.110 He had been in 
Congress seven years before he got an appointment he could grow with. In 1947, he 
made it onto the Appropriations Sub-Committee for the Labor Department and the 
Federal Security Agency (which, in 1953, became the department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare). Labor and FSA was actually not his first choice, but he quickly made the 
most of the appointment, rising to chairman of the subcommittee in 1949.111 
 The chairmanship gave Fogarty the opportunity to actually solve problems. “It’s 
nothing personal,” D. S. Greebert reported Fogarty saying, “Nothing happened to me 
when I was a kid that made me decide that medicine has to be improved. It’s just that I 
feel that as long as people are sick, something has to be done to make them feel 
better.”112 Fogarty once told a reporter that in 1949 he encountered a young man who 
couldn’t walk without the help of two canes. When Fogarty asked “what’s wrong with 
you?” the man responded that no one had ever heard of it. Fogarty’s response to this 
encounter was to call up the surgeon general and ask about multiple sclerosis: “what it 
was all about, how many people had it, what were we doing about it. He told me that 
almost nothing was known about it, and that we weren’t doing anything about it. So, I got 
them $500,000 as a starter to get to work on it.”113  
 Fogarty’s interest in medical research quickly became a consuming passion. He 
set out to convince Americans that the best strategy for American prosperity was federal 
funding for bio-medical research, which he often claimed was the same as public 
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health.114 “It is my considered opinion,” he announced to the House in 1950, “that public 
health is one of our foremost instruments of national defense. With the threat of war 
hovering over our heads, it is foolhardy even to consider the slightest curtailment of any 
service or project which is directed toward preventing disease and promoting health. 
More than ever, in a period of national emergency, it is essential that we press forward to 
more gains against the ravages of sickness.”115 Not only would medical advances secure 
the country’s borders, but, Fogarty believed, it would also function as a means of cutting 
federal expenditures.  
 He matched this oratorical strategy with a savvy ability to work the legislative 
process to demand larger and larger budgets for the NIH. Fogarty understood that 
because appropriations bills start in the House and then make their way to the Senate, he 
would need an ally in the Upper House. Senator Joseph Lister Hill, a Democrat from 
Alabama who had already supported hospital growth in the landmark Hill-Burton 
legislation from 1946, became Fogarty’s ally.116 Named after Joseph Lister, the great 
medical pioneer of antiseptic surgery, Hill, like Fogarty, had an inclination to believe that 
scientific research could solve most, if not all, of the country’s problems.117  
 With the help of the NIH director, James Shannon, Fogarty and Hill implemented 
a strategy whereby the NIH as well as each of the separate institutes within the NIH could 
request funds. For example, in the 1943 appropriations budget the NIH’s requested funds 
included the Microbiological Institute, the National Institute for Neurological Diseases 
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and Blindness and other basic medical problems not covered by other institutes. In 
addition to this overall request, institutes within the NIH such as the National Cancer 
Institute, the National Heart Institute, the National Institute of Arthritis and Metabolic 
Diseases, the Institute of Dental Research, and the National Institute of Mental Health, 
came in with separate budget requests.118 The result was a majestic increase in the 
Institutes’ overall budget.119  
 Fogarty’s budget process began with a hearing. Scientists would come before his 
subcommittee and instead of defending the budget requests, they would be asked, why 
not more? Fogarty would demand that his witnesses describe their original budget 
requests and what happened to that request as it passed through the Bureau of the Budget. 
But even the original ask would not be enough for Fogarty. He wanted NIH scientists and 
doctors to dream up what they could do with almost unlimited funds. As a journalist in 
Science divulged, “Fogarty holds the belief that medical research is no place for 
economy, and after his witnesses pay lip service to the need for centralized fiscal 
planning, they graciously concede that they could use some more money, and Fogarty 
piles it on.”120   
 Once Fogarty got his number, he would cajole the often-skeptical Appropriations 
Committee with his “mastery of his subject,” “his ability to rattle off lists of lifesaving 
developments that have resulted from federally financed research, and his glowing 
predictions of a great break-through around the corner.” When the bill arrived on the 
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floor, he would be ready “to inundate with facts any economy-minded member who 
questions the need, and to demand a roll-call vote whenever his budgets are 
threatened.”121 
 If all else failed, Fogarty would look at his colleagues and say that you are either 
for or against medical research. In the end, during the Fogarty years, the House was 
always for medical research.122 The bill would then go to the able hands of Hill in the 
Senate, where sometimes the number would rise yet again, and then back to conference 
for a settlement. In 1950, the NIH received 52.1 million dollars; in 1954, 71.15 million 
dollars; in 1955, 81.268 million dollars—and the numbers would only go up.123 
 Fogarty’s evangelical zeal for scientific funding attracted the devotion of doctors, 
scientists, and financial leaders in the field. Most importantly, his decades long friendship 
with the savvy and monetarily endowed Mary Lasker gave him the power to move money 
within and outside of the legislative arena.124 His intimate relationship with the Laskers’ 
American Cancer Society (ACS) is evidenced by an exchange he had in 1950 over tickets 
to the Broadway show South Pacific. On April 19, John H. Teeter of the ACS wrote to 
Fogarty, “I don’t like to wind up making a request—but I’ve been asked to try to get 
tickets for South Pacific—for the evening of May 16 or 17. Do you suppose you could 
help me out?”125 Fogarty procured the tickets and responded on May 1, “Because of the 
many requests made of me for tickets I would appreciate it if you would not publicize the 
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fact that I was instrumental in securing them.”126 But more than simple exchange of 
favors and mutual advancement marked the relationship between Lasker and Fogarty. 
There was a true and tender affection between the two. They congratulated each other on 
their successes, enjoyed sharing meals, and, when necessary, eased each other’s grief and 
mourning.127  
 By 1956, on the eve of Forand’s bold legislative announcement, Fogarty had 
accrued files of almost amorous letters from medical professionals. Doctors and scientists 
working on arthritis, cerebral palsy, blindness, neurological diseases, and cancer thanked 
him heartily for the ability to pursue their work.128 The great cancer doctor Sydney Farber 
wrote, “The entire medical profession and everyone who benefits from research owes you 
deep gratitude for the magnificent fight you have kept up for so many years, to increase 
our resources in behalf of the health of our people.”129 Hospital officials praised him and 
relied on him for consistent renewal of the Hill-Burton act.130 Most importantly, his 
constituents recognized his worth and praised his accomplishments.131 
 Even his colleague from the great state of Rhode Island, Aime Forand, rose in 
praise. In June of 1956, Congress bestowed on Fogarty the honorific “chairman of the 
better health of the nation” and Forand declared, that “the ‘lion’s share’ of the credit for 
expansion of facilities and advancement of research at the National Institutes of Health 
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goes to Rep. Fogarty.”132 By 1958, the tides had surely turned. Forand, not Fogarty, was 
being hailed as the country’s great progressive savior. Fogarty’s constituents agreed, 
putting pressure on him to do more that just offer his lukewarm support for federal health 
insurance for the elderly.  
*** 
 Since entering Congress, Fogarty had tried to advance the well-being of the 
elderly. He just had his own approach to policy. He used his powers of appropriation to 
advance research into mental health, disability, and rehabilitation.133  In 1955, he even 
tried to create a Selected Committee on Problems of the Aging in the House.134 
Throughout his career, he preferred initiatives that solved ailments at the level of 
scientific research or set up bureaucratic institutes and committees with the sole purpose 
of researching and curing problems. His success financing the NIH came largely through 
such a bureaucratic technique, which set up separate institutes with their own budget 
requests. The Forand bill was not exactly his policy bailiwick, it did not cure the problem 
of aging at a biological level nor did it set up a single government institution geared to 
taking care of elders. Moreover, it infuriated many of his friends in the medical 
profession. Still, Fogarty could not solely rely on his legacy of supporting scientific 
research. In 1956 and 1957, he met with Clark Tibbitts and Ollie Randall to learn about 
the problems afflicting American elders and ongoing public and private initiatives to 
address them.135 He was particularly persuaded by Randall’s approach, which 
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concentrated on broad articulations of the problem and local, grassroots, initiatives.136 For 
Fogarty, as for Randall, this method was not indicative of a theory of government that 
universally privileged state over federal action. When it came to scientific research, 
Fogarty always fought for a robust federal government. But the problems of old age, he 
contended for a time, would be best tackled locally.  
 In 1958, he came up with a temporary solution to his political problems. In 
January, Fogarty submitted H.R. 9822, a bill to convene a White House Conference on 
Aging. To prepare for the  conference, states would have the funds and the time to 
prepare their own responses to the problems of old ages.137 The Act “authorized grants of 
$5,000 and $15,000 per State to carry out their responsibilities,” which included both the 
creation of statewide conferences and the publication of new data and 
recommendations.138 In this way, Fogarty hoped to use the federal government to 
spearhead a nationwide effort to solve the problem of old age through local means.  
 Fogarty was not the only congressman hedging his bets in 1958. Although social 
welfare proponents bristled with the Eisenhower administration from 1953 to 1956, two 
important innovations in the field of aging took place. In addition to the 1954 
amendments to the Social Security Act, which extended old-age and survivors’ insurance 
coverage to farmers, domestic employees, and other self-employed workers, the 
Eisenhower administration offered what they called Medicare, or health insurance to 
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dependents of the armed forces, and established a federal council on aging.139 At the 
Office of Aging, Clark Tibbitts continued his work ambitiously, forging numerous 
partnerships with states, helping them to establish local legislative committees on the 
aged and national governors’ conferences on the issue.140 Still, for the elderly, this was 
just not enough.141 In the winter and spring of 1958, individual congressmen proposed 
eighteen separate bills having to do with the aged, nine of which called for a Bureau of 
Older Persons to be created within HEW.142 On March 18, Congressman Roy W. Weir 
(DFL-Minnesota) presided over hearings to figure out which of these bills Congress 
should pursue. Fogarty had a real stake in the hearings. He supported the Bureau but 
wanted to make sure that his Conference came first. Not surprisingly, he was also the first 
witness called to the floor.  
 Fogarty opened his testimony with a coy reminder of his stature, “thank you for 
allowing me to delay my appearance until this hour because of some work I had already 
programmed for the Appropriations Committee, which has to do with this very thing we 
talking about this morning.”143 After reminding the crowd that he controlled a significant 
budget, he went on to explain the logic behind his own bill. First, his conference would 
follow in the tradition of similar successful conferences on behalf of Children and Youth. 
Secondly, it would give local power to people in the States who can come up and share 
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their own workable solutions.144 He then went on to remind the audience that he had a 
particular stake in this issue, having helped create it through his generous funding of bio-
medical research. He announced, “the increasing number of people living in old age 
represents an achievement of the medical research and improvements in medical care 
which we have been supporting for more than two decades. I would like to pause here to 
say that all of the members of this committee that I know have supported the 
Appropriations Committee on medical research to their fullest extent. That is one of the 
reasons we have the longevity enjoyed by some of our older persons today.” 145 If 
Congress can create the gift of longevity, he claimed, it can surely figure out a way to 
make that gift worthwhile. 
  In addition to advocating for his own bill, part of Fogarty’s strategy at the hearing 
was to postpone the creation of a Bureau on Aging. From a policy perspective, Fogarty 
actually supported the creation of such a Bureau. He consistently criticized the federal 
government for not doing enough on behalf of the elderly and voiced his concern about 
understaffing and the decentralization of power. Nonetheless, he knew the Eisenhower 
administration would reject this kind of bureaucratic reshuffling, and he wanted to get 
some real action on this issue when he went back to constituents.146    
 While it was relatively easy to dismiss a push for the Bureau, it was harder to get 
everyone to accept his Conference. Herbert Zelenko, a congressman from New York, 
aided his cause: “May I ask the gentleman just one question? You agree that all of the 
other legislation has great merit. But, as I understand it, you feel that by H.R. 9822, we 
should first…get the benefit of collective thought of the most people before going into 
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specific legislation; is that correct?” 147 After receiving an affirmative nod Zelenko 
continued,  “Is it your feeling that by proceeding this way we would, in the initial stages, 
overcome, let us say…going into specific legislation which might be blocked and thereby 
set us back in the program?” 148 This vague question received an equally vague response 
from Fogarty. According to the political scientist Henry Pratt, “the tenor” of Fogarty’s 
remarks “was that he had been correctly interpreted.” The Conference would provide a 
strategic delay to all current legislation on the topic, most importantly, the polarizing 
Forand bill.149  
 Fogarty closed his argument with an unusually charged interchange with Dr. 
Robert H. Hamlin, who served as the assistant to the Secretary for Program Analysis at 
HEW. Hamlin doubted the efficacy of the Conference. Tone-deaf to the political cachet 
of simply doing something on this issue, he reminded the congressmen that the president 
could easily call for such a conference, thus rendering their legislation completely 
unnecessary.150 After a biting interchange, Fogarty jumped on Hamlin, “What do you 
think is wrong with this approach of the White House Conference on Aging! What is bad 
about it! In view of your experience with the White House Conference on Education what 
would be bad about this approach!” 151 Fogarty won the verbal spar. Hamlin stepped 
down and the White House Conference emerged as the best proximal solution. 
“Conceivably,” comments Pratt, “the House subcommittee could have endorsed both, 
Fogarty’s White House Conference idea and the Bureau of Older Persons concept, there 
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being no logical inconsistency between them; but after the hearings concluded it chose to 
endorse Fogarty’s idea and to shelve the others for the moment. Legislative strategy, 
more than the merits of the case, lay behind the decision.”152 For Fogarty, the hearings 
had been a home run. He delayed action on the Bureau and secured his conference.  
 During the 1959 hearings on the Forand bill, Fogarty could relax. He had a bill 
and a position. He supported all efforts to help the elderly but he believed that some 
would be more productive and politically expedient than others. In a speech prepared for 
the Ways and Means committee on July 14, 1959, he beseeched, “Why not explore the 
possibilities of several large scale experiments in the various proposals for achieving 
better medical care of the aged that have been put forward in the last decade? Why not 
see if there may be still other approaches worth exploring?”153 Research, he argued, still 
offered the best solution. “The point I want to stress is simply this. A great, proud, 
wealthy and humanitarian nation no longer can afford to let millions of elderly, helpless, 
or dependent citizens suffer needless pain, disability, and death. We have the medical 
knowledge to alleviate many of their medical problems…. Some means must—I repeat—
must be found to bringing that knowledge to those who need it most.” 154 For “Mr. Public 
Health,” old age would remain a disease with a biomedical cure. The goal of the federal 
government should be to spearhead the cure while the states received funds to administer 
the band-aids. 
 To his vocal constituents, many of whom supported the Forand bill, Fogarty 
strategically deployed his legacy and his Conference, “There is no question in my mind 
that Congress should take steps to provide such medical care. This area has troubled me 
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for a number of years and I have been doing everything I can to tackle the problem 
through my own field of medical research and by such things as my sponsorship of the 
White House Conference on Aging. All this, of course, while working closely with my 
colleague in Congress, Aime Forand, in an attempt to strengthen and broaden his bill.”155  
 In 1958 and 1959, Fogarty scored strategic points, but the match was just 
beginning. Between 1958 and 1961, the year of the Conference, Cruikshank, Forand, and 
seniors across the country discovered two crucial allies, Senator Patrick McNamara (D-
Michigan) and presidential hopeful Senator John F. Kennedy (D-Massachusetts), 
garnering enough momentum to convince even circumspect old age groups that the fight 
for health insurance equaled a fight for their own security. 
 
VI. Convincing the Nation 
 Less than a year after Forand submitted his famed bill, the congressman, then 
almost sixty-five, announced that he would retire from the House in 1960. Opposition to 
his bill was ferocious and personal. He received numerous disturbing letters from doctors 
calling for the removal of his body parts.156 He even received a prescription for “One 
tranquilizer: repeated often as a cure for the confusion and panic which you must have 
been suffering when you drafted this unreasonably expensive and shortsighted bill.”157 
Upon hearing of Forand’s retirement, Cruikshank offered these parting words, “While we 
regret that anyone should wish to demote you from Congress, we would certainly 
welcome you to our department here in the AFL-CIO!”158  Walter Reuther followed suit 
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writing, “The nation would be better served if there were more Aime Forands 
representing its interests within the halls of congress.”159 With Forand out of Congress, 
Senator Patrick McNamara, the elder Democratic statesman from Michigan, emerged as a 
new voice on behalf of seniors in Washington. McNamara would head the Senate 
Subcommittee on Problems of the Aged and Aging, a public relations goldmine. 
  The idea for a Senate subcommittee on the aging, did not actually originate from 
a senator. According to Richard Harris, William Reidy, a staff member of the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, “had become convinced that the problems of 
the increasing number of old people in this country were acute and that they affected far 
more people than just the elderly themselves—mainly their children.”160  Reidy reached 
out first to Senator John F. Kennedy. Kennedy agreed with Reidy’s estimation of the 
problem but planned to offer his support for the cause in other ways. In February of 1959, 
the Senate authorized Joseph Lister Hill, Fogarty’s great ally, to set up Reidy’s 
subcommittee. Senator Patrick McNamara received the chairmanship.161  
 A month later, McNamara reached out to Cruikshank alerting him to the new 
subcommittee and asking “What are the major problems of the aged and what priorities, 
if any, could be established in determining what the Federal government should do in 
meeting these problems?”162  In April, Cruikshank responded. “As you know,” he began, 
“we believe that much more should be done by the federal government in meeting this 
situation. We have been especially concerned with the addition of health benefits for the 
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aged through the social security system, and we urge your Committee to explore the 
kinds of health services which older citizens are now receiving from public clinics.”163  
 McNamara took Cruikshank’s advice. To pursue the problem of old age, his 
committee would design a series of town hall hearings across the country. The opening 
year would take on the problem of health care. As McNamara announced, “A major 
reason for starting this year’s hearings on the aged’s health problems…was the 
unanimous position of the Subcommittee’s majority members that ‘The No. 1 problem of 
America’s senior citizens is how to meet the costs of health care at a time when income is 
the lowest and potential or actual disability at its highest.’”164 The press release continued 
with an explicit argument against the findings of the 1950 Conference on Aging, 
“Contrary to a widespread belief that the aged have no special problems of their 
own…they have almost three times as much chronic illness as do young people. Their 
medical expenditures are nearly twice as high, on a per capita basis, as the expenses of 
younger persons.”165 By the time the subcommittee got to work, those who supported and 
designed the incremental approach to health care had convinced politicians and much of 
the public that health care costs were both the worst and most solvable problem of old 
age.166   
 From the start, “the hearings got headlines.”167 Kicking off in Washington, D.C., 
and then spreading out cross the country, McNamara’s hearings gave individual seniors 
the opportunity to speak directly to the American public. The public knew little about the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
163 Cruikshank to McNamara, April 28, 1959, Mss 1002, Box 8, File 38. Cruikshank Papers. 
164 Press Release, Subcommittee on Problems of the Aged and Aging 1959 or 1960, Mss 1002, Box 8, File 
38, Cruikshank Papers. 
165 Ibid.  
166 See Chapter II and III for additional background. 
167 Harris, A Sacred Trust, 91. 
! "(+!
predetermined structure of the event. Rather than planned, the hearings felt remarkably 
organic. As one staff member described, “The Senator’s policy in conducting the 
hearings was unique, as far as I know. After listening to the experts on both sides, he 
simply opened up the microphone to anyone in the room who wanted to have his say. 
Well, the old folks lined up by the dozen everyplace we went. And they didn’t talk much 
about housing or recreation centers or retirement problems or part-time work. They 
talked about medical care. For the first time, we had these people telling what life was 
like for them—and letting us know that they were more than a lot of statistics.”168 It did 
not hurt that many of the opening experts actually discussed health care.169 “The upshot,” 
the staff member concluded was, “front-page stories everyplace we went. This gave the 
movement its first big push forward on the national scene.”170 Through the hearings, the 
personal pleas of America’s medically needy elders dominated articles, radio programs, 
and television shows.  
 In February of 1960, the subcommittee released an official report; not surprisingly 
members “strongly urged social security financing of medical care for the aged.”171  Two 
months later, Business Week featured a story headlined “A Challenge that can’t be 
ducked.” “Health insurance for the aged,” it reported, “is fast becoming the No.1 issue 
facing Congress this year. And there is political dynamite to it: Any candidate suspected 
by the millions of old people (and those concerned about their health problems) of taking 
a cold or know-nothing attitude toward the issue is likely to be in serious trouble this 
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election year.”172 Not only had the McNamara hearings succeeded in turning public 
opinion towards the issue of old age, but it had done so in a way that made health 
insurance seem like the most pressing concern. The article continued, “One thing about 
the issue is clear: Although plenty of politicians may see it as a vote-catching devise, 
there is nothing synthetic or phony about the problem. Everyone who has seriously 
studied the situation has concluded that the provision of better health care for the aged is 
a serious—and growing—problem.”173  
 As the McNamara hearings circled the country, support for health insurance for 
the aged tumbled into the offices of conservative politicians. The opposition would have 
to get creative. Throughout the 1950s, republicans and southern Democrats had been able 
to simply oppose, ideologically, any expansion of social security to include health 
insurance.174 By 1960, they needed to offer their constituents a counter policy. 
Interestingly, rather than develop an alternative solution to the problem of old age, they 
decided to provide health care for the needy through a progressive federal tax.  
 Where liberals, writes Theodore Marmor in his comprehensive study of Medicare, 
ended up “proposing limited hospital-surgical insurance,” conservatives advocated 
“broader benefits for a small class among the aged—the destitute.”175 This approach to 
health insurance would be articulated in a bill presented by Democratic Senator Robert 
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Kerr of Oklahoma and Congressman Wilbur Mills of Arkansas. In this bill, the means 
tested approach, so maligned by liberal policy makers, demanded that individuals over 
sixty-five demonstrate their financial indigence before receiving medical coverage.176 
However, once they qualified, these individuals could receive comprehensive medical 
care, which included but was not limited to, doctors’ visits, hospital stays, prescription 
drugs, and nursing home visits.177 To fund the program, legislators included a federal 
income tax, which would work in coordination with matching state funds. From the 
outset, this raised red flags. Few states, if any, could actually provide the ample funds 
needed to implement such a program. For this reason, when Kerr-Mills was eventually 
adopted in 1960, legislators and scholars rightly claimed that the policy had little chance 
of having a productive national impact.178  
 In 1960 moderate Republicans also offered their own solutions to the old age 
problem, again in the realm of health insurance, by emphasizing state initiatives and 
private insurance options.179 One in particular concerned Nelson Cruikshank. Cruikshank 
greatly admired New York Senator Jacob Javits, and wanted to understand the origins of 
a particular section of his bill, which would give elderly individuals choice over their 
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private insurance carriers.180 When Cruikshank went to visit Javits’s office, he discovered 
that the push for individual choice came from a single origin. In his words, “It was simply 
that in discussing this with Javits, his first proposals were to allow free choice…. We 
traced down the source of it. A bunch of retired teachers in New York that were in the 
American Association of Retired Persons—an outfit which is subsidized by Continental 
Casualty Company—came down to see Javits and told him that they thought medicare 
ought to give a principle of free choice and that one ought to be able to use the tax money 
to buy this other insurance they had.”181 The young, but financially endowed, insurance 
collective and nascent lobbying group AARP was, by 1960, stretching its newfound 
political muscle and getting into the policy game. While the McNamara hearings would 
push Medicare’s long-time opponents to propose alternative policies, the upcoming 
election, and the momentum it gave to senior citizens, would quiet the softer critiques of 
the Forand bill that came from such organizations as the AARP. 
 
VII. Senior Citizens Get Organized 
 In 1947, Dr. Ethel Percy Andrus founded the National Retired Teachers 
Association (NRTA), the organizational predecessor to the American Association of 
Retired Persons (AARP).182 Forced to retire at age sixty-five, Andrus started to 
coordinate retired teachers to argue for better pensions and tax benefits. According to 
William Fitch, the executive director of AARP in the 1960s, Andrus’s original intent was 
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to persuade “older people to help themselves and each other.” NRTA “was really not 
intended to be a senior citizens’, golden age type of group, but really to see if there isn’t a 
more responsible role for older people to play in retirement.”183 Almost immediately, the 
organization’s members began discussing the need for some form of health insurance. At 
the time, it was nearly impossible to find a policy written for those over sixty-five that 
would provide adequate coverage throughout old age. As Fitch recalls, “So the president 
of the group…went to almost every major insurance company to see whether or not an 
insurance policy could be written for persons in retirement that couldn’t be canceled, 
where pre-existing conditions wouldn’t be eliminated.”184  
 In 1955, Andrus found her answer from a thirty-one-year-old New York insurance 
broker, Leonard Davis, who had just secured a deal with Continental Casualty Company 
to provide life-insurance policies for 800 retired teachers in New York.185 Although later 
defamed for caring more about his commercial interests than the needs of AARP 
members, Davis became Andrus’s strategic and financial partner.186 Davis agreed to 
invest $50,000 in a program that would make NRTA members eligible for the New York 
State benefits. His initial investment paid off. By 1972, disclosed Pratt, Davis’s holdings 
in NRTA-AARP insurance products were valued at a whopping $184 million.”187After 
1955, the program expanded rapidly and in 1958, the duo created a new organization, 
AARP, to handle the insurance requests of non-teachers; NRTA and AARP shared office 
space and staff but retained separate boards of directors.188 AARP insurance policies not 
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only “sold by the tens of thousands” but proved to insurance companies that retirees 
could be “good risks, who paid their premiums on time.”189 Peter Corning, while 
conducting an oral history with William Fitch, summarized the AARP insurance 
experiment as follows, “In effect, the experience of your insurance program was that it 
was a profitable undertaking in general—at least for the segment that the population that 
your members consists of.”190 William Fitch replied, “Very much so. Not only for our 
own members, but I think it pioneered the way for many other insurance companies.”191 
Insurance companies now wanted to cover the elderly.  
  As Forand’s bill circulated from 1958 to 1960, the NRTA and the AARP 
publically offered “lukewarm” support of the policy and privately advocated their own 
semi-private version of the bill.192 The remunerative AARP insurance policies gave them 
a significant financial stake in keeping old age insurance within the private sector, or so 
they originally thought. When Medicare finally did pass in 1965, AARP made a killing 
selling supplementary Medicare insurance called Medigap.193 In 1960, William Fitch 
took up the position of Executive Director to the NRTA and AARP and, with Andrus, 
crafted a political approach that responded to seniors’ desire for federal health insurance. 
He came from a government background and knew how to operate in Washington, D.C.  
 Fitch discovered his interest in the aging while “on loan to the State of Israel” as a 
Social Security official from 1955 to 1956. Originally deployed to help the country 
develop its own social insurance program, he soon became interested in the radically 
different cultural assumptions that surrounded aging and the elderly. In his words, “I 
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watched how older people were being used in the upbuilding of the State of Israel. There 
really wasn’t any chronological barrier to employment. Anyone who was able and 
interested and willing to work had a job regardless of how old they were, so I became 
perhaps much more closely interested in the problems of older persons—housing and 
income and supplementary employment, that sort of thing.”194 Fitch returned to the 
United States in 1956 to serve as the Director of the Office of Aging.195 Back in 
Washington, he grew acquainted with Fogarty while putting together a report, at the 
congressman’s request, on the elderly in Rhode Island.196 In the opening days of 1958, 
Fitch was with Fogarty at a late-night emergency meeting at an airport in Washington, 
when Fogarty hammered out the details of the White House Conference on Aging.197 
 For two years, Fitch worked as the staff director for a Conference designed to 
empower states and stall action on the Forand bill. In 1959, the NRTA and AARP 
approached the expert on aging and asked if he “didn’t want to practice what [he’d] been 
preaching” and take over the two organizations as the executive director.198 Fitch took the 
job the following year and with the help of Andrus began to articulate a more subtle and 
strategic position on the pending Forand bill.  
  First, the duo attempted a genuinely bipartisan approach to aged health care, 
speaking at Democratic and Republican assemblies and even reaching out to the AMA.199 
Throughout the 1960s, Fitch and the NRTA-AARP hedged. They seemed to support 
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Fogarty and Forand, while pursuing alliances with Democrats and Republicans.200 And 
though they still offered their own approach to federally funded healthcare, featuring 
private insurance options, the coming election, and a small campaign wing working for 
John F. Kennedy, rendered senior support for Medicare visible. Soon even soft 
opposition from the likes of the AARP became publically unpalatable, especially to 
seniors. The NRTA-AARP, Fitch stressed in 1966, was “never against…a national health 
program.”201  
*** 
 In 1960, the Kennedy campaign had an idea. The candidate of youth would win 
the presidency with the organized support of the old. Before Forand had the chance to 
withdraw to a sedate retirement, the phone rang. It was Kennedy, asking the congressman 
to be the national chair of a campaign group called Senior Citizens for Kennedy.202 Since 
1958, Kennedy had realized the power of the senior vote. He devoted ample energy to 
crafting his own version of the Forand bill and listened carefully as advisors, like Myer 
Feldman, told him that health care for the elderly “was a big issue” and that it could 
“have a great effect on the outcome of the Presidential election in 1960.”203  
 When Kennedy called, Forand “couldn’t turn the fellow down.”204 This was a way 
back into politics by spearheading an issue that had made his name. But he did have one 
condition. Having himself become a senior citizen, he needed some extra help. The 
Kennedy camp generously provided Forand with a full-time traveling companion, 
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evidence, perhaps, that by 1960 his name was powerfully and usefully synonymous with 
health care for the aged.205 Senior Citizens for Kennedy partnered with golden age clubs 
across the country to rally on behalf of this young senator. The campaign endowed the 
fledgling senior’s movement with an organizational structure and a proximal goal. 
 On November 3, leading up to the election, Senior Citizens for Kennedy staged 
one of their many rallies in support of Kennedy. They chartered over 100 buses to shuttle 
seniors to New York’s Union Square.  Over 4000 seniors paid 30 cents for the privilege 
of hearing the Republicans slammed by former governor Herbert Lehman: “The 
Republican leadership does not care whether you are young or old; it does not care what 
your problems are,” Mr. Lehman said, “The Republican leadership just doesn’t care 
unless you happen to be big business.”206 The 106-year-old “grand marshal,” Broadus A. 
Jackson, regaled the crowd with tales of his recent transfer of party alignment.207 He had 
voted for Republicans since 1876 but now he was a Democrat for the sole reason that 
Republicans did not support medical care for the elderly.  
 That same year, the New Republic featured the article “Watch Out for Grandpap.” 
In it Gerald W. Johnson wrote, “Pundits of many shades of opinion have wondered at the 
recklessness of the Eisenhower Administration in inviting the massive retaliation of old 
people by torpedoing the Forand bill that would have provided medical care for persons 
over 65 by raising social security payments. The usual comment is that there are 16 
million Americans now past 65, and the vast majority of them are voters.”208 And it’s not 
just the old people that were furious. The article continued, “An aged and ailing parent is 
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a burden on many an American who is under 65—just how many nobody knows, but 
probably several millions. Their resentment may be even more bitter and lasting than that 
of the old folks themselves.”209 The resentment seemed to have spilled out onto Richard 
Nixon. 
 After Kennedy won the election, Cruikshank paid a visit to his old friend, Arthur 
Flemming, Eishenhower’s Secretary of HEW. Flemming and Cruikshank had attended 
college together at Ohio Wesleyan and worked side by side at the War Manpower 
Commission.  Cruikshank had always believed that Flemming supported the Forand bill 
and confronted him on this issue as he watched his friend clean out his desk. Eisenhower 
was leaving office, and Nixon had lost the election. “At that point I thought it was safe to 
let our hair down a bit,” recalled Cruikshank, “And I said to him, ‘Art, this was an 
awfully close election…. You know, it was just so close that if your man Nixon had 
adopted medicare, he would be being inaugurated tomorrow.’”210 Flemming replied, 
“Well, I think you’re right. It would have made the difference. It was that close.”211  
 Democratic officials were equally convinced that seniors had helped secure the 
election. As Pratt argues, “Senior Citizens for Kennedy had convinced top-level 
Democratic politicians that the basic hypothesis upon which the operation was organized 
has been correct. Elderly voters could be appealed to, like the farm vote or the Negro 
vote, on the basis of their own separate identity and self-interest.”212 And, as of 1961, that 
self-interest was squarely in the Democratic camp. Medicare would be integrated into the 
official party platform and become a crucial issue in the Kennedy White House. 
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 In the early 1950s, oldsters gathered in public to celebrate their skills. They touted 
their abilities and basked in the glow of charitable organizations willing to give them a 
meal and take a photograph. In 1960, aggressive seniors had replaced these 
accommodating oldsters. Gone were concerts and hobby shows. In their stead, senior 
citizens rallied by the thousands to voice their political opinions. The promise of health 
insurance, the strategic coordination offered by the AFL-CIO, the popularity of the 
McNamara hearings, and the organizational capacity of Senior Citizens for Kennedy 
combined to offer seniors a chance to mobilize for a single, concrete, solution.   
 In 1958, Fogarty secured his Conference. But the interim years had not been kind 
to his cause. While the Conference proposal fulfilled Fogarty’s political needs, as did his 
continued generous funding of the NIH, his policy ideals were dwindling beneath the 
Medicare momentum. In addition to furthering medical research into the diseases of old 
age, he wanted to explore the nuanced problems that confronted American elders and 
offer local, tailor-made solutions. He urged states to pursue their own statistics, create 
reports, and ask the same philosophical questions about the nature of care that occupied 
the federal government: What are the obligations of the government to its aging citizens? 
Should government take over care for the aged or aid caregivers? Should the needs of the 
aged take precedence over other concerns? But on the eve of his great conference, the 
battle lines had been drawn. As Kennedy prepared to enter the White House, health 
insurance for the aged emerged as a litmus test that put policy makers squarely for or 
against America’s senior citizens.  
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CHAPTER V  
 
Obligated to Act:  
The 1961 White House Conference on Aging 
 
“Survival, it is called. Often it is accidental, sometimes it is 
engineered…always it is temporary.”1 
                Wallace Stegner, Crossing to Safety. 
 
I. Introduction 
 For almost two decades, the United States federal government sought to define 
and solve the problem of old age. Policy analysts argued over which characteristic best 
described the elderly—chronology, anatomy, unemployment, or disease—and which 
programs would best ameliorate the affliction: job retraining, adult education, 
preventative health care, and finally, federal health insurance. Going into the White 
House Conference on Aging (WHCA), another question would be posed, one centered 
less on circumscribing ailments and more on understanding the nature of obligation.  
 For much of American history the obligation to care for the elderly fell to an aged 
person’s children, local community, or lastly a religious or civic charity.2 By the middle 
of the twentieth-century, this safety net had visibly eroded. Clinicians, gerontologists, 
social workers, religious leaders, community volunteers, political scientists, and 
politicians tried their best to stitch together an ethical response to this palpable need. As 
each safety net (family, community, state) requested further assistance, demand grew for 
the federal government to intervene. As politicians and their aides zeroed in on a 
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definition of the problem of old age and a working solution, they exhumed a question 
seemingly put to rest in the 1930s: does the federal government have a special obligation 
to assist its aged citizens? 
 “One of the most important responsibilities of the White House Conference on 
Aging,” a circulated preconference paper specified, “will be to evaluate and to make 
recommendations concerning the role of the Federal Government in the aging field.”3 
The paper questioned “how far is it right or necessary for the Federal Government to 
assume responsibilities that heretofore have been primarily those of private individuals 
and groups or of State and local governments?”4 In other words, who should be 
responsible for the elderly? How does ascribing obligation in one direction relieve or 
divert obligation in another? These questions always haunted the conversation around 
eldercare, but at the WHCA, they would have an explicit, if brief, airing.  
 While speakers such as Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel, Ollie Randall, and 
Senator Barry Goldwater would explore the contours of intergenerational and 
government responsibility, the interventions they suggested would be starkly and 
immediately overshadowed. John Fogarty’s carefully designed conference, would, in the 
end, be remembered for unleashing an oratorical tsunami on behalf of federal health 
insurance for the elderly. This public relations coup was due in no small part to the 
anglings of Nelson Cruikshank and the AFL-CIO’s growing collection of allies. Not only 
did the conference provoke a surge of public support on behalf of medical insurance for 
the aged, but it helped create a senior citizens lobbying group to advocate for what came 
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to be called Medicare. Four months after the conference, 67% of Americans favored 
“having the Social Security tax increased in order pay for old-age medical insurance.”5  
 Medicare did not actually become law in 1961, 1962, or even in 1964. As 
Theodore Marmor eloquently writes, “Battles like Medicare are fought in public but 
settled in private.”6 While it took another presidential election and Democratic wins in 
Congress to actually push Medicare out of the Ways and Means Committee, the White 
House Conference on Aging sealed the Democratic front on behalf of Medicare. From 
1961 on, a set of assumptions dominated policy for the elderly: Old age is best defined 
chronologically; the great hardship of old age, financial indigence due to rising medical 
costs, could be relieved by offering funds for medical intervention; and, finally, the 
Federal government has a unique responsibility to take care of its citizens once they 
acquire sixty-five years of age.  
 
II. Designing the 1961 White House Conference on Aging 
 The 1961 White House Conference on Aging (WHCA) made the 1950 conference 
seem dinky. Three years of analysis, professional development, state conferences, and 
$2,156,000 in appropriations preceded the event. The majority of those dollars went 
directly to the states, which in turn used the funds to produce a plethora of conferences 
and reports. Although written documents could agree that old age was a torturous, 
financially unstable time for most elderly Americans, state conferences populated by 
politicians, doctors, labor leaders, and activists vehemently disagreed on the appropriate 
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solution to the hardships. For three years, their disagreements dominated local 
conversations and paved the way for a conference that, while broad in intent, was limited 
in outcome.  
 Before the WHCA even opened, the press reported accusations that the 
conference was rigged. In October of 1960, labor leaders suggested that unless the 
conference organizers provided stipends for delegates to attend, the meeting “would 
reflect only the views of well-to-do persons.”7 By which, they meant doctors. State 
conferences, designed to prepare for the WHCA, ended in disaster. The Illinois 
Conference on Aging concluded with a “dispute over a recommendation opposing federal 
medical assistance to the aged.”8 As the opening date approached, press-reported 
accusations of delegate stacking grew even more frequent. On January 8, a day before the 
WHCA began, the Baltimore Sun described a public slight to Wilbur Cohen. The 
“architect of the present social security system,” would not attend because, he claimed, 
“the American Medical Association, private insurance interests and business 
representatives had stacked the conference.”9 Cohen and the press had one thing right: the 
conference was stacked, but just not that successfully. 
 In the months leading up to January 9, Cruikshank and his colleagues at the AFL-
CIO had hatched a plan to use the conference as a propaganda tool to promote health 
insurance for social security recipients. Without the manpower to stack the conference 
with delegates, they hoped to capture the crowd by strategically placing sympathetic 
supporters in crucial meetings. To do so, Cruikshank and his colleagues needed to figure 
out how the proceedings would be organized.  
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 In 1958, Congress determined that the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW), which was then under the leadership of Arthur S. Flemming, would 
organize the conference. Flemming appointed a former Republican congressman from 
New Jersey, Robert Kean, as chairman, and Kean, with the help of HEW and an advisory 
committee, settled on the theme, “Aging with a Future—Every Citizen’s Concern,” and a 
structure. There would be twenty subject matters, to be tackled by smaller working 
groups.10 Each of the working groups would be tasked with creating both summaries and 
actual policy statements following the meeting. From day one, the conference leaders 
knew they had to tread carefully around the juggernaut of health insurance for the aged.  
 They sought to both tackle and defer the policy question. Days before the 
conference, Kean explicitly stated that “catastrophic illness of the aged” was “one of the 
main problems to be faced” and, with the advisory committee, concluded that a key 
question would be “How far should the Federal Government go to help the retired pay 
their bills.”11 Still, the organizers hoped to evade particular policy ramifications, even 
going as far to ban the phrase “Forand bill” from the proceedings.12 They were also 
mindful of how delegates would position themselves in the different working groups. 
William Fitch, who served as the staff director for the conference for two years, recalled 
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an internal debate over where to place the subject of medical financing, in the section on 
“Health and Medical Care” or “Income Maintenance.”13  
 As “doctors and insurance people” were “jockeying” to fill the working group 
they believed would take on this issue, the conference organizers, without leaking it to 
the AMA, decided that the discussion of medical financing belonged in “Income 
Maintenance.”14 They agreed that health insurance was really an economic issue and that 
this placement would garner the broadest crowd.15 As Fitch recalled, “Well, basically, as 
long as it was to be an amendment under Social Security, and as long as Social Security 
was basically income maintenance, we decided that it would all be discussed as an 
amendment to the Social Security part of it rather than something that would be a 
separate program in health.”16 A conversation about health care came to be explicitly 
understood as one about health insurance and income security. If Cruikshank knew about 
this internal protocol decision, he kept it to himself.  
 Five days before the conference began, Cruikshank prepped George Meany, 
president of the AFL-CIO, for his opening speech. “It is very clear,” Cruikshank related, 
“that the chief battleground will be on this question of medical care for the aged under 
social security. As you know this is the burden of the speech that you are delivering 
Monday night at the Shoreham.” The AMA, Cruikshank continued, “has made a major 
project of covering state conferences…. As a result only ten states have come up with a 
positive recommendation of medical care through social security.”17 Monday night, he 
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related, is the AFL-CIO’s chance to do more with less. With only 150 delegates to 257 
physician and dentist delegates, labor was outnumbered. The strategy for “our delegates,” 
he noted, “will be to present at all the work groups and subject sessions to which they are 
assigned a reasonable and logical approach to the problem of medical care so that the 
middle-of-the-road groups…can be won over.” “What our boys need,” Cruikshank 
offered in conclusion, “is a good locker-room talk from the head coach before they go 
into the field where the odds are rather heavily against them.”18 The AMA would have a 
different strategy, trying deliberately to overpower the “Health and Medical Care” 
section, which they misguidedly thought would take on the question of health 
insurance.19  
 
III. Opening Day 
 On January 9, President Eisenhower, with only eleven more days in office, began 
his day with an early bipartisan twist. He breakfasted with Senator Barry Goldwater and 
met with George Meany, before addressing, at 10 am, the opening session of the White 
House Conference on Aging.20 It had been three years since Fogarty first proposed the 
conference, and thousands of delegates arrived prepared. And if they weren’t, “large kits 
with programs, reports, study materials” awaited them.21  
 In Constitution Hall, Eisenhower addressed a stately audience of over 3000. The 
men wore suits, ties, respectable black-rimmed glasses; the women wore calf-length 
skirts with sensible black shoes. Within this sea, a few baldheads, nuns’ habits, and some 
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flair in the form of laced hats could be spotted. Seated behind Eisenhower, the other 
keynote speakers—Senator McNamara, Congressman Fogarty, and Secretary 
Flemming— awaited their turns.22 The musical selections by the United States Marine 
Band and thoughtful comments by the conference organizers ignited the crowd.23 The 
audience gushed. With every leading thinker in the field of old age attending, the 
conference was sure to be an occasion of real political importance.  
 Congressman John Fogarty was more skeptical. In 1961, he was over 
conversation; he wanted action. When he first introduced the bill in 1958, Fogarty 
admonished his fellow politicians, “In spite of the many surveys, books, and conferences 
on aging, the greatest accomplishment to date has been the output of words.”24 To 
promote local activity on behalf of the elderly, the financially savvy Fogarty built into his 
bill an appropriations budget, which would be offered to states as an incentive to prepare 
for the WHCA. And prepare they did, with document after document and an outpouring 
of committee meetings and conferences.25 
 From 1958 until 1960, Fogarty could tolerate this outpouring of research 
recommendations, policy reports, and conflicting data on the elderly across the states. In 
1961, he strongly felt that the country had collectively said enough on the topic. “This 
past year,” he beseeched WHCA  attendees, “has been called the ‘gerontological year.’ 
Never before have so many meetings, studies and reports been devoted to the subject of 
aging. I would like to agree with this thought but cannot. I have been critical of the 
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preconference accomplishments. I have made the distinction between activity and 
action.”26 The WHCA, he urged on opening night, had to be about action.  
 For Fogarty, action in this arena meant something quite specific and bureaucratic. 
He wanted the conference to bring about a Federal Commission on Aging, which would 
have independent agency status and report to the president. Not surprisingly, he also 
called for a “special research section in the Commission to encourage, stimulate, and 
disseminate information that will prevent or correct many of the threats of illness, 
disability and the other difficulties that plague the later years.”27 Aspects of the Fogarty 
solution would eventually triumph in the Older Americans Act, but not until 1965.28  
 Action, for those participants from labor, social work, medicine, and industry 
would not mean another commission; it would mean the success or defeat of the Forand 
bill. In the years between 1958 and 1961, the Forand bill absorbed national politics, even 
providing a pivotal wedge in the 1960 presidential election.29 Entire organizations had 
been created to urge politicians to support or thwart the bill.30 Senator Patrick 
McNamara’s Senate Subcommittee’s public hearings gave a national stage to the growing 
power of senior citizens groups, the social security department of the AFL-CIO, and 
social welfare activists. The AMA followed suit, bolstering its defense with increased 
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spending and renewed coalitions across the health care industry.31 Both camps arrived at 
the conference ready to put the opposition to rest. 
 Over three thousand people would attend the meeting, 2,565 of whom had the 
honor of being voting delegates. The now graying Clark Tibbitts; Wilma Donahue, who 
spearheaded adult education in the 1940s at the University of Michigan; Ollie Randall, 
who built some of the first old age homes; and E. V. Cowdry, the respected cytologist 
and founding member of the field of gerontology, came to offer their input. Despite the 
high-powered collection of experts on aging, business executives, government operatives, 
media darlings, and medical professionals with wide ranging proficiencies, the WHCA 
would be a single-issue skirmish, with a clear winner. 
 
IV. Taking Over the Conference 
 On Monday afternoon, participants got to work, discussing everything from recent 
research in gerontology to demographic patterns. While vibrant “activity” took place 
across the groups, the “action” was in the sections on “Health and Medical Care” and 
“Income Maintenance.” Stacked with physicians, the “Health and Medical Care” section 
looked powerful from the outside, but, upon arrival, attendees realized they explicitly 
lacked the authority to make policy recommendations on the financing of medical care. 
This privilege went to the group meeting on “Income Maintenance,” where physicians 
and their allies held only 37 out of the 269 delegate positions and 77 of the delegates 
came from the AMA’s opposition, labor and social welfare groups.32  
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 John R. Lindsey, a journalist for Medical Economics, witnessed the proceedings. 
When he entered a sub-group dedicated to “Income Maintenance” in Foyer B-5 of the 
Shoreham hotel, Dr. Ernest B. Howard from the AMA took the floor railing, “Shall we 
have a Big Brother welfare state in which Big Government pays our medical bills for us? 
Social Security medical care is socialized medicine.” When Howard sat down, a “stocky 
man across the table rose to his feet. He was Anthony G. Weinlein, director of research 
and education for the Building Service Employees International Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O. He 
said, “I think all of us have heard these arguments before. All we’re trying to do is help 
people to a decent old age.”33 The match of wills and rhetoric pressed on. Finally, 
Workgroup I-5 quieted for a vote. Sixteen supported “Social Security medicine”; twelve 
opposed it. Lindsey described the breakdown: “For Social Security medicine: five labor 
union representatives, four public welfare officials, four leaders of retired citizens groups, 
a young man with the Fair Employment Practices Commission in California, a retired 
professor of education, and Mrs. Shirpser of Berkeley Calif. Against Social Security 
medicine: four physicians, five insurance company executives, a businessman, a lawyer, 
and an unaffiliated private citizen.”34 The other working groups in “Income 
Maintenance” concurred, with a final vote of 170 to 99.35  
 When the physicians twiddling away their delegate votes in the “Health and 
Medical Care” working group heard about the vote, they proposed their own amendment 
against federal health care financing for the elderly. Repeating the party line they wrote, 
“Compulsory health care inevitably results in poor quality health care.”36 The section 
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adopted the amendment with a vote of 165 to 122. Intercommittee warfare ensued, with 
Conference Chairman Robert Kean called in “for a ruling.”37 Kean concluded that 
everyone had a right to state opinions on medical care, but that the working group on 
“Health and Medical Care,” had “no right to pass any recommendation on financing such 
care.”38 With that, the AMA had visibly lost.  
 The pro-Medicare contingent captured the ruling and then proceeded to secure 
public opinion within and outside the conference. “The applause in Constitution Hall was 
deafening,” when Dr. Warren Draper, a physician for the United Mine Workers and a 
delegate with “Health and Medical Care,” read his minority report before the conference, 
stating: “‘It is distressing to be told by organized medicine that the quality of care that the 
individual physician renders will be influenced by the source of payment.”39 
 On January 12, the day the conference concluded, the Baltimore Sun broadcast, 
“The AFL-CIO and the AMA fought it out today, and the AFL-CIO won.”40 The 
Conference’s conclusions, the Sun reminded readers, are not “binding.” The 
overwhelming decision on behalf of Medicare “merely lets the world in general, and the 
United States Congress in particular, know how the majority of the 2,600 delegates from 
several hundred organizations interested in the problems of aging feel about the 
situation.”41 “We got burned, all right,” reflected the former president of the AMA, Dr. 
David Allman.42 While Allman blamed “the stacking done by the Social Security boys—
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the union guys, the social welfare people,” 43 Dr. Golda Nobel advanced a slightly more 
nuanced assessment. In her report to the American Medical Women’s Association, she 
acknowledged that nineteen out of twenty sections “were almost completely obscured by 
one controversial issue…the method of payment for medical care for the aged.” This was 
not a simple problem of stacking a strategic working group. In her words, “It did not 
require a penetrating mind to recognize that the W.H.C.A. was a ploy for what turned out 
to be a highly successful launching of a trial balloon, which, far from being shot down, 
was buoyed up higher and higher by an enthusiastic and demanding plurality.… The 
priority over the many equally important problems of the aged, given to the polemic 
problem of medical payment, suddenly transformed the conference into what might be 
described as an indignation-meeting.”44 
 This “indignation-meeting” did not bolster the AMA’s cause with Dr. Nobel. 
Rather, she related to her fellow female physicians, “it became impossible to participate 
in this conference and remain insensitive to the intense hope, as expressed by the many, 
in the direction of resolution.” This issue was a “paradox for the medical profession.” It 
was a tribute to a field that had helped bring about “lower mortality, improved health and 
longer life span.” Meanwhile, the AMA’s political stance had cast “its members as an 
enemy of the people.” “The truth is simply this,” Dr. Nobel concluded, “the medical 
profession has already given up many of its prerogatives to lay hospital administrators, to 
quasi-governmental bureaus, to insurance groups. By continuing with its attitude of 
political neanderthalism, it will forfeit many of its remaining powers. And not merely the 
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profession, but also the quality of medical care will suffer.”45 At the close of the 
conference, experts had voiced their support of Medicare, the press and the public had 
concurred, and even doctors were challenging the ranks.  
 
V. Who is Obligated? The Rabbi, The Social Worker, and The Senator 
 Although barely reported, dissent at the conference did not exclusively come from 
the AMA. Religious leaders, social workers, and conservative politicians offered their 
own assessments of its direction. Some supported health insurance for the aged but raised 
concerns about the single-minded focus of the conference; others urged thinkers to see 
the Forand bill in a larger framework of the proper role of the federal government. 
Although these soft and hard dissents did not deter the surge of support for the Forand 
bill, they exposed the pitfalls that would continue to haunt both the Medicare movement 
and the eventual policy.  
 In the throes of the conference, the soft critiques offered by the bill’s supporters 
gained ground, igniting conversations and stimulating a rethinking of the parameters of 
care for the aged. At the close of the conference, and in the ensuing years, concerns 
offered by the likes of Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel and Ollie Randall were 
overshadowed by the growing conservative opposition, which conflated the particular 
case of health insurance for social security recipients into a wider argument against a 
bloated federal government. 
 Born in Poland, Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel arrived in America at the end of 
World War II. An intellectual luminary in Europe, Heschel established himself in 




published works on medieval Jewish philosophy, Hasidism, and theology, eventually 
articulating his own philosophical approach to religion in his pivotal works Man Is Not 
Alone (1951) and God in Search of Man (1955).46 His ethical code extended beyond the 
page and the classroom: he believed faith demanded action. He took stands on the major 
ethical questions of his day, speaking in Washington, D.C., forging a close alliance with 
Martin Luther King Jr. and championing the civil rights movement. In 1961, many 
Americans knew Heschel’s name; what they did not know was his particular take on the 
nature of family obligation.  
 At the meeting on “The Older Person, Family Life, and The Services They Need,” 
the great rabbi stood to speak and presented his audience with a harrowing description: “I 
see the sick and the despised, the defeated and the bitter, the rejected and the lonely. I see 
them clustered together and alone, clinging to a hope for somebody’s affection that does 
not come to pass. I hear them pray for the release that comes with death. I see them 
deprived and forgotten, masters yesterday, outcasts today.”47 Looking at his audience he 
continued with a reproof: “What we owe the old is reverence, but all they ask for is 
consideration, attention, not to be discarded and forgotten. What they deserve is 
preference, yet we do not even grant them equality. One father finds it possible to sustain 
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a dozen children, yet a dozen children find it impossible to sustain one father.”48 The 
audience was listening.  
 This was the second time Heschel had addressed an interfaith crowd in 
Washington, D.C. A year earlier, he had challenged prevailing attitudes to the so-called 
problem of youth. At the White House Conference on Children and Youth, which took 
place on March 28, 1960, he questioned the efficacy of focusing on “youth” outside of 
their relationships with adults. He pronounced, “The heart of the Ten Commandments is 
to be found in the words Revere thy father and thy mother. Without profound reverence 
for father and mother our ability to observe the other comandments is dangerously 
impaired.”49 But reverence, he asserted, will not develop automatically it must be earned. 
The onus, then, is on the parents, the adult generation, to be worthy of such a feeling. He 
went on, “The problem we face, the problem I as a father face, is why my child should 
revere me. Unless my child will sense in my personal existence acts and attitudes that 
evoke reverence—the ability to delay satisfactions, to overcome prejudices, to sense the 
holy, to strive for the noble—why should she revere me?”50 Before fretting over the 
moral fiber of the young, Heschel insisted that adults, parents, had the obligation to fret 
over themselves.  
 But parents, he conceded, can only do so much. American culture and policy, he 
maintained, created an unfortunate division between the world of the young and the 
world of the old. Age segregation dismantled the opportunities for shared learning, shared 
joy, and shared wonder. “Our society,” he lectured, “is fostering the segregation of youth, 
the separation of young and old. The adult has no fellowship with the young. He has little 
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to say to the young, and there is little opportunity for the young to share the wisdom of 
experience, or the experience of maturity.”51 At a conference devoted to describing the 
problems of the young, Heschel called attention to the fact that thinking about any 
problem as that of the young, or that of the old, will only lead to a further dismantling of 
the familial relationships. Heschel urged a multigenerational approach to the problem of 
youth, one that refrained from extracting the young from the kinship relationships that 
marked their lives. He pursued a similar approach at the White House Conference on 
Aging. 
 Heschel overtly endorsed using the “Social Security mechanisms” to provide 
“medical care for the aged,” but he did not think this would solve the problem of old 
age.52 The problem, he reiterated throughout the conference, was more than material well 
being; it was the agony of psychological and spiritual insecurity.53 Echoing the earlier 
position of Ollie Randall, he described the “ills of old age” as “(1) The sense of being 
useless to, and rejected by, family and society; (2) the sense of inner emptiness and 
boredom; (3) loneliness and the fear of time.”54 The only answer to the hardship of old 
age was “a sense of significant being.”55 
 Rather than focusing on what the elderly need, Heschel believed that the elderly 
themselves had to focus on the way in which they are still needed, on their obligations at 
this stage of life. “What a person lives by is not only a sense of belonging but also a sense 
of indebtedness. The need to be needed corresponds to a fact: something is asked of man, 
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of every man.”56 In concert with this approach the delegates of the “Patterns of Living” 
section concluded with a Senior Citizens Charter that listed not only the “Rights of Senior 
Citizens” but also the “Obligations of the Aging.”57!One obligation was “to prepare 
himself to become and resolve to remain active, alert, capable, and self-supporting, and 
useful so long as health and circumstances permit and to plan for ultimate retirement.”58!
 Finally, he urged his audience to focus not only on physical space but also on 
time. “Time is the only aspect of existence which is completely beyond man’s control. He 
may succeed in conquering space, in sending satellites around the moon, but time 
remains immune to his power.”59 Time posed a specific challenge to the aged, for, “Old 
age has the vicious tendency of depriving a person of the present.” It does so because the 
“aged thinks of himself as belonging to the past.” 60 This tendency must be balanced by 
attitudes and policies that offer the elderly an opportunity to be present, to continue the 
process of growing. “It is precisely this openness to the present,” Heschel argued, “that 
he must strive for.”61  
 Even though many of Heschel’s solutions to the crisis afflicting elders required 
internal work, he offered a number of policy solutions to aid Americans in this 
conceptual revision. First, the government should abandon chronological age from all 
policies. “The most delightful resolution the White House Conference on Aging could 
pass would be to eliminate from now any mention of the date of birth from the 
certificate.”62 Secondly, the government could urge private industries, insurance 
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companies, advertising agencies, and social service organizations to abandon the 
conflation of leisure, retirement, and old age.63 “While we do not officially define old age 
as a second childhood, some of the programs we devise are highly effective in helping the 
aged to become children,” he insisted.64 The emphasis on recreation, he continued, 
“aggravates rather than ameliorates a condition it is trying to deal with, namely the 
trivialization of existence.”65 In line with the attitudes of Clark Tibbitts and the work of 
Wilma Donahue at the University of Michigan, Heschel believed that there should be 
serious senior universities to foster continued intellectual engagement and skill 
reeducation for the elderly. This would have the added benefit of giving the middle aged 
and young the impression that seniors are capable of growth. “The goal,” he contended, 
“is not to keep the old man busy, but to remind him that every moment is an opportunity 
for greatness.”66  
 Returning to the logic of his “Children and Youth” speech, Heschel protested 
seeing the problems of the aged outside the hardships and pressures of the modern 
family, which he endowed with his own definition based as much on action as blood. 
Even today, the expectation of care resides in the family unit, but, he continued, “such 
expectation presupposed the concept of a family which is not only an economic unit but 
also an interplay of profoundly personal relations. It thinks of the family not only as a 
process of living together but also of a series of decisive acts and events in which all 
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members are involved and by which all are inwardly affected.”67 By isolating kinship 
networks into individual units, the obligation to work together and to enjoy one another, 
Heschel worried, would dissolve. For Heschel, this problem was as much economic as it 
was cultural: “Children today experience their highest moments of exaltation in a 
children’s world, in which there is no room for parents. But unless a fellowship of 
spiritual experience is re-established, the parent will remain an outsider to the child’s 
soul.” “One of the beauties of the human spirit,” he maintained, is that we “appreciate 
what we share, we do not appreciate what we receive.”68 To reconstitute the position of 
the elderly in society, Heschel argued, the government could assist in creating policies 
that aid intergenerational relationships and cater to kin networks rather than individuals. 
Age segregation, he insisted at a conference dedicated to the aged, could foster rather 
than solve the maladies of old age as well as the trials of youth.  
 Like Heschel, Ollie Randall offered a soft critique of the narrowing agenda of the 
conference. Summarizing the proceedings to the National Council of Jewish Women, she 
remarked, “It really surpassed my gloomiest expectations…. I am happy to say that the 
general atmosphere—once one could talk of something other than medical care and the 
AMA’s position—was favorable to well organized discussion and the development of a 
series of interesting policy statements and recommendations.”69 While she did endorse 
using social security to finance medical care for the elderly, she urged further focus on 
the conflicts between generations, local needs, and retirement practices, and, most 
importantly, the mounting housing crisis.  
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 Since Randall ran her first old age home in the late 1920s, the institutional 
landscape for housing the elderly had transformed. The problem, as she saw it, was 
twofold: there was a dangerous shortage of feasible low-income housing for elderly 
couples and singles and there was a growing trend toward proprietary nursing homes, 
which separated the elderly from communities.70  
 One of the most dramatic, and unexpected outcomes, of postwar public policy in 
the arena of old age was the growth of proprietary nursing homes. Responding to a public 
outcry about alms and poorhouses, the 1935 Social Security Act stopped public funds 
from going to individuals housed in such institutions. The unintended result was the rise 
of privately owned homes for the elderly.71 The 1946 Hill-Burton Act and its subsequent 
amendments contributed significantly to this trend, building incentive structures for 
homes for the aged to become their own kind of medical facilities, nursing homes.72 
“With the advent of nursing homes,” physician and aging expert William C. Thomas 
comments, “proprietary homes—businesses operated for a profit—grew from virtual 
nonexistence to dominate the whole field of long-term care.”73 This development he 
argues, flew “in the face of the hundreds of years of health care in the health facility 
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tradition and despite the predominance of critical judgment of professionals and 
leaders.”74  
 Randall agreed. By 1960, there were somewhere between ten and eleven thousand 
nursing homes in the United States, and this was just the beginning.75 By 1980 that 
number would jump to 17,000 nursing homes with an agregate revenue of over 12 billion 
a year. Much of that revenue, 60% within each home, came directly from the federal 
government.76 After undertaking a fourteen-year study of these types of institutions, the 
former associate counsel to the U.S. Senate Committee on Aging, Val J. Halamandaris, 
had this to say in 1977: “The average senior citizen looks at a nursing home as a human 
junkyard, as a prison, a kind of purgatory, halfway between society and the cemetery, or 
as the first step of an invisible slide into oblivion. Nursing homes are not only 
synonymous with death, but with the notion of protracted suffering before death.”77 In 
1961, Randall hoped the Conference would help redirect this trend. She wanted housing 
for the elderly but she wanted such housing to be responsive to the complex social and 
medical needs of the aged.78 “Adequate housing,” the working group on the subject 
concluded, “means housing which the aging can afford, which meets the special physical 
needs of the aged, and which is designed to avoid isolation from the rest of the 
community or an institutionalized feeling.”79 One of the most important aspects of old 
age housing, Randall argued for two decades, was its placement within a larger 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 Ibid. 
75 Vladeck, Unloving Care, 45. 
76 Ibid., 3, 23. 
77 Moss and Halamandaris, Too Old, Too Sick, Too Bad, 14. 
78 See chapter II. 
79 The Nation and Its Older People, 181. 
! %$%!
intergenerational community. That prospect grew ever more difficult with the rise of 
suburbs, exurbs, and industrially designed proprietary nursing home buildings.80  
 Geneva Mathiasen, Randall’s colleague at the National Council on Aging, and a 
cohort of likeminded experts prepared a background paper on local community 
organization for the conference that reflected another of Randall’s longstanding concerns: 
that single-minded approaches would never adequately deal with the complex and case-
specific ailments afflicting the country’s elders. Obstacles to solving the problem of old 
age, the paper opened, were philosophical as well as methodological, “our society is 
confronted not only with how to provide services, but with questions of family versus 
community responsibility.” Each community, the paper argued, had to struggle with these 
debates and provide local approaches. They had to find solutions to “what should be 
done” as well “how it should be done.”81  
 Drawing on the example of Mr. and Mrs. Malady, the writers insisted that 
communities across the country could see the results of misbegotten community plans, 
which did not exactly fit local needs. The 78-year-old Mrs. Malady suffered from 
arthritis, heart disease, and cared for her blind 84-year-old husband on a meager pension 
and Social Security. With few surviving friends and no nearby family, the couple could 
use support. They could benefit, the essay continued, from “a specially designed housing 
project,” a “recreation center,” “homemaker services,” or “homecare.” But, in their 
community, as in most, the actual services are standardized and limited. It would be 
“valueless” to Mrs. Malady to have, for example, a home for the aged dedicated to single 
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living. Moreover, it could be detrimental for their quality of life to be pushed into a 
nursing home, and a “chronic hospital might be useful for a period of time, but what 
happens to the Maladys after they leave the hospital doors?” The only answer, the writers 
concluded, is to retain multiple professions and perspectives in community planning.”82  
 This approach, which privileged the local over the federal, would be echoed, 
albeit with a different tenor, by Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona. Goldwater, a 
political representative of the growing postwar conservative renaissance, maintained a 
philosophical approach that joined a respect for individualism, with skepticism over 
social planning at a federal level and a deep fear of Communism.83 He would come to 
offer the harshest and most lasting critique of the single-minded policy focus of the 
conference.  
*** 
 In a photograph snapped at the WHCA, Senator Barry Goldwater is seated next to 
Rabbi Heschel. Although the two shared a similar style in suits, their facial hair, glasses, 
and positions on the American family and the problem of old age quickly brought their 
fundamental differences to light.84 Whereas Heschel pushed for benevolence and 
generosity at every level of planning, from the family to the federal government, 
Goldwater believed that benevolence was a scarce resource. If the government gave too 
much, children would start to give too little. 
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 Barry Morris Goldwater, a business man from Phoenix, came to Washington, 
D.C., in 1952 as a United States Senator.85 As the inheritor of a family dry goods 
company, he advanced a political ideology centered on personal responsibility, 
individualism, and states rights. He was a conservative before the term married social 
issues, like abortion, with economic ones, like low taxes. As head of the family business, 
he was relatively progressive, integrating his stores, instituting limited workweeks, and 
offering employees fringe benefits.86 As a senator, he believed strongly in leaving 
governing policies to individuals and the states, even voting against the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act.87  
 Throughout his life, he remained a man of contradictions, bucking party loyalty in 
the 1990s by supporting federal intervention for a woman’s right to choose and allowing 
openly gay soldiers to serve in the military.88 President Eisenhower had this to say about 
Senator Goldwater, “Barry, you speak too quick and too loud.”89 Rick Pearlstein 
surmised decades later, “Goldwater had a flair for self-dramatization.”90 In 1961, 
Goldwater was busy crafting his political persona and a coherent conservative ideology to 
go with it. Opposition to a ballooning welfare state was his trump card.  
 In 1960, Goldwater published The Conscience of a Conservative, a ghostwritten 
screed, which set out to convert the nation.91 Conservatives, the book argued, were not 
against social welfare, rather they were for personal responsibility and fearful of a strong 
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and suffocating state. Moreover, federally mandated charity dangerously bolstered 
government power and spending while having a deleterious affect on the character 
development of Americans. One “of the great evils of Welfarism,” he maintained, was 
“that it transforms the individual from a dignified, industrious, self-reliant spiritual being 
into a dependent animal creature without his knowing it.”92  
 Goldwater extended these ideas in his speech at the White House Conference on 
Aging. Like Heschel, he made family life the center of his comments. Unlike Heschel, he 
saw the threat to family life coming not from the actions of actual family members but 
from a malignant outside source, Communism. He decried, “Family responsibility which 
is built by the understanding and love of the members of the family between each other 
and as a unit is the great strength of free people and the family is the basic target of 
communism everywhere in this world. Destroy the mutual respect and love that members 
of the family have for each other and you have effectively destroyed the spiritual strength 
of any nation.”93 Familial destruction, Goldwater argued, would come from the shift in 
responsibility from the children to the state. He broadcast, “The key word here, I submit, 
is the word ‘responsibility.’ Where does responsibility primarily lie in questions affecting 
the family and its aged members?... It is a problem too intimate for cold handling by 
bureaucracy…. If the attitude develops that we don’t have to worry about mother and 
father because the Federal Government is going to take care of them, then you have 
pretty much destroyed both ends of the line of responsibility in the family, the 
responsibility of the parent to the child and the child to the parent.”94 If the government 
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stepped in, he insisted, first children would stop taking care of their parents and then 
parents would have no reason to take care of their children. In essence, Goldwater 
centered his vision of familial obligation on the essential selfishness of all parties. 
 Goldwater, Randall, and Heschel were all concerned with personal and familial 
responsibility, yet they came to drastically different conclusions about how such 
responsibility could be cultivated. Randall hoped to give the aged the gift of personal 
responsibility by creating self-run aged centers, educating the young and middle aged 
about the demands of old age, and keeping the elderly engaged in communal life.95 
Heschel agreed but added another layer. He felt that mutual responsibility for family 
members had to be pursued through shared learning and work opportunities. Age 
segregation, not Communism, loomed as the largest threat to family obligations. Heschel 
and Randall urged federal policy that supported kinship and communal relationships. 
Although the elderly surely needed help with the rising cost of healthcare they also 
needed policies at the level of urban planning, housing, employment, and reeducation that 
would help them productively participate in the social and economic life of the country. 
 Rather than a proactive response towards cultivating family obligations, 
Goldwater felt that the status quo worked and that any intervention to ease the financial 
burdens on families would diminish individual responsibility. He concluded his 
conference remarks, “Let’s not, then, dash off into some new frontier that will in the long 
run bring more trouble to all of us. Let’s take the steps necessary to encourage our people 
to take care of themselves and their families, and the problems in this general field will 
be solved as they have always been solved by the Americans themselves.”96 As 
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Goldwater pursued his political ambitions in the early 1960s and repeatedly offered his 
conflation of Medicare with Communism and the dissolution of personal obligation, 
progressive and Democratic concerns about Medicare became less salient. By the middle 
of the 1960s, anyone who wanted to offer a soft critique of the policy, or use the phrase 
“personal responsibility,” ended up sounding a little too much like a Goldwater 
Republican.97 
 
VI. The National Council of Senior Citizens 
 One month after the WHCA closed, President John F. Kennedy spoke before 
Congress. Still echoing the dreams of an incremental approach to health insurance, he 
began, “Ill health and its harsh consequences are not confined to any state or region, to 
any race, age, or sex, to any occupation or economic level. This is a matter of national 
concern.”98 Still, solutions must begin somewhere, and Kennedy led with the elderly and 
followed with the children:  
Those among us who are over 65—16 million today in the United States—
go to the hospital more often and stay longer than their younger neighbors. 
Their physical activity is limited by six times as much disability as the rest 
of the population. Their annual medical bill is twice that of persons under 
65—but their annual income is only half as high. The nation’s children—
now 40 percent of our population—have urgent needs which must be met. 
Many still die in infancy. Many are not immunized against disease which 
can be prevented, have inadequate diets or unnecessarily endure physical 
and emotional problems.99  
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The needs of the elderly and the needs of children must be met, but government, he 
conceded bore “only a part of the responsibility.”100 The Kennedy administration would 
adopt the Ewing approach to national health insurance. They would strive for broad 
national health programs through incremental policies. Medicare would be the primary 
obligation and the rest would have to follow.  
 Kennedy offered his own version of Medicare. He proposed “that all persons aged 
65 and over who are eligible for social security or railroad retirement benefits” receive 90 
days of inpatient hospital coverage, 180 days of nursing home services following hospital 
visits, outpatient clinical diagnostic services if the costs exceed $20, and coverage for 
visiting nurses.101 Although still primarily a hospital insurance program, the surgical 
benefits included in the original Forand bill were dropped. The Kennedy bill would be 
financed by a small increase in social security contributions from employers and 
employees and an “increase in the maximum earnings base from $4800 a year to 
$5000.”102 In this way the policy would be financially self-supporting. Most importantly, 
he argued, “This program is not a program of socialized medicine. It is a program of 
prepayment of health costs with absolute freedom of choice guaranteed. Every person 
will choose his own doctor and hospital.”103 The following week, Senator Clinton 
Anderson (D-New Mexico) and Congressman Cecil King (D-California) introduced 
Kennedy’s bill.104  
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 Despite widespread public support, the King-Anderson bill languished in the 
Ways and Means Committee.105 Kennedy responded to the congressional stonewall by 
using his defeat to shore up even more national attention to the issue. As Marmor writes, 
“Although he had rejected the use of arm-twisting tactics within the Congress, Kennedy 
hoped to put indirect pressure on legislators by going to the public with an educational 
campaign about the legislation denied him in 1961.”106 The WHCA and the remnants of 
Senior Citizens for Kennedy came to his aid yet again; this time, in the form of the 
National Council of Senior Citizens. 
*** 
 Elders had been agitating for self-representation, and their own lobby, since the 
pension movement of the 1930s.107 Oliver Carlson, secretary of The Liberal League for 
Adequate Pensions, pleaded in 1949 “that those drawing old-age pensions should dump 
pension promoters overboard and run their own organization.”108 In 1955, a popular radio 
host continued this tradition by pushing old folks to organize their own union: 
 We are faced with the obvious fact that our senior class is growing 
tremendously and becoming a factor of potent political power. This is a 
power of which our politicians are well aware. It could be organized like 
the veterans, the farmers, or the unions, into a political pressure group, 
which at the very least could defend itself against discriminatory practices. 
It could wield its mature influence in the directions of national safety and 
betterment.109  
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 At first blush, the National Council of Senior Citizens (NCSC) looked like such a 
union. Elders swarmed political rallies, gathered for letter campaigns, and staged events 
across the country alerting politicians to their growing power. Upon closer examination, 
the NCSC was a one-issue coalition, created by labor unions to harness the senior vote 
and present the image that the fight for Medicare came solely from America’s aged 
citizens. 
 Although one could credit Oscar Ewing for introducing the idea of a senior 
citizens group that would lobby on behalf of Medicare, the journalist Richard Harris 
locates the NCSC’s conception at the WHCA. There, a conversation took place between 
Aime Forand, Nelson Cruikshank, Charles Odell from the United Auto Workers Union, 
and James Cuff O’Brien from the United Steel Workers. Odell and O’Brien argued for 
the merits of a seniors group, while Cruikshank hesitated, fearing a renaissance of the 
Townsend movement. Harris reported Cruikshank saying, “The Townsend people, back 
in the thirties, were widely irresponsible…. If they’d had their way, the United States 
would have been bankrupt inside a year.” Cruikshank feared that a seniors group “might 
create a sort gerontocracy that would plague the government for one handout after 
another.”110 In the summer of 1961, Odell and O’Brien moved forward with the idea. 
They secured a small amount of funds, persuaded the now renowned Forand to chair the 
organization, and set up a small office in Washington, D.C.111 
 With the structure of the National Council of Senior Citizens determined, 
Odell and O’Brien went back to Cruikshank. According to Cruikshank, the duo 
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wanted a formal endorsement from the A.F.L.-C.I.O. and money.112 This time, he 
was persuaded by their argument: the elderly needed the labor movement and the 
labor movement needed the elderly. Summarizing their logic, he recalled,  
Look, labor can’t do this alone. It’s got to be more than a labor cause. The old people are 
interested in this, but they’re inarticulate, they have no way of channeling their influence 
to Congress, they don’t know how to be effective with Congress. They’ve got to have a 
paper, a bulletin, a little staff of field people and people that can talk their own language, 
appeal to their own interests, get them to take part in political action and legislative 
action. And the labor movement can’t do this…. Its political activity is ragged and 
known…. You need a broader base and this is the way to get it.113 Moreover, Cruikshank 
understood that a fight which pitted organized labor against organized medicine, would 
never garner public sympathy. A fight between organized medicine and aged Americans, 
they gambled, would.114 The A.F.L.-C.I.O. agreed to sponsor and fund the organization. 
 Six thousand thank you letters from seniors awaited Forand after Kennedy’s 1960 
win. Until the founding of the NCSC, they were left unanswered.115 These letters now 
formed the basis for a growing coalition of seniors and senior groups that would 
participate in the NCSC’s political mission, the passage of Medicare. When Oscar Ewing 
received his form letter, he wrote back delighted by Forand’s new mission. Then, in a 
post script, he reminded the former congressman of his own decade long strategy, “Just 
on the basis of naked political power, can 185,000 doctors have more weight than 16 
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million people who are 65 and over? If these 16 million voters organize they can easily 
put the doctors in their place, Ewing wrote.”116  
 While Forand urged a grassroots approach to funding and political organizing, the 
NCSC survived, and flourished, off of two major donations, one from the A.F.L.-C.I.O. 
and the other from the Democratic National Committee (DNC).117 Kennedy’s election 
alerted the DNC to the voting power of the elderly. Leaders within the party came to 
believe by 1961 that the aged vote won a number of key districts and contributed to 
Kennedy’s win.118 With the AMA marshalling its troops, the DNC decided to keep the 
NCSC afloat with small donations.  
  With funding secured, the organization morphed from a loose confederacy of 
interested elders to a structured lobbying group.119 As William R. Hutton, a public 
relations professional hired to run the organization remarked, “The AMA had all the 
money, and we had all the old people. My job was to switch them from the bingo circuit 
to social action.”120 And that he did. While the NCSC remained a collection of golden 
ring clubs and aged activists, through Hutton, “the council became an important pressure 
point in the push for Medicare, holding giant rallies, organizing major letter campaigns to 
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Congress,” as Robert M. Ball remarked.121 Hutton, Cruikshank, and others also devised a 
series of strategies to enhance Medicare’s public appeal while zeroing in on the districts 
of key Ways and Means Committee members. 
 The voice and look of massive groups of elderly provided the main thrust of the 
public relations campaign, but the Medicare strategists widened their tent by appealing, 
recalled Ball, to “the sons and daughters of the elderly,” to those Americans “most at risk 
for the hospital bills of their parents.”122 At the same time that proponents of Medicare 
extended their audience to the middle-aged they fostered multi-organization coalitions 
through joint projects. The popular pamphlet “We Support?” listed over sixty different 
national organizations that had come out in favor Medicare. The pamphlet itself had been 
a feat of collaboration, published by the American Association of Social Workers, with 
the printing costs covered by the United Steel Workers and the mailing costs by the AFL-
CIO.123 Finally, Forand and Cruikshank devised a plan to use the NCSC to target key 
members of the Ways and Means Committee.  
 When Peter Corning interviewed Forand for the oral history Social Security 
Project he asked, “One of the comments that’s been made about the National Council is 
that as a young organization seeking to play a role and influence the course of a major 
piece of legislation, it seemed to have a very firm grasp of exactly where the problem lay, 
and I mean specifically the Ways and Means Committee. It has been said that you were 
the person who was responsible for formulating for the National Council what the 
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problem in Congress was and how it needed to be solved. Is that true?”124 Forand 
responded with hearty agreement. The NCSC had been instrumental in organizing senior 
meetings in the congressional districts of the Ways and Means committee members. 
George Smathers (D-Florida) would credit Lyndon Johnson for changing his vote in 
1965, but Cruikshank worked tirelessly with the NCSC on the ground in Florida to 
influence his position. In Cruikshank’s words, “Well, we really went to work—the 
National Council of Senior Citizens and our unions and everybody else—to really make 
these demonstrations…. For instance, in Fort Lauderdale, they had to change the hall 
three different times. Smathers came and looked out over a sea of several thousand old 
people. And while they were orderly and all, there were banners all over the place for 
medicare and everything else.”125  
 By 1962, the NCSC had 1,500,000 members and had been involved in thirty-five 
congressional races, offering their support to pro-Medicare candidates. 126 On May 20 of 
that year, NCSC with the help of seventy independent senior organizations, put together 
twenty-eight mass rallies across the nation to support Kennedy’s health insurance 
initiative.”127 In July, the group organized a petition signed by 2.5 million people on 
behalf of the plan.128 While scholars disagree on the actual impact the NCSC had on the 
eventual Medicare vote in Congress, few would disagree that the fight for health 
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insurance consolidated the senior citizens movement.129 Seniors might not have created 
Medicare, but Medicare surely helped create senior citizens.  
 From 1962 until its final passage in 1965, the fight for Medicare moved from the 
realm of broad public relations to the closed doors of the United States legislature. As 
political scientists, historians, and economists have carefully plotted, the policy battle 
would be fought pawn by pawn in Congress. Still, it took the 1964 election to remove the 
final legislative roadblocks. Lyndon Johnson’s vision for a caring, obligated, central 
government bested Goldwater, and the Democrats obtained thirty-two new seats in the 
House.130  
 Despite almost 14,000 pages filled with years of testimony on the subject in the 
Ways and Means Committee Chairman, Willbur Mills had, until 1964, been able to stall 
reporting a Medicare bill. After the election, he had to act.131 But the way he did 
surprised everyone, Democrat and Republican alike. Mills, with the assistance of Wilbur 
Cohen, decided to merge the Republican alternatives to Medicare with the King-
Anderson bill in what Cohen would call the “three-layer-cake” approach.132 The final bill 
included a hospital insurance program (Part A), a voluntary doctor’s insurance program 
(Part B), and an expanded version of Kerr-Mills, now called Medicaid.133 Mills pushed 
through a far more expansive view of federal health care while retaining much of the 
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logic of the first proposal in 1952, which spotlighted institutional care, bolstered private 
insurance options, and allowed doctors to set their own rates.  
 The pitfalls of the bill, including a massively inflated budget, incentives for 
doctors and hospitals to raise their prices, lack of cost-control mechanisms, and 
administrative complexity, have been well debated, as has the impact the bill has had on 
relieving elderly poverty.134 In 1959, 35.2% of Americans over sixty-five years of age 
lived below the poverty line. In 2000 that number had dropped to 10%.135 What has been 
less understood is how the drive to pass such a program inadvertently quieted a series of 
crucial conversations on the nature of old age, on age segregation, and on the viability of 
intergenerational health and social policies. 
 
VII. Conclusion  
 
 Two years after the passage of the historical legislation he spent decades fighting 
for, Cruikshank pensively reflected, “there are many ironies in this matter.”136 Rather 
than paving the way towards national health insurance, he believed that Medicare 
buttressed the private insurance industry:  
Now that it’s passed, I think all the pressure for national health insurance 
is removed. You see, it’s not just that it fills the gap for the group of the 
population which non-governmental insurance could not fill, but removes 
the intolerable burden from the non-governmental health insurance…. In 
other words, what we were really doing was making voluntary insurance 
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viable, for all—shoring it up for almost all of the working population of 
the country.137  
For Cruikshank, as for Truman, Ewing, Cohen, and the vast majority of its greatest 
proponents, Medicare was never the goal. It was always the compromise.138 No one 
imagined a permanent policy of age segregation in health care financing or the 
contagious impact that would have on the acceptance of age segregation more generally.  
 Despite his cynical rejoinder, Cruikshank concluded his remarks on Medicare, 
particularly the benefit of structuring federal benefits through payroll taxes, on a more 
optimistic note. “When the working man agrees to pay a payroll tax, he’s buying not just 
medical benefits, but he’s buying his dignity and self-respect, which to him is very real 
and worth money.”139 For the elderly, Cruikshank realized, Medicare became its own 
kind of lifeline.140 It restored dignity by giving the aged a method to finance old age. He 
might have added that the policy also helped seniors forge a special relationship with the 
government, establish political power, and ignite discussions on the trials of aging in a 
country culturally fixated on youth. Arguably, Cruikshank’s optimism in the program 
would only have been enhanced as Medicare eventually refined its financing to reign in 
health care costs in 1983 through prospective payments and became part of a larger 
national health insurance program with the Affordable Care Act in 2010.  
 In the opening month of 1965, Fogarty, who had come to accept Randall’s vision 
of eldercare, offered his own, parting concerns: “We are on the threshold of enacting a 
program of health care for the aged and most of us will agree that action is long overdue.” 
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America’s great proponent of medical research continued, “However, I am deeply 
concerned that some may be misguided into believing that health-care is the total answer 
to the needs of the elderly.”141 Fogarty’s concern was rightly placed. The fight for equity 
for the aged did not end in 1965, but a certain kind of policy conversation narrowed. The 
Medical Security Solution, with its myopic focus on health care, medical progress, and 
health insurance, obscured crucial aspects of a prolonged old age, not least of which was 
the need for a dignified and peaceful place to end life.  
 In a 2011 New York Times piece, “How Medicare Fails the Elderly,” Jane Gross, a 
journalist who spent a decade “studying the elderly,” hit on a central theme that has 
dogged conversations about aged care in this country.142 Namely, that the overwhelming 
optimism that old age could be medically solved stymied serious conversations on 
confronting the end of old age and the reality of death. She argued that Medicare was 
primed to help the elderly sustain life, but not at all equipped to help them face death. 
While Medicare would not reimburse assisted living costs or home health aids for her 
ailing mother, it would, she writes, “pay for ‘heroic’ care for a woman who was dying of 
old age, not a disease that could be treated: Diagnostic tests. All manner of surgery. 
Expensive medications. Trips to the emergency room.”143 In many ways, Medicaid, and 
not Medicare, has come through as the only long-term, non acute-care, solution available 
to elders, and, here too, financial incentives support institutionalization. “For millions of 
older Americans,” write the political scientists James H. Schulz and Robert Binstock, 
“Medicaid is the only means by which long-term custodial care can be supported. Each 
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year half a million people ‘spend down’ their assets in order to qualify for long-term care 
assistance available under Medicaid.”144 Many of these “frail older people may end up 
being placed in nursing homes because institutional care, not home or community-based 
care, is the only form of long-term care for chronic disease paid for under the U.S. 
system.”145 There is a mismatch Gross rightly observes, “between what is covered and 
what is actually useful…. This mismatch tortures our elderly, drains the Medicare trust 
fund and leaves adult children with depleted retirement reserves.”146  
 Seventy-one years before Gross wrote this article, cytologist and gerontologist 
E.V. Cowdry proffered his own concerns about the treatment of chronic disease. In the 
aptly titled 1940 article “We Grow Old,” Cowdry agonized over how medical 
intervention might be misused on the aged: “To prolong their suffering is, like war, a 
misuse of science.”147 This early bio-medical innovator focused attention on how terms 
like health care, or even care, for that matter, must be carefully defined before being 
single-mindedly pursued. Cowdry understood that words mattered. How the elderly were 
defined, how their health needs were characterized, and how solutions were articulated 
would lay the groundwork for decades of federal policy.  
 By 1961, the Medical Security Solution and its attendant conflations overpowered 
political discourse: old age and the number sixty-five, health care and hospital care, and 
economic security and health insurance, to name only a few. It is the challenge of 
contemporary policy makers to untangle these conflations. To rethink the basic building 
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blocks of the current eldercare architecture and offer careful definitions of old age, its 
benefits, its challenges, its needs, and its gifts. Only then will a serious conversation on 
























A Long Life and A Good Death 
 
“One season only, 
and it's done. 
So let the battered old willow 
thrash against the windowpanes 
and the house timbers creak. 
Darling, do you remember 
the man you married? Touch me, 
remind me who I am.” 
  —Stanley Kunitz1 
 
 “Is it worth it?”2 With these four words esteemed physician and gerontologist 
Robert Butler challenged forty years of American attitudes and policy making around old 
age. After decades of scientific research and federal policy, he wrote in his 
groundbreaking 1975 book Why Survive?, “we cannot promise a decent existence for 
those elderly alive.”3 The United States federal government has poured billions of dollars 
into defeating chronic disease, life-sustaining technologies, and institutions, such as 
hospitals and nursing homes, designed for medical intervention. Is it worth it? Is the 
extension of life the only valuable goal?  
 For many, this is an unthinkable—even reprehensible—question. Morally, 
politically, and personally it is unpalatable to imagine life not worth saving. Butler 
understood those stakes. He did not want a society that withdrew health care based on age 
or one that saw swaths of citizens as unworthy of medical research and intervention. 
Rather he posed the question to urge every politician and citizen to have a strategy by 
which they could answer, “yes, it is worth it”; to have a way to endow these additional 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Stanley Kunitz, excerpt from “Touch Me,” from Passing Through: The Later Poems, New and Selected 
(New York: WW Norton, 1995), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/unbound/poetry/antholog/kunitz/touchme.htm.  
2 Robert N. Butler, Why Survive?: Being Old in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), xi. 
3 Ibid.  
! """!
years of life, between sixty-five and eighty-five or seventy-five and ninety-five, with 
security, purposefulness, and joy.  
 Butler, who passed away in 2010, was not the first to embark on such a quest. 
Scientists, social workers, policy makers, doctors, and religious leaders have, since the 
close of World War II, attempted to relieve the burdens of old age. Collectively they have 
challenged the definition of old age, the viability of chronology as a medical and political 
marker, the dissolution of intergenerational relationships and obligations, and the dangers 
of myopically seeking longevity over a purposeful and dignified end. Their perspectives, 
while present in scientific, medical, and political discourse, did not translate into broad, 
well-funded federal programs.  
 In their stead, the government threw its financial and administrative weight 
behind initiatives, such as bio-medical research and Medicare, which sought to cure the 
diseases of old age and relieve financial insecurity by covering the health care costs of 
social security recipients. I have referred to this approach as the Medical Security 
Solution.  
 In this dissertation, I have asked how and why the Medical Security Solution 
captured the attention of policy makers, activists for the aged, and senior citizens in the 
middle of the twentieth-century, as well as what ideas were lost in this process. It is my 
contention that three trends in the postwar period aligned to support this solution: a belief 
in the curative powers of bio-medical science, the political need for an alternative to 
national health insurance, and the emergence of socially organized elders ready to take on 
a cause. By 1961, the viability of Medicare as a solution to the problem of old age muted, 
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but did not erase, two decades of capacious conversations on the complex challenges of 
providing for America’s aged citizens. 
 Those conversations survived in university classrooms and gerontology-training 
programs, and even managed to come to light in a few policy initiatives, such as the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, which benefited the elderly without segregating them 
from other age groups.4 Still, the ideas advanced by such experts as  E. V. Cowdry, Ollie 
Randall, and Abraham Joshua Heschel never arose as a serious policy alternative to the 
Medical Security Solution. They failed to so for a number of reasons. For one, experts, 
suspect of the push to medically cure old age, were still willing to help the elderly 
through any feasible means. Rather than sacrifice the good for the perfect, they quieted or 
postponed their concerns. Moreover, many remained optimistic that Medicare would be 
the first step toward universal health care. In addition, it was difficult to translate their 
proposals, which advocated for intergenerational planning, reemployment initiatives, an 
end to age-specific policies, local housing and home care initiatives, and, finally, public 
conversations on the limits of science, technology, and life itself, into actual federal 
policies. Finally, and most importantly, these critiques of the Medical Security Solution 
fell to the wayside as seniors themselves consolidated around Medicare. Fighting for 
federal policy in the 1960s endowed seniors with a solid political identity. One of the 
effects of the Medical Security Solution was the creation of a powerful senior citizens 
lobby dedicated to retaining, and not challenging, the benefits of the Medical Security 
Solution.  
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 By plotting the ascendant assumptions of the Medical Security Solution—that old 
age can be defined chronologically, that the elderly are a special social problem, and that 
this problem can be solved through medical intervention and government-sponsored 
health care—this dissertation offers a measured approach to thinking through a formative 
period in American policy making. By many appraisals, the Medical Security Solution 
was a success; it delivered results. More Americans are living well past sixty-five years 
of age and have been saved from debilitating poverty. Still, the drive to solve the problem 
of old age overlooked the basic fact that old age is not the kind of problem that can 
actually be solved. Eventually, if one is lucky, it will arrive. And when it does two basic 
needs still persist: how to keep living and how to die.  
*** 
 For E. V. Cowdry, and his colleagues, old age was not a problem; it was a risk 
factor. As a scientist leading an interdisciplinary movement, gerontology, he encouraged 
physicians, politicians, and other researchers to describe and discover what a healthy old 
age could look like. He wanted a bio-medical research program that would untangle 
assumptions that pushed the elderly out of jobs, communities, and homes. One that 
tackled the following types of questions: How did genetics, nutrition, and intellectual 
pursuits induce or deflect the onset of chronic disease? How much did chronology even 
matter in the onset of most diseases associated with old age? Was the passing of years, 
poverty, or unemployment the greatest risk factor in deteriorating physical health? 
Through generous funding from the Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation, Cowdry and other early 
gerontologists capably pursued this research agenda through conferences, publications, 
and even a journal. They sought a biological definition of old age that would increase the 
productivity and social use of those currently deemed too old to contribute. 
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 As funding moved away from the nonprofit sector to the federal government, and 
to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in particular, the gerontologists’ 
interdisciplinary research agenda narrowed. The extraordinary growth of the NIH in the 
postwar era and the Institutes’ penchant for funding research for single diseases or basic 
science altered the focus of biological gerontology. As it became harder to secure funds 
to investigate what healthy aging looked like, labs initiated projects on curing single 
diseases and extending life.  
 As congress continued to enlarge the budget of the NIH, policy makers in the 
Truman administration angled for a way to give all Americans health insurance. Their 
failure to do so collided with a motivated group of social-welfare advocates urging the 
government to do more on behalf of its aged citizens. In response to grassroots efforts to 
bring the elderly to the attention of the nation, the Truman administration called for the 
First National Conference on Aging, to take place in August of 1950. This conference 
lifted the national profile of the elderly, offered specialists the opportunity to articulate 
the complexity of the hardships of old age, and, perhaps most importantly, gave Oscar 
Ewing the momentum to offer the aged solution to universal health care. 
 Ollie Randall, a luminary in the field of social welfare for the aged, delivered one 
of the most articulate visions of aged care leading up to and during the conference. Like 
Cowdry, she eschewed chronological definitions of old age, settling instead on an 
understanding of old age based on need. In addition to basic economic security and 
housing, the elderly needed, more than anything else, to remain involved and useful to 
society. Nothing mattered more to Randall than that the elderly continue to work and live 
within communities. She wanted dignified, self-run, living arrangements, where older 
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Americans could continue to make choices for themselves and give back to society. She 
advocated early intervention, reeducation, continued employment, and pan-generational 
policies geared to preparing citizens of all ages for a healthy and productive lifespan.  
 While Randall moved seamlessly between the language of the physical and 
spiritual needs of the elderly, conference attendees settled on a more concrete framework 
to describe the problem of old age. Attendees, particularly those confronted with the 
enormous material needs of the elderly, concluded that the problems of old age were poor 
health and economic dependency. To solve these problems, however, the government 
should not focus its attention solely on the elderly. Rather it should treat these two 
problems as they arose across the life cycle. All age groups required preventative health 
care, job retraining, and financial assistance. To solve the problem of old age, the federal 
government should start by ameliorating the dual hardships of chronic disease, through 
preventative health care, and economic dependency, through job-retraining programs or 
financial assistance. 
 In 1950, the conference’s interventions persuaded reporters, physicians, social 
workers, religious leaders, and academics. They did not, however, persuade policy 
makers within the federal government. With the Social Security Act, the viability of age-
based policies became ever more attractive. Policy makers eager to help needy 
Americans sought to capitalize on the success of the aged as a worthy group of poor, 
rather than abandon the category of old age altogether. Although administrators, like 
Oscar Ewing, agreed with the conference’s conclusions, they saw the aged as a way out 
of their own political quagmire and believed that by making the aged a solution to their 
own problems they would, in turn, solve the hardships of the aged. At the conference, 
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Ewing witnessed the visual and rhetorical power the aged had over Republicans and 
Democrats alike. Everyone gets old, including congressmen and senators. He forged 
ahead with his plan to offer sixty days of hospital insurance to America’s worthy social 
security recipients.  
 Health insurance for social security recipients arose as a solution to the problem 
of universal health care, not to the problem of old age. Offering such health insurance as 
a policy sought to capitalize on a relatively popular and funded entitlement program, 
Social Security, and avoid a direct confrontation with doctors by limiting insurance to 
hospital fees. The country had already deemed retirees a uniquely worthy class of 
American citizen, and the Truman administration believed that federally supported health 
insurance for this group would be an appropriate first step towards national health 
insurance for all Americans. Still, Ewing’s bill foundered until the dual forces of an 
empowered AFL-CIO and a growing senior citizens movement pushed the proposal, now 
called the Forand Bill, to the forefront of national politics.  
 In the 1950s, individuals over sixty-five years of age began to visualize 
themselves as a particular social group with political needs. Calling themselves senior 
citizens, they came together in new social clubs, political action groups, and lobbying 
organizations. At the outset, different groups of seniors articulated different needs, such 
as employment and affordable housing. With the creation of the Forand Bill, the 
momentum of the 1960 Kennedy campaign, and the realization that health insurance for 
social security recipients was a viable political option, these groups coalesced. Through 
the help of organizations affiliated with the AFL-CIO, senior groups began to organize 
meetings, rallies, and political campaigns to support what came to be called Medicare. 
! "")!
 The seniors, or perhaps more accurately, the seniors and their backers, the AFL-
CIO, became so persuasive that political representatives across the country who did not 
support Medicare offered their own solutions to the problem of old age. By the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, even their solutions came in the form of medical security. To solve the 
problem of old age, congressmen and senators supported a robustly funded NIH, the 
construction of hospitals, and versions of health insurance for needy elders. Congressman 
John Fogarty, the man who singlehandedly built the modern NIH budget, convinced his 
colleagues to host a second conference on behalf of the aged to stall the political scepter 
of Medicare.  
 Despite Fogarty’s intentions, the 1961 White House Conference on Aging offered 
a national platform to demonstrate support for Medicare. Seniors, specialists in the field, 
and experts across industries joined before the press in a public cry on behalf of health 
insurance for America’s deserving elders. Although overshadowed, the conference also 
hosted a soft, but cutting, critique of the singular drive to solve old age through medical 
security. “In enabling us to reach old age,” Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel stated, 
“medical science may think that it gave us a blessing; however, we continue to act as if it 
were a disease.”5 Heschel also alerted attendees to the pitfalls of cultural and political age 
segregation. He urged the government to drop chronological definitions of old age and set 
up policy programs that sought to mend the mounting cleavage between generations 
through joint initiatives, particularly in the realm of education. Returning to the spiritual 
and existential needs that haunted Randall, Heschel pronounced, “It is marvelous indeed 
that for the first time in history, our society is ready and able to provide for the material 
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needs of its senior citizens. Yet in addition to the problem of material security we must 
face the problem of psychological and spiritual security.”6 Heschel’s words survived the 
conference; they were republished and quoted. They hit a nerve but did not translate into 
policy.  
 By 1961, the Medical Security Solution was ideologically entrenched. In the two 
decades following World War II, a powerful faith in medicine and a particular policy 
idea, Medicare, captured the country’s attention. Grassroots activists and policy makers 
agreed that, to help the aged, the government should cure the diseases of old age in 
laboratories and ensure economic security for deserving elderly through health insurance. 
When Lyndon B. Johnson signed Medicare into law on July 30, 1965, Americans across 
the country lauded the president. A dignified old age was finally secured.  
*** 
  The Medical Security Solution did not solve the myriad hardships of old age, it 
did, however, add years to American lives. In 1986, the sociologists S. Jay Olshansky and 
A. Brian Ault announced that a fourth stage of epidemiologic transition had arrived, “the 
Age of Delayed Degenerative Diseases.”7 After passing through eras marked by 
pestilence, pandemics, degenerative and man-made diseases, mankind, in nations such as 
the United States, had managed to defer, by decades, mortality from chronic ailments.8 
By 2050, the United Nations predicts that one out of every five individuals in the world 
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will be over the age of sixty-five.9 Not only are human beings over sixty-five populating 
the earth at a remarkable rate but those individuals are now slated to live even longer 
lives. In this new order, men and women can expect to live well into their eighth decade. 
In the United States today, the number of individuals over eighty is growing annually at 
3.8% and centenarians are considered the fastest rising age group.10  
 Robert Butler referred to this demographic transition as The Longevity 
Revolution.11 In his groundbreaking book of the same name, Butler offered scholars and 
policy makers a way out of the verbal noose created by the phrase the problem of old age. 
Rather than fixating on a falsely static category, old age, Butler reminded readers that the 
gift of twentieth-century public health and medical intervention was an increase in 
longevity, an increase in the human lifespan. A focus on the challenges of a longer 
human lifespan, rather than a stage of life called old age, offers a number of insights that 
reveal the adverse implications of the Medical Security Solution and can assist future 
policymakers.  
 By focusing on what it means to live longer, rather than what it means to simply 
be old, four issues, which have been exacerbated by the drive to cure old age, are 
revealed. The first deals with the pitfalls of the category of old age, which throughout the 
mid-twentieth century allowed policy makers to envision a homogenous group with 
similar needs.  
 The late political scientist, and mentee of Ollie Randall, Robert Binstock, and his 
colleague James H. Schulz refer to the era between 1935 and the 1970s as the age of 
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“compassionate ageism.”12 In their words, “Researchers, journalists, and politicians took 
what was a very heterogeneous group of people and attributed to them the same 
characteristics, status, and just desserts—creating an artificially homogenized group that 
they labeled ‘the aged.’”13 The results of this approach were mixed. On the one hand this 
allowed the aged to become a special class of citizen with their own entitlement 
programs. On the other hand, it elided crucial differences, such as need, race, class, 
gender, and region, which would have allowed for more nuanced policies in the realms of 
housing, health care, and pensions. It also promoted a set of policies that segregated the 
aged from other groups and promoted age-based political identity.  
 The second issue is that of health not health insurance. As individuals survive 
cancer, heart disease, and other forms of chronic disease they are more likely to succumb 
to Alzheimer’s disease or other forms of dementia. As Butler writes, “Unless we find 
ways to prevent or cure Alzheimer’s and other severe dementing diseases, the world will 
shortly be confronted with epidemic proportions of these diseases. People over eighty-
five, the fastest growing population, also manifest the highest rates of Alzheimer’s 
disease, approaching a conservatively estimated 20 percent.”14 As the philosopher John 
Dewey prophesized in his introduction to Cowdry’s Problems of Aging in 1939, “the 
solution of one type of problem brings with it new and unforeseen problems.”15 
Longevity planning in this arena recognizes that Alzheimer’s is a disease that affects 
more than just the patient. It poses significant challenges for that patient’s surviving 
spouse, children, friends, and, even, institutional home. Thinking about the diseases of 
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old age as a communal and pan-generational issue would aid patients as well as 
caretakers, perhaps by leading to programs such as subsidies for families working with 
home care programs or tax breaks for institutions that are willing to locate in the center 
rather than the outskirts of towns.  
 Thinking carefully about health in terms of the human lifespan has led researchers 
past the hardships at the end of the lifespan to how those hardships can be averted at the 
beginning of the lifespan. As scientists and doctors recognized as early as the 1940s, 
healthy aging begins in youth. Butler bolsters this claim, writing, “Because many of the 
diseases of longevity originate in utero and in early childhood, we need a life-span 
perspective to guide all aspects of health care. With genes accounting for only some 25-
percent of one’s health and longevity, our environment and personal behaviors account 
for the rest.”16 The category of old age fostered the illusion that health care intervention 
could begin productively after an individual turns sixty-five. The category of longevity 
helps dismantle this illusion.  
 The third major issue, and one that has been duly recognized by social workers, 
political scientists, economists, and politicians, is that a longer lifespan requires a serious 
vision for long-term care. In 1970, in an effort to cut federal funding for skilled nursing 
home care after ninety days, Wilbur Mills, echoing a prominent belief, claimed, “It is 
utterly impossible for me to believe that medical science has not gotten to the point where 
most of these people will not be so improved at the end of 90 days they can get what it 
takes to care for their needs in less expensive types of nursing homes.”17 Mills was 
wrong. A longer lifespan has only meant a greater need for skilled long-term nursing 
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home care. As Schulz and Binstock summarize, “if you are lucky enough to live a long 
life, then you are likely to end up needing some form of long-term care. A person who 
reaches the age of 65 has a four out of ten chance of spending some part of his or her 
remaining life in a nursing home. Currently, the overwhelming majority (75%) of people 
age 85 and older has long-term care needs, and about one in five is in a nursing home on 
any given day.”18 Due to its optimism, the Medical Security Solution failed to deal with a 
pressing need of longevity: extended and diverse forms of care in the final stage of life. 
Instead, policies like Medicare created adverse incentives that over-hospitalized patients 
and ignored basic living needs. Here again, thinking about this issue as an 
intergenerational challenge can be illuminating. Randall always favored local planning 
for the elderly. She wanted children and family members to decide with their aging 
parents the best housing solution. Diverse financing for myriad forms of long-term 
housing needs to be an option. Some families will need only home-maintenance services 
and low-level nursing care; others will require medical institutions. A policy approach of 
this type, which necessitates the deployment of subsidies, tax breaks, and entitlement 
programs, would not be easy to implement. But for many families and for many ailing 
elderly, it would be an appropriate and humane way forward.  
 Finally, and most astoundingly, the forty-year obsession with solving the problem 
of old age through Medical Security led to a glaring and now politically instantiated 
oversight: citizens will die. Ensuring a dignified and peaceful death is a challenge of both 
a prolonged lifespan and the current institutional landscape. It is a trial that Congress, 
whether its members are permitted to admit, has played an outsized part in creating. 
Before the alarm of “death panels” rang from partisan opposition to a provision in the 
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Affordable Care Act (which would have offered funding for optional end-of-life 
counseling, such as hospice), the Special Committee on Aging in the United States 
Senate called a hearing to discuss “Death with Dignity.”  
 In 1972, three years after Elizabeth Kubler Ross published On Death and Dying, 
her disarming account of institutional death in the United States, Senator Frank Church 
(D-Idaho) declared “At least 80 percent of the population of this Nation now dies in 
institutions—hospitals, nursing homes, and other facilities of one kind or another. Yet not 
very long ago, the largest percentage of Americans died in their own homes, quite often 
with other generations of their own families in residence or nearby.”19 Congress, he 
argued, has a particular obligation as “so many actions taken by Congress within recent 
years are directly related to the type of institutions available to most Americans. It has 
been said, and I am sure it will be said at these hearings, that Medicare put entirely too 
much emphasis upon institutionalization of patients, thereby increasing costs of treatment 
and anxiety among patients.”20 This is not an easy issue, Church admitted, and there are 
“no easy answers.” But there needs to be a “public discussion” and greater “public 
understanding” on all of the “issues related to death and dying in the United States….”21 
This hearing would be the start. 
 The first witness, Dr. Arthur E. Morgan, plaintively retold the story of how his 
beloved wife died. After his wife endured a brain injury from a fall, Morgan could no 
longer care for her alone and moved her to a nursing home eight miles from where he 
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lived. This was not the end of her life or the end of their romance. He recalled, “I used to 
visit her every day, and she once said to me, ‘I wish there was somebody I could talk to; I 
would like to tell them how much your visits mean to me.’ Her expression was imperfect, 
but she would sometimes speak a little and say, ‘This means so much to me.’”22 
Eventually, she lost her sight, her hearing, her speech, and most of her motion. Still, for 
some of that time, Morgan continued, “the affection between us was enough to give 
joy.”23 Later, though, “her responses were largely ended and life was mostly a burden.” 
She tried to stop eating but the nursing home had a policy of force-feeding. Morgan’s 
wife “opposed having the nurse pry her mouth open to put food in it.”24 Because he was 
there every day and probably because he was a doctor, he successfully fought the policy, 
but only in his wife’s case. “Toward the end,” he concluded, “she was allowed…not to 
eat and…her last days were not disturbed as they might have been otherwise.”25 Morgan 
along with the senators in the room did not know exactly how to proceed. They were 
terrified of policies that could unduly shorten someone’s life or of determining whom, if 
anyone, should ever make the profoundly difficult decision of withdrawing care. But they 
did not cower from the difficult conversation or thrust it beyond the realm of their 
responsibility. They knew a dignified death mattered to most Americans, and they wanted 
the government to provide some context for a realistic discussion, rather than a 
proscription, on how to prepare for the end of life. 
 The complexity of ethically and medically confronting the reality of death is but 
one in a series of confounding issues overshadowed by the hubristic drive to solve what 
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never should have been termed a problem. Old age, Congressman Fogarty often 
pronounced, is the boon of public health and medicine. To reach old age, one has to 
survive diseases, accidents, and a host of trials that living demands. The obligation of 
society, of government, might not be to solve old age, but rather to reframe longevity as 
the ultimate gift; to return to some of Cowdry, Randall, and Heschel’s insights and 
imagine the aging person within his or her social relationships and obligations; and to 
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